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To my favorite critics: Anne, Benjamin, and Jayna.

Foreword
The National Labor Relations Act was passed by Congress 50 years 
ago with the broadly stated objective of protecting the right of workers 
to seek union representation and to bargain collectively with employers. 
There is reason to contend that this objective has not been fully realized. 
As reported by the author of this study, workers fail to negotiate con 
tracts after winning representation elections 25 to 30 percent of the time.
Evidence indicates that employer resistance to good faith bargaining 
plays a significant role in the failure to secure first contracts. William 
Cooke has developed and tested hypotheses concerning the impact of 
NLRB procedural delays, discriminatory discharges, and other salient 
factors on whether first contracts are negotiated. Drawing from his find 
ings, he proposes policy and procedural changes designed to (1) halt 
discriminatory discharges preceding certification elections and during 
first-contract negotiations and (2) expedite NLRB case handling of ob 
jections and challenges and employers' refusals to bargain.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibili 
ty of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
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national and international union organizations included in my nation 
wide sample; Mr. Robert Droker (supervising attorney, NLRB, Region 
25) for making sense to an outsider of NLRB records and for clarifying 
the subtleties of NLRB policies and procedures; and to Mr. Charles Maz- 
za (head, Statistics and Research Section, Indiana Employment Security 
Division) for providing access to wage and employment data. In order to 
maintain the confidentiality of survey responses from the more than 200 
(somewhat reluctant) union representatives, I unfortunately cannot iden 
tify their personal assistance. Nevertheless, let me gratefully recognize 
their substantial effort and time.
Several graduate students in the industrial relations programs at Pur- 
due University and the University of Michigan provided me with ex 
cellent research assistance: Mr. Thomas Drumwright, Mr. Ira Tif- 
fenberg, and Ms. Melinda Williams. Mrs. Jeannette Schleede and Mrs. 
Deborah Kay Lentz were an immense help in providing clerical and 
technical assistance as this report went through its many (far too many) 
revisions. Finally, I thank Dallas Jones of the University of Michigan, 
Jack Fiorito of the University of Iowa, Wayne Wendling of the Upjohn 
Institute, and participants of the Harvard labor economics seminar for 




The objective of this study has been to investigate the fac 
tors that explain why 25-30 percent of the time unions fail to 
obtain contracts after winning the right to negotiate con 
tracts in secret ballot representation elections. Several of 
these factors have major implications for public policy as 
they are tied to labor relations law and its application to 
union organizing. In order to fully understand the workings 
of the law and the implications of our findings upon ap 
propriate public policy reform, we begin with an historical 
overview of American labor law and a detailed examination 
of the policies, practices, and experiences of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which regulates labor- 
management relations and union organizing in the private 
sector. We then describe our research design and findings of 
an investigation of the factors that impact upon the 
likelihood that unions obtain or fail to obtain first contracts. 
Finally, we draw upon our findings and knowledge of the 
law to prescribe changes in public policy to better effectuate 
the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
It was found that 23 percent of a sample of unions in In 
diana and 28 percent in a nationwide sample failed to obtain 
first contracts after winning certification elections in 1979 
and 1980. The statistically significant findings can be sum 
marized as follows:
  Unions negotiating with firms having relatively high 
wages vis-a-vis the firm's industry were more likely to 
obtain first contracts.
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  Unions negotiating contracts with firms in which 
separate bargaining units were already under contract 
with the union were more likely to obtain first contracts.
  In southern states with state right-to-work laws, unions 
were less likely to obtain contracts than in other states.
  Where the percent of workers voting for union represen 
tation was higher and the size of the work unit was 
larger, unions were more successful in obtaining 
agreements.
  In those negotiations in which national union represen 
tatives were involved in negotiations, unions were more 
successful in reaching agreements.
  Where the national union required national approval of 
local first-contract agreements, unions were less suc 
cessful in obtaining agreements.
  The delay associated with NLRB resolution of employer 
objections and/or challenges to union election victories 
sharply reduced the chances of unions obtaining first 
contracts.
  Employer refusals to bargain substantially reduced the 
chances of unions obtaining first contracts.
  Discriminatory discharges and other forms of illegal 
discrimination against union activists have a dramatic 
negative impact on the likelihood that unions obtain 
contracts.
It is the latter three findings that demonstrate the need for 
labor law reform. The three key areas of recommended 
public policy changes stem from our need to expedite NLRB 
proceedings, to block discriminatory discharges of union ac 
tivists, and induce recalcitrant employers to negotiate in 
good faith. In short, the evidence shows that those groups of 
workers who need union representation the most in order to
countervail harsh employer treatment are more likely than 
others to be denied that representation.
Toward expediting NLRB case handling, several proposals 
in the Labor Reform Bill of 1977 are first evaluated. 
Dismissed are the proposals that would (1) allow the Board 
to make summary judgments of uncontested ALJ recom 
mendations and (2) make Board orders not appealed within 
30 days automatically enforced by the appellate courts. 
These proposals are dismissed on the grounds that employers 
who primarily seek to forestall their duty to bargain would 
invariably, through legal maneuvering, frustrate the best in 
tentions of these reforms.
The proposal to enlarge the Board to seven members with 
seven-year appointments (while continuing to rely on three- 
member panels for much of the decisionmaking) has the best 
chance of the three reform bill provisions to expedite NLRB 
case handling. Here at least the speeding up of the process is 
dependent upon the efficient management of a larger Board 
and not upon the imagination of defendants to circumvent 
new case handling procedures.
Based on the finding of a large negative impact of the 
delayed resolution of employer objections and challenges 
upon first-contract negotiation outcomes, it is recommended 
that objections and challenges be subject to court review just 
as are unfair labor practice (ULP) complaints. This would 
obviate the need to reroute the resolution of employer objec 
tions and challenges through the technical refusal-to-bargain 
ULP complaint procedure. Those employers who want ap 
pellate court review of NLRB decisions would not be denied 
that review but at the same time would not be able to 
forestall their duty to bargain the additional months it now 
takes under the current resolution scheme.
An alternative policy would be to amend the NLRA to 
make it explicit that NLRB decisions regarding objections 
and challenges are not reviewable by the courts. Here we
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would eliminate any right of employers to technically refuse 
to bargain. This alternative would eliminate the long delays 
typically associated with circuit court decisionmaking.
One provision of the Labor Reform Bill required the 
Board to establish guidelines for providing make-whole 
remedies to entire work groups who were denied the benefit 
of union contracts during periods when employers refused to 
bargain in good faith. The purpose of providing make-whole 
remedies is to deter employers from bargaining in bad faith 
since if they did, they would still be compelled to retroactive 
ly compensate work units. The fundamental flaw in the pro 
posal stems from the underlying assumption that unions 
ultimately obtain first contracts. That is shown here to be a 
spurious assumption. Unless we are willing to dictate im 
proved terms and conditions of employment for work units 
who never come under contract, the make-whole remedy can 
be seen as an additional incentive to employers to deny first 
contracts altogether. Hence, it is recommended that the 
make-whole proposal be dropped from the labor law reform 
agenda.
Finally, proposals to deter the flow of discriminatory 
discharges of union activists are evaluated. Two proposals 
were developed in the Labor Reform Bill to deter employers 
from such illegal behavior. The first proposal was to increase 
the size of the present back pay award (i.e., lost earnings 
with mitigation). As a means of deterring illegal discharges, 
and, in turn, improving the chances of unions to obtain first 
contracts, even double back pay (without mitigation) would 
fail to yield a sufficient deterrent. The problem with the pro 
posal is twofold. Double back pay awards without mitiga 
tion would be insufficiently costly in most circumstances to 
offset the perceived long-run "gain" to many employers 
(i.e., keeping unions out of the workplace). The fact is that 
the price to the employer of a few well placed discharges is 
quite modest at best. An additional problem with this pro 
posal is that unless the discharged employees are reinstated
Xll
and the employer's vindictive behavior thus rebuffed, larger 
back pay awards would not reduce the implied threat of 
further employer reprisals.
The heart of the problem is the necessity for quick 
reinstatement. A second proposal in the Labor Reform Bill 
would compel the Board, under the automatic injunction 
provision of the NLRA [section 10(1)], to seek injunctions in 
discriminatory discharge cases. Of all the recommendations 
to thwart that minority of employers who stoop to 
discriminatory discharges in order to bust union organizing 
efforts, this recommendation holds the greatest promise. 
However, we must modify the proposal to insure that a suc 
cessful deterrent is developed. Besides the assurance of 
reinstatement, timeliness of reinstatement remains impor 
tant. Even 10(1) injunctive relief takes considerable time. It is 
estimated that it would take an average of 55 days from the 
date of discharge to secure a 10(1) injunction. This delay is 
likely to be sufficiently short in the case of first-contract 
negotiations, which typically take several months to obtain 
from employers who do bargain in good faith. But the 
55-day delay is far too long in the case of winning representa 
tion rights in the first place. Employers can time discharges 
just prior to election day, insuring that key union activists 
are out of the way during crucial campaign periods. To 
thwart this practice, the NLRB must establish a policy that 
elections lost by unions (where discharges have taken place) 
will be automatically rerun, or in the more flagrant cases of 
campaigns involving illegal discharges, employers will simply 
be ordered to recognize and bargain with unions. Before 
elections are rerun the discharged employees will be 
reinstated a clear rebuff to the employer and a clear signal 
to other workers that the law will indeed protect them. By 
making certain that discharged employees be reinstated 
reasonably quickly and that lost elections accompanied by il 
legal discharges would automatically result in rerun elec 
tions, the deterrent effect of 10(1) injunctions should come to 
light. Employers will simply have more to lose by
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discriminatorily discharging employees than from campaign 
ing and negotiating fairly. The expected outcome, therefore, 
would be a sharp drop in discriminatory discharges. Hence, 
the greatest concern of the opponents of utilizing 10(1) in 
junctions (i.e., that the NLRB regional staff and district 
courts would be overwhelmed by a large and growing case 
load) would be circumvented.
It is worth noting that none of the present recommenda 
tions directly impede employers from surface bargaining or 
"going through the motions" during first-contract negotia 
tions. The present recommendations, on the other hand, are 
expected to have a considerable indirect effect upon forcing 
recalcitrant employers to bargain in good faith. By ex 
pediting NLRB case handling and insuring that discrimina 
tion against union activists is halted, it is believed that union 
strength in negotiating first contracts will be enhanced 
substantially. It will be this enhanced bargaining power upon 
which unions will necessarily have to rely to economically 
force recalcitrant employers to fulfill their legal duty to 
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Evolution of the National 
Labor Relations Act
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the 
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce 
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred 
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and 
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self- 
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ 
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations Act, 1935
As stated above, the National Labor Relations Act was 
passed in 1935 in order to protect workers' civil liberties with 
regard to the right to seek union representation and to 
bargain collectively with employers. Although these rights 
were not to be fully sanctioned by the law until the Supreme 
Court ruled on the Act's constitutionality in 1937, passage of 
the Act was a permanent and radical departure from 
American labor law history.
This report comes nearly 50 years after passage of the Na 
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) but, as reported herein, 
much of the intent embodied in the Act is presently being 
frustrated and to no small degree. The focus of this study is 
upon investigating why 25-30 percent of the time workers, 
after exercising their rights under secret ballot to be 
represented by unions, fail to negotiate contracts with 
employers. As will be fully documented herein, NLRB case
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handling delays, discriminatory discharges of union ac 
tivists, and employer refusals to bargain are major im 
pediments circumventing the "protected" rights of workers 
to union representation.
Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of American 
federal labor law. Although our history of union- 
management relations has been marked by considerable con 
flict including the loss of lives and destruction of private 
property chapter 1 does not focus on these tribulations. In 
stead, its purpose is to trace the legal antecedents and lay out 
the framework of our present labor law. Chapter 2 reviews 
the workings of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), which is the federal agency charged with inter 
preting and applying the NLRA. The chapter's primary 
focus is upon the policies and administrative procedures of 
the NLRB in protecting the rights of workers to bargain col 
lectively once they have gained those rights through secret 
ballot voting. These first two chapters are written to provide 
essential background material for chapters 3 and 4. Chapter
3 presents an investigation and analysis of the factors that 
help explain the dismal failure of unions (in general) to ob 
tain first contracts after winning the right to negotiate those 
contracts. Based on these findings, various public policy 
recommendations to better safeguard the legislated rights of 
workers to bargain collectively are discussed and evaluated 
in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 briefly summarizes the key 
points, findings, and recommendations of the study.
A Period of Judicial Hostility
Before describing the purposes behind and enactment of 
the NLRA in 1935 and its amendments in 1947 and 1959, let 
us take a brief look at the legal history of labor relations in 
early America. The story begins with union organizing ef 
forts in the early 1800s. The most celebrated case and the one 
that set the early tone for union organizing and collective
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bargaining was the 1806 Philadelphia Cordwainers Case. 
Cordwainers (better known as shoe and bootmakers) in 
Philadelphia initially organized a guild of journeymen, the 
purpose being to insure quality products. Later, however, 
with a rapid extension of product markets and increasing 
competition, the journeymen were motivated to maintain 
their earning power. In their efforts to raise wages and secure 
"closed" shop agreements (i.e., every worker must be a 
union member), the shoemakers found themselves in court. 
The 1806 case led the Philadelphia court to find the union to 
be nothing less than a form of criminal conspiracy. The con 
spiracy doctrine was based on several governing principles of 
English common law, including:
  Unions interfere with the freedom of contract and prop 
erty rights of both individual workers and employers.
  Unions have monopoly power and are thus disruptive to 
both market competition and to the political system.
The so-called conspiracy doctrine took hold in the various 
courts of early America and workers were largely deterred 
from even forming unions (see Wellington, 1968, pp. 7-26).
Not until the early 1840s did the conspiracy doctrine begin 
to give way. In the landmark case of Commonwealth v. 
Hunt, a Massachusetts Supreme Court judge decided a case 
where a union of shoemakers refused to work for their 
employer unless the employer fired a "scab" (i.e., a non 
union worker). Judge Shaw reasoned that the court must be 
a neutral umpire in deciding union organizing and collective 
bargaining rights. To find a union unlawful under the con 
spiracy doctrine, Judge Shaw held, the courts must find the 
objectives and/or activities of a union unlawful. In and of 
themselves, unions were not unlawful.
Shaw's decision, however, does not appear to have had all 
that much influence upon restricting the courts' use of the 
conspiracy doctrine only the focus had shifted. Employers 
turned to the courts to block specific union activity strikes,
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pickets, and boycotts. The courts after 1842 acted much like 
my landlady who, concerned primarily about the interests of 
her other tenants, agreed to let me have a piano in my apart 
ment as long as I did not play it!
The conspiracy doctrine began to wane in the late 1800s, 
but was replaced by court injunctions. There appeared to be 
little consistency in the judicial justifications for enjoining 
union activity, but the evidence suggests that injunctions 
were very easy to obtain, often without hearing the unions' 
side.
After the criminal sanction had been replaced by 
the injunction, the courts had continued to act far 
beyond their range of competency; adjudicating 
without standards, without principles, and without 
restraint. . . . The abuse, moreover, extended to 
the procedures the courts employed and the decrees 
they issued as well as to the substantive law they 
developed. . . . Standards of fair procedure and 
experience with equitable remedies existed, but 
were simply disregarded. (Wellington, 1968, p. 39)
An important development in federal law in 1890 was 
unanticipated. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed by the 
U.S. Congress, ostensibly to impede the monopolistic ap 
petite of industrial conglomerates. Ironically, employers 
were able to utilize this piece of legislation against unions 
who, it was reasoned, had monopolistic characteristics in 
tended to restrain competition and disrupt interstate com 
merce. It is of interest to note that disruption to commerce 
and competition was one of the principles underlying the 
criminal conspiracy doctrine. It is also important to 
underscore here that judges for the first time based their 
decisions upon interpretation of federal legislation, albeit 
their perverse interpretation of the law probably would not 
have arisen without widespread judicial hostility toward 
unionization.
Evolution of the NLRA 5
The history of the application of the Antitrust Act to 
union activities was most interesting. Case after case, both 
lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court found unions in 
violation of the law typically in cases where unions em 
barked upon boycotts. It was not until 1908, however, that 
the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the Sherman Anti 
trust Act was applicable to union organizing. Here, the 
United Hatters of North America, in an organizing drive, 
engaged in a nationwide boycott against Loewe and Com 
pany of Danbury, Connecticut. The Court decided the Hat 
ters violated the antitrust law in "that the act prohibits any 
combination whatever to secure action which essentially 
obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states, or 
restricts in that regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in 
business." 1
Shortly after the Danbury Hatters case, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Clayton Act. Unions first billed this act as a ma 
jor victory as it was believed to have exempted unions from 
antitrust prosecution. The act stated that neither labor 
organizations nor their members could "be held or con 
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the antitrust laws." The president of the 
American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, declared 
the Clayton Act (Section 6) as the "Industrial Magna Charta 
upon which the working people will rear their construction 
of industrial freedom." (Witte, 1932, p. 68) It soon became 
clear, however, that the act only stated that unions, in and of 
themselves, were not illegal something the courts had 
generally recognized after Commonwealth v. Hunt in 1842.
An important Court decision in 1921 laid to rest any ques 
tion of the value of the Clayton Act to union organizing. In 
the Duplex decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
ruled against the International Association of Machinists 
(I AM). The I AM, in seeking union recognition and bargain 
ing rights, had pressed boycotts against the products of 
Duplex Printing Company of Battle Creek, Michigan. The
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high Court ruled that the boycott was illegal under the Sher- 
man Antitrust Act. 2
Throughout the 1920s, the lower courts (and even the 
Supreme Court) frequently used the Sherman Antitrust Act 
to enjoin union organizing activity. Furthermore, prior to 
1921 the federal courts restricted the application of the an 
titrust law against boycotts in general and against strikes in 
the railroad industry, but after 1921 they widened the ap 
plication to include ordinary strike activity undertaken in all 
kinds of industries.
Another popular ploy of employers during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s was to have employees sign individual con 
tracts of employment prohibiting them from joining or act 
ing in behalf of unions. These contracts were dubbed by 
union organizers as "yellow-dog" contracts. Under the 
pretense of freedom-of-contract principles (one of the prin 
ciples underpinning the criminal conspiracy doctrine), 
employers would use the contracts as effective deterrents to 
union organizing. When union organizers attempted to 
organize an employer's workforce, the employer would seek 
an injunction against the organizers. Union organizers, it 
was argued before the courts, were attempting to cause 
employees to "breech" their private contracts with the 
employer.
In spite of the fact that several states passed laws and the 
U.S. Congress passed the Erdman Act in 1898 that forbade 
employers in the railroad industry from executing yellow- 
dog contracts, their use became quite widespread especially 
after the Supreme Court ruled in 1908 that such contracts 
were legal. 3 Here, the United Mine Workers (UMW) attemp 
ted to organize the workers of Hitchman Coal and Coke 
Company in West Virginia. Aware that the Hitchman 
employees had signed yellow-dog contracts as a condition of 
employment, the UMW organizers attempted to get workers 
to "agree" to union representation, but not actually join the 
union per se. The union's strategy was to convince a majori-
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ty of workers to agree to union representation and subse 
quently call a strike for recognition. The Court ruled, 
however, that the union was still attempting to convince 
workers to breech contracts, which the majority of the Court 
believed workers entered into on a "voluntary" basis.
What this meant to collective bargaining and 
unionization was indeed profound. Faced with an 
organization campaign, the employer made the ex 
ecution of the yellow-dog contract a condition of 
employment. In periods of less than full employ 
ment, workers would be economically coerced into 
the agreement. The employer then applied for an 
injunction restraining any person who might en 
courage workers to join a union. Any disobedience 
to the injunction was punishable as contempt of 
court. (Taylor and Witney, 1983, p. 45)
Injunctions against union organizing and collective 
bargaining activity had become so widespread in the early 
1900s that the period has generally been characterized as 
"government by injunction." Our brief review of the era of 
injunctions, however, would not be complete without 
referencing the historic "Debs" case. In that case, the 
American Railway Union in 1894 induced a series of strikes 
against the railroads. The Union was attempting to force the 
Pullman Car Company to reinstate a number of discharged 
union leaders and to negotiate over Pullman's cut in wages. 
A lower court enjoined the union and shortly after imprison 
ed its president, Eugene Debs, for violating the terms of that 
injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court, upon hearing the 
union's appeal, decided that the use of injunctions was con 
stitutional. 4 Coupled with the blessing of the Court, the na 
tional publicity surrounding the strikes invariably populariz 
ed the use of injunctions by employers seeking to block 
union organizing and impede union power in collective 
bargaining.
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Antecedents to the NLRA
Except for a brief period during World War I when Presi 
dent Wilson got a pledge from both labor and industry 
leaders to avoid strikes and established the War Labor Board 
to help resolve labor disputes, it was not until 1926 that the 
federal government successfully intervened to promote in 
dustrial peace, support collective bargaining, and protect 
workers' rights to organize. That government initiative was 
embodied in the Railway Labor Act of 1926. The Act, albeit 
limited to the railroads, stands as a major precursor to and 
model for the NLRA that followed in 1935. Congress, in 
enacting the Railway Labor Act, sought labor-management 
peace in the railroad industry. The assumption was that the 
process of collective bargaining could bring that peace and 
that procedures for mediation and arbitration of disputes 
could facilitate any necessary resolution of disputes. Of 
greater interest to our present inquiry, the framers of the 
1926 Act presumed that nonunionized workers would elect 
representatives for collective bargaining. It had become ap 
parent that many carriers had established "company 
unions" to "represent" the interests of the workers. But 
these company unions were effectively controlled or 
dominated by company officials. They had no affiliation 
with union organizations outside of the company and the 
company restricted negotiable issues. The legitimacy of the 
company union practices under the Railway Act was soon 
tested in the courts. The Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks 
charged that the Texas & New Orleans Railroad had violated 
the new law because it would not recognize and bargain with 
them. Instead, the railroad had established its own company 
union, the "Association of Clerical Employees - Southern 
Pacific Line." Upon reaching the high court in 1930, to the 
surprise of many, the Court ordered the railroad to cease its 
interference with the right of workers to select their own 
union representatives. 5 The Court, therefore, also upheld the 
constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act. And although 
the law was thwarted by continued use of company
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dominated unions until further amended in 1934, the 
Supreme Court's decision was a historic moment in labor 
relations law. For the first time, the Court had recognized 
the right of the federal government to enact legislation in 
tended to protect workers' rights to self-organization and to 
encourage collective bargaining.
After the Railway Labor Act of 1926 had been enacted, 
Congress was apparently in the mood to legislate away some 
of the inequities imposed by the courts upon labor- 
management relations. In 1927, public hearings over an anti- 
injunction bill were begun. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act was enacted, which had been constructed to greatly cur 
tail the use of injunctions against union organizing and col 
lective bargaining. The Act very clearly stipulated that the 
courts were to leave unions free to strike, to picket, and to 
boycott. Only in cases where violence or fraud were present 
or union activity fell outside the scope of a very broadly 
defined "labor dispute," were the courts free to enjoin 
union related activity. In addition, the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act made yellow-dog contracts unenforceable in the courts. 
Again, to the surprise of many, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of that act.
A further legislative development that was to serve the 
union movement was passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, a cornerstone of President 
Roosevelt's general New Deal plan to bring the country out 
of the depths of the great depression. Section 7(a) of the 
NIRA is of particular interest here, as it had the purpose of 
protecting the rights of workers to form or join unions of 
their choosing and to engage in collective bargaining. The 
underlying purpose of Congress in Section 7(a) was to in 
crease the purchasing power of workers and consequently 
help the recovery of U.S. industry. Congress, however, fail 
ed to spell out what was legal or illegal behavior. Nor were 
any mechanisms provided to interpret the intent of Section 
7(a) or provide for its enforcement. A wave of union strike 
activity occurred that summer, which apparently prompted
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President Roosevelt to create the National Labor Board to 
interpret and enforce the new law. However, over the next 
year it became quite evident that the labor board could not 
effectively execute the law against employer recalcitrance 
and union impatience. Frustrated by the labor board's in 
ability to implement the law, Congress formed a new labor 
board in 1934. But, again, the labor board failed to be effec 
tive it simply could not enforce its rulings (Taylor and 
Witney, 1983, pp. 166-174). Soon thereafter, the NIRA was 
held unconstitutional in its entirety by the U.S. Supreme 
Court (1935). 6
The National Labor Relations Act
Exactly one month after the ruling by the Supreme Court, 
Congress overwhelmingly passed the National Labor Rela 
tions Act, popularly called the Wagner Act after its primary 
sponsor, senator Robert Wagner. Considerable work had 
gone into drafting the Wagner Act in the months before its 
passage. Having witnessed the struggle and inability of the 
labor boards under the NIRA to protect the rights of 
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining, con 
gressional leaders under the guidance of Senator Wagner 
foresaw the need for separate and clearly articulated legisla 
tion. That legislation, it was also believed, would need a 
labor board that could turn to the courts for enforcement.
To accomplish the broadly stated objectives of the NLRA, 
which declared that "employees shall have the right to self- 
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their choos 
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining," five unfair labor practices (ULPs) 
were spelled out. 7
1. Employers could not "interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of their rights."
2. "Domination or interference with the formation or ad 
ministration of a labor organization or contribution of 
financial or other support to it" was forbidden.
Evolution of the NLRA 11
3. Employers could not discriminate "in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in 
a labor organization."
4. Employers could not "discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because he has filed 
charges or given testimony under the act."
5. Employers could not "refuse to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of employees duly chosen pur 
suant to other provisions of the act."
A three-member National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
was established to interpret and enforce the Wagner Act. By 
hearing charges against employers in violation of the five 
broadly defined ULPs stated in the Act, the NLRB was 
charged with making explicit those specific employer prac 
tices that were prohibited under the law. After an investiga 
tion into the merits of a complaint, the Board would order 
the employer to cease and desist his unlawful activity if they 
found the employer in violation of the Act. In addition, the 
NLRB was to fashion appropriate remedies (but not 
penalties) where necessary. In order to enforce the Board's 
rulings and remedies associated with ULPs, the Board could 
call upon the Circuit Courts of Appeal to direct employers to 
abide by Board decisions and orders. In chapter 2, we will 
examine in depth the procedures and practices of the NLRB 
with respect to union organizing and first-contract negotia 
tions.
Passage of legislation and effectuation of its purposes are 
frequently two separate accomplishments. With respect to 
the passage and effectuation of the Wagner Act, little could 
be closer to the truth. On one hand, there was widespread de 
fiance of the Act. Employers who were willing to go to great 
lengths to undermine union organizing and collective 
bargaining before the Act were no less willing to do so after 
the Act. Indeed, it appears that many employers were even 
more willing to resort to underhanded practices in order to 
skirt the law. On the other hand, the NLRB was also
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swamped by suits against its own investigative and enforce 
ment responsibilities.
By February 1936 District Courts had granted near 
ly forty temporary injunctions. Of eleven cases 
already decided the courts had ruled against the 
government in five. Some district judges enjoined 
the board even from holding hearings, the basic 
preliminary procedural step. (Auerbach, 1966, p. 
55)
It appears that these suits against the NLRB were generally 
based on questions of constitutionality. Many employers and 
their legal counsels simply believed the Wagner Act was un 
constitutional and hence openly defied it. The principle of 
freedom-of-contract, it was held, was being abridged. Fur 
thermore, the one-sidedness of the Wagner Act, wherein no 
ULPs by unions were promulgated, rubbed salt in the 
wounds of hardened anti-union employers but also disturbed 
more fair-minded employers and less interested parties.
It became quite clear that until the Supreme Court ruled 
favorably upon the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, the 
NLRB would have little effect upon enforcing its provisions. 
Employers therefore continued to discriminatorily discharge 
or refuse to hire union activists, maintain community-wide 
blacklists against union activists and sympathizers, refuse to 
recognize unions, maintain company unions, close plants in 
response to unionization, refuse to bargain in good faith 
when so ordered by the NLRB, enlist professional strike 
breaking companies, and even stockpile munitions in fac 
tories. Perhaps most appalling to the general public was the 
widespread use of professional spies hired to infiltrate 
unions, to identify union sympathizers and monitor union 
strategies with regard to organizing, negotiations, and other 
concerted activity. Some spies went so far as to take over the 
leadership of local unions; their mission was to cause inter 
nal union strife and break up organizations.
This invidious display of employer animus toward 
unionization was brought to light during the LaFollette
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Committee hearings which began in 1936. The decision to 
conduct the LaFollette hearings was in large part a response 
to the findings of investigations conducted by the NLRB in 
its earliest months of operation, findings that demonstrated 
to proponents of the Wagner Act that the purposes of the 
Act and the role of the NLRB were, without doubt, being 
undermined.
Although the LaFollette Committee investigated the 
abridgement of civil liberties other than in union- 
management relations, in its first year of hearings it detailed 
anti-union practices of industrial espionage, intimidation of 
union activists by armed private police, professional 
strikebreaking, and the stockpiling of munitions on com 
pany premises.
These accoutrements of industrial strife 
represented the underside of industrial relations. 
Their frequent use convinced the LaFollette Com 
mittee that management was conducting 'a col 
ossal, daily drive in every part of the country to 
frustrate enunciated labor policy. . . .' (Auerbach, 
1966, p. 97)
Although the LaFollette Committee made it quite evident 
to the public that workers were being denied the right to self- 
organization and collective bargaining (in the most disdain 
ful of ways), it was not until the Supreme Court (in February 
1937) ruled upon the constitutionality of the Wagner Act 
that the NLRB was able to begin effectuating the law. In that 
historic decision, probably the most important Court deci 
sion in U.S. labor history, the Court examined both the issue 
of the Act's jurisdiction with regard to interstate commerce 
and whether or not the potential of labor-management strife 
affected the free flow of commerce. The facts of the case 
dealt with the discriminatory discharge of 10 union members 
involved in organizing activities associated with a plant own 
ed by Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation. The NLRB had 
found Jones & Laughlin in violation of Section 8(a)(3), 
which forbids discrimination against employees for union
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activity. The Supreme Court's decision rested largely upon 
the following arguments.
The steel industry is one of the great basic in 
dustries of the United States, with ramifying ac 
tivities affecting interstate commerce at every 
point. . . Instead of being beyond the pale, we 
think that it presents in a most striking way the 
close and intimate relation which a manufacturing 
industry may have to interstate commerce. . .
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free ex 
ercise of the right of employees to self-organization 
and representation is a proper subject for condem 
nation by competent legislative authority. Long 
ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. 
We said that they were organized out of the 
necessities of the situation; that a single employee 
was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he 
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the 
maintenance of himself and family; that if the 
employer refused to pay him the wages that he 
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave 
the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treat 
ment; that union was essential to give laborers op 
portunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer. . . 8
Amendments to the NLRA
The evidence indicates that after the question of constitu 
tionality of the Wagner Act was settled, union membership 
rose at an unprecedented rate, rising from some 4 million 
members in 1936 to roughly 15 million in 1947. The years 
following the Wagner Act, however, were not necessarily 
peaceful ones and it became more and more apparent that 
unions not unlike employers were willing to commit un 
palatable labor practices. With substantially greater power, 
unions were able to engage in strikes and boycotts far more 
effectively than any time in American history. With this
Evolution of the NLRA 15
power and its exercise in full public view, the public became 
more aware of its abuses. For instance, John L. Lewis, the 
powerful president of the United Mine Workers publicly 
defied President Roosevelt and the National War Labor 
Board in 1943 when he steadfastly refused to order the mine 
workers back to work during World War II. Ironically, fur 
ther abuses stemmed from the rivalry between the AFL and 
the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). The CIO 
had embarked successfully upon organizing basic industries, 
such as steel and autos, with the purpose of organizing all 
skill levels. The AFL, however, wanted all craft workers in 
these industries under their own umbrella. Unanticipated by 
the proponents of the Wagner Act, the two powerful 
organizations clashed and often fought bitterly over jurisdic- 
tional rights. The clash between the AFL and CIO tied the 
hands of many employers caught in the middle of strikes and 
boycotts over these jurisdictional disputes; workers, too, 
were caught in the middle.
Other abuses arose as unions utilized strikes and boycotts 
against employers not directly involved in given labor 
disputes, attempted to impose "closed shop"agreements on 
disinterested employees (i.e., all workers must join the union 
before being hired), and discriminated against black 
workers. With the election of many Republicans to the U.S. 
Congress in 1946, coupled with an unprecedented wave of 
strike activity during the same year and a public impression 
that unions were being infiltrated and controlled by com 
munists, the stage was set for a major change in the Wagner 
Act.
Passed over the veto of President Truman, the Taft- 
Hartley amendments to the NLRA were signed into law in 
1947. The focus of these amendments was upon union unfair 
labor practices. For the most part the employer ULPs con 
tained in the Wagner Act were not altered. Instead, the 
general intention of Congress was to balance the NLRA, 
checking the power of both unions and employers and, in 
turn, promoting the peaceful resolution of labor- 
management conflict.
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As stated in a declaration of policy of the Taft-Hartley 
Act:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to 
promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the 
legitimate rights of both employees and employers 
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide 
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the 
interference by either with the legitimate rights of 
the other, to protect the rights of individual 
employees in their relations with labor organiza 
tions whose activities affect commerce, to define 
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and 
management which affect commerce and are in 
imical to the general welfare and to protect the 
rights of the public in connection with labor 
disputes affecting commerce.
The heart of the amendments read:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization or its agents -
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exer 
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 ... or 
(b) an employer in the selection of his represen 
tatives for purposes of collective bargaining or the 
adjustment of grievances . . .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an employee" for 
nonmembership in the union unless a union-shop 
agreement is in effect and the employee fails "to 
tender the periodic dues and initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an 
employer . . .
(4) To engage in or to induce or encourage the 
employees of any employer to engage in, a
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strike ... to use, manufacture, process, transport 
or otherwise handle" goods with the objective of:
"(A) forcing or requiring any . . . self-employed per 
son to join any labor . . . organization . . .
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to 
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of his employees unless such labor 
organization has been certified as the representative 
of such employees . . .
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or 
bargain with a particular labor organization as the 
representative of his employees if another labor 
organization has been certified as the representative 
of such employees . . .
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign par 
ticular work to employees in a particular labor 
organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class 
rather than to employees in another labor organiza 
tion or in another trade, craft, or class . . .
(5) to require of employees covered by an agree 
ment ..." any initiation or admission fees "in an 
amount which the Board finds excessive or 
discriminatory ..." and
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
pay . . . for services which are not performed or 
not to be performed ..."
In addition to the above unfair labor practices, the Taft- 
Hartley Act amended the NLRA in several other important 
ways which are of special interest to our inquiry about union 
organizing and first-contract negotiation outcomes. First, 
under Section 7 of the Wagner Act, the following clause was 
added in order to make it clear that workers could refrain 
from forming, joining, or assisting unions if they so desired, 
except where a legitimate union-shop agreement had been 
made: "Employees . . . shall also have the right to refrain 
from any or all such activities." Second, Section 14(b) allow-
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ed states to establish so-called right-to-work laws, whereby 
no employer and union within the given state could enter in 
to union-shop agreements (i.e., workers must join unions 
after being hired). Hence, in states passing such legislation, 
workers under a collective bargaining agreement were still 
free not to join the union. Unions, however, still would be 
required to represent fairly these employees as the exclusive 
representative of all employees in a given work unit. Finally, 
the size of the Board was increased from three to five 
members. The purpose of this change was to better facilitate 
the speedy handling of representation elections and the 
resolution of labor-management disputes.
The NLRA was further amended in 1959 with the passage 
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
more widely known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. Only Title 
VII of the Landrum-Griffin Act, however, amended the 
NLRA. All other titles were promulgated in an attempt to in 
sure union democracy, rid unions of corruption by union 
leaders and corruption between union leaders and 
employers, and to regulate the use of union funds. Although 
there are a number of important amendments under Title 
VII (especially those closing loopholes involving secondary 
boycotts), two amendments are especially pertinent to our 
investigation and those are briefly discussed next.
First, Section 8(b)(7) was added as a seventh union ULP to 
the six enunciated in the Taft-Hartley Act. The proviso holds 
that it is unlawful for a union:
to picket ... or threaten to picket . . . any 
employer where the object thereof is forcing or re 
quiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a 
labor organization ... or forcing or requiring the 
employees of an employer to accept or select a 
labor organization as their collective bargaining 
representative. . . .
The basic restrictions against picketing for recognition pur 
poses are that picketing cannot be conducted (1) for more 
than 30 days, giyen that the union files a successful petition
Evolution of the NLRA 19
with the NLRB to hold a certification election, (2) if another 
union has been lawfully recognized as the representative of 
the employees, or (3) if a valid election concerning union 
representation has been conducted within the previous year.
Second, cases of discrimination against employees by 
either employers or unions for union activities or inactivities 
are to be given priority treatment over all other cases in the 
regional office in which they are filed, except for cases where 
the Board is compelled under section 10(1) of the Act to seek 
injunctions against illegal union strikes, pickets, and 
boycotts.
Except for bringing the U.S. Postal Service and nonprofit 
hospitals under the NLRA in 1971 and 1974, respectively, 
the Act has not undergone any substantive changes since 
1959. However, a labor law reform bill that would have in 
cluded several important amendments to the Act was passed 
easily in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977 but 
failed by one vote in the Senate by filibuster. The provi 
sions of the reform bill were aimed at speeding up NLRB 
procedures and case handling and reducing the incidence of 
discriminatory discharges and employer bad faith bargaining 
during first-contract negotiations. Many of the bill's provi 
sions are discussed and evaluated in chapter 4 and hence are 
not covered in this chapter.
Summary
During the period 1806 to 1932, the federal government 
allowed, for the most part, the federal and state judiciaries 
to dictate public policy regarding union organizing and col 
lective bargaining. It is clear that the federal courts were 
hostile toward union organizing and collective bargaining. 
Their concerns were primarily with disruption of interstate 
commerce, freedom-of-contract, and private property 
rights. The courts initially saw unions as criminal con 
spiracies under common law and later as monopolies under 
antitrust legislation; they readily granted injunctions against 
concerted union activities and enforced yellow-dog con 
tracts.
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Although the U.S. Congress passed legislation to give 
workers limited rights of organizing and collective bargain 
ing (i.e., the Erdman Act, Clayton Act, and Railway Labor 
Act) it was not until the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 was 
passed by Congress that legislative action successfully block 
ed the judiciary from handing out injunctions and enforcing 
yellow-dog contracts. In 1932, the legal environment sur 
rounding union organizing and collective bargaining shifted 
course from a long period of hostility to one characterized as 
a hands-off approach. Shortly thereafter, however, with the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling favorably upon the constitu 
tionality of the Wagner Act in 1937, the legal environment 
became one that encouraged union organizing and collective 
bargaining and in today's sociopolitical context, ignored the 
rights of employers and workers not interested in collective 
bargaining. With passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 
the legal environment then shifted to one of intended 
neutrality, protecting the rights of workers to decide whether 
or not they wanted union representation and balancing the 
power of both unions and employers. Since 1947, that gen 
eral philosophy of labor relations law has been maintained.
Legal philosophy and its day-to-day realization, however, 
are frequently at odds. Part of being at odds can be at 
tributed to the fact that parties subject to the law and af 
fected adversely by it, often work hard to successfully under 
mine it. Disparity between legal philosophy and practice can 
also be attributed to the fact that the makers of law are 
unaware that legal niceties often fail to result in anticipated 
outcomes. With respect to negotiating first contracts, it will 
be shown in this study that many employers have found effi 
cient and cheap ways to undermine the law. In turn, policy 
recommendations that obviate some legal niceties are 
prescribed in an attempt to bring day-to-day practices in line 
with our legal philosophies.
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Chapter 2
The National Labor 
Relations Board
We can now take a close look at the NLRB: its structure, 
its procedures, its policies, and its increasing case load. 
Although the NLRB derives its responsibilities and authority 
from the NLRA, the U.S. Supreme Court has shaped its 
policies and the circuits courts of appeal must enforce its 
decisions and orders. Section 9 of the NLRA lays out the 
responsibilities and operational framework of the NLRB 
with regard to conducting representation elections, and Sec 
tion 10 lays out the responsibilities and operational 
framework of the NLRB with regard to unfair labor prac 
tices. As one can see, the NLRB wears two hats: one to con 
duct and monitor elections to determine whether or not a 
majority of workers want to be represented by a union and a 
second to resolve charges that employers or unions have 
committed ULPs under the law. In order to understand the 
role and impact of NLRB procedures and policies upon the 
likelihood that unions fail to obtain contracts after winning 
representation elections, we will need to understand both 
functions of the NLRB. It will be shown in chapter 3 that 
when the NLRB puts on its second hat, the first hat is often 
toppled.
In this chapter we will first review the structure of the 
NLRB and its jurisdiction. We will then examine the pro-
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cedures and policies imposed upon and adopted by the 
NLRB to conduct representation elections. Subsequently, 
the procedures and policies of the NLRB to resolve ULPs are 
described. Finally, we will examine in some detail several 
NLRB-related factors that are suspected of influencing the 
likelihood that unions obtain first contracts.
NLRB Structure
As depicted in figure 2-1, the Board and the General 
Counsel have separate functions: the former acts as judge 
and the latter as prosecutor. 1 Prior to 1947, the Board acted 
as both judge and prosecutor. The Taft-Hartley Act severed 
these roles. The General Counsel's office supervises the ac 
tivities of the regional offices, conducts and administers both 
union representation elections and investigations into ULP 
complaints. The General Counsel also holds responsibility 
for any litigation proceedings necessary to effectuate the 
policies of the Act (e.g., injunctive relief) and the decisions 
and orders of the Board. The Board, whose office is in 
Washington, DC, hears ULP complaints that are not settled 
informally by the regional office staff and are contested by 
the losing party subsequent to a hearing and decision by an 
administrative law judge. In light of its interpretation of the 
NLRA, the Board decides the merits of ULP complaints and 
prescribes remedies to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. 
It also resolves objections and challenges to representation 
election outcomes and in some cases resolves questions of 
appropriate makeup of bargaining units.
Both the Board members and General Counsel are 
presidential appointments which require confirmation by the 
U.S. Senate. Board members serve five-year appointments, 
while the General Counsel serves four years.
In order to effectuate the broadly stated responsibilities 
above, the Board exercises full and final authority over the 
Offices of Executive Secretary and Solicitor, and over the
Figure 2-1 






SOURCE: NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Series 8, as amend 
ed (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 333.
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Divisions of Judges and Information (see figure 2-1). Each 
Board member exercises full and final authority over his or 
her own staff of legal counsel. The Office of Executive 
Secretary receives and assigns cases brought before the 
Board and issues and serves all Board decisions and orders. 
Board member staffs are comprised of lawyers who assist 
their respective Board members in preparing case decisions. 
The Office of the Solicitor acts as legal advisor to the Board 
regarding questions of law and policy, any pending legisla 
tion affecting the NLRA, or litigation affecting the Board. 
The Division of Judges is the division responsible for the 
supervision of hearings conducted by administrative law 
judges involving ULP complaints. The Division of Informa 
tion acts as the Board's liaison with the media and the 
general public.
The General Counsel's Washington, DC staff (who report 
to the Deputy General Counsel responsible for overall 
organizational coordination) include the Divisions of Opera 
tions Management, Advice, Enforcement Litigation and Ad 
ministration. The Division of Operations Management 
assists in the coordination of all General Counsel operations 
within Washington, DC and between the Washington, DC 
office and the various regional or other field offices. The 
Division of Advice is responsible for providing legal research 
and advice to the Regional Directors with regard to complex 
and/or novel legal questions concerning ULPs and injunc 
tion proceedings. The Division of Enforcement Litigation 
has responsibility for all NLRB litigation in the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal and U.S. Supreme Court. This litigation 
includes enforcement of Board orders and its defense before 
the courts when Board decisions and orders are appealed by 
losing parties. Within this division is the Office of Appeals, 
which reviews ULP charges denied by the regional offices 
and, in turn, recommends actions to the General Counsel. 
The Division of Administration is responsible for general ad 
ministration, support services, and financial management.
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Outside of the Washington, DC divisions of the General 
Counsel are 33 regional offices and 19 subregional and resi 
dent offices. Regional Directors supervise staffs of attorneys 
and field examiners in the investigation and processing of 
ULPs and union jurisdiction disputes and in the administra 
tion of representation elections. In addition, Regional Direc 
tors may initiate district court injunctive relief as mandated 
in Section 10(1) of the Act.
Election Policies and Procedures
There are three basic types of representation elections con 
ducted by the NLRB. The first is called a certification elec 
tion which involves workers who are not currently 
represented by a union certified by the NLRB. The second is 
called a decertification election, which involves workers who 
are currently represented by a union certified by the NLRB. 
This is an election to decide whether or not the majority of 
workers want the given union to continue representing them 
for purposes of collective bargaining. The third type is called 
a deauthorization election, which allows workers to decide 
whether or not the union and employer are to continue under 
a union-shop agreement. In all three elections the majority 
vote decides the outcome. Our interest here is with certifica 
tion elections, since they precede first-contract negotiations. 
The Act also allows employers to forego elections yet 
recognize and negotiate with unions showing majority sup 
port. But again, our present interests do not lie with this 
generally uncommon practice.
A union, employee, or employer may petition the NLRB 
to conduct a secret ballot certification election. Employers 
rarely petition for elections, however. There are only two cir 
cumstances in which the law allows employers to petition for 
an election: (1) after a union requests the employer to volun 
tarily recognize it and (2) after a union has, for organiza 
tional and recognitional purposes, picketed the employer for 
more than 30 days. In the first instance, unions normally file
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a petition once the employer refuses voluntary recognition. 
In the second instance, the union (realizing it has little 
chance to win an election) disclaims its interest in represent 
ing the workers and ceases the picketing.
In conducting a certification election, the NLRB must in 
itially decide on several issues. First, the regional office staff 
must find a sufficient "showing of interest," which requires 
that at least 30 percent of the prospective bargaining unit 
seeks representation by a given union. Here the NLRB 
generally relies upon the signing of "union authorization" 
cards by workers within the proposed unit. These cards must 
clearly state that the person signing the card wants the given 
union to represent him or her in collective bargaining. 
However, some workers later change their minds and are not 
compelled to vote for the union on election day.
A second question that must be decided at the outset is 
whether or not the NLRB has and is willing to exercise 
jurisdiction over the employer. The NLRB has been granted 
by the Supreme Court broad authority in deciding its 
jurisdiction over interstate commerce. However, even from 
its inception the NLRB has not had the resources necessary 
to exercise the full breadth of its statuatory responsibilities. 
In 1950, the Board shifted from a policy of deciding jurisdic 
tion on a case by case basis to one that established sales 
volume thresholds by industry. In 1958, the Board revised 
these earlier standards. For example, for most nonretail 
enterprises the standard was set at $50,000 of sales or service 
volume either purchased or sold across state lines. For retail 
enterprises, a total sales volume standard was set at 
$500,000. Surprisingly, these standards have not changed 
since 1958, in spite of inflation.
The third issue to be resolved by the NLRB is whether or 
not the petitioned unit of workers is appropriate for collec 
tive bargaining purposes. The NLRA states that the "Board 
shall decide in each case whether ... the unit appropriate 
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
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thereof." The Act goes on to hold (1) that professional 
employees must have a separate right to vote upon their in 
clusion in units that include nonprofessional employees and 
(2) that plant guards must be represented by unions that 
bargain exclusively for plant guards. In addition, the term 
"employee" was defined in such a way that agricultural 
workers, domestic service workers, and supervisors are ex 
cluded from protection provided by the Act.
Except as restricted by the Act, the Board is faced with 
complex decisions concerning appropriate unit determina 
tion. In making these decisions, the Board examines several 
criteria on a case-by-case basis. Generally, it seeks to find a 
"community of interests" among the work unit under con 
sideration. These criteria largely include (1) similarities in 
skills, duties, and working conditions; (2) the nature of an 
employer's organization (e.g., the organizational and super 
visory structure, the integration of various operational func 
tions, and physical proximity); and (3) the employees' 
preferences.
Once the regional office has found a sufficient "showing 
of interest," decided jurisdiction over the employer, and 
made an initial decision on the appropriateness of the peti 
tioned bargaining unit, the regional office contacts the 
employer informing him that an election will be held. At this 
point, the NLRB staff ask the employer to "consent" to an 
election involving the proposed unit. The employer may con 
test the makeup of the unit under consideration. If he does, 
NLRB staff then attempt to get the employer and union to 
agree (or compromise) on a suitable alternative combination 
of workers. The union will invariably prefer the original 
makeup since it comprises a work unit of which the union 
can expect substantial (if not majority) support in an elec 
tion. The employer, on the other hand, may wish to limit the 
union's chances of winning the election and, hence, will 
argue for a different makeup one, for instance, that would 
include workers in other stores or plant departments whom 
the employer perceives are less sympathetic to union 
representation. In any case, if the parties cannot agree on the
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appropriate unit, then a hearing is called to examine more 
closely the dispute over the determination. If a hearing is 
held, the election becomes what is known as a Regional 
Director-ordered election, in which the Regional Director 
decides the appropriate unit. In novel or complex cases, the 
Regional Director may pass the decision on to the five- 
member Board to decide upon the appropriate 
unit something that rarely transpires. These cases result in 
so-called Board-ordered elections.
If the parties can agree upon the unit without a hearing, 
the election is called a "consent" election. The parties have 
two options under the consent decree that pertain to the right 
of appeal of any objections or challenges that rise over the 
election. The parties can decide to give the Regional Director 
final say in the resolution of any objections or challenges or 
they may opt to give the five-member Board final say in all 
objections and challenges. Opting for the latter results in 
what is known as a "stipulated" election (or "stip" as it is 
commonly called).
The majority of elections are generally held within one to 
three months of the petition date. When a hearing is held 
under a Regional Director-ordered election, it often takes 
several more months. The regional office, in any case, 
notifies the parties of the date and place of the election. 
Regional office staff conduct the secret ballot election and 
count the votes soon thereafter, typically in the presence of 
employer and union representatives. If either the union or 
employer question the right of any individual to vote, they 
may "challenge" an individual's ballot as it is being cast but 
not after the election. Challenged ballots are not opened 
unless the election is sufficiently close so that the number of 
challenged ballots potentially could change the outcome. For 
example, say the union obtains 60 votes and the employer 
(i.e., "no union") obtains 55, but there are 5 challenged 
ballots. Upon an investigation of each and every challenged 
ballot, the Regional Director decides whether or not each 
challenged ballot was cast by an individual with a right to
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vote. If, in the example above, all five challenged ballots 
were valid ballots and each ballot was a vote for "no 
union," then the revised tally would be 60 to 60 and the 
union would have lost the election. Anything short of 5 votes 
for "no union" would result in an election victory for the 
union, regardless of the validity of the challenged ballots.
Objections to the election conduct of either party must be 
filed within five working days of the close of the election, 
regardless of any challenges made. The evidence filed with 
objections must be sufficient to provide aprimafacie case. 
The regional office then investigates the objections filed. If 
either party has conducted itself in such a way as to suffi 
ciently deny workers their rights under Section 7 of the 
NLRA, then the NLRB can set up a rerun election. In cases 
where the employer's activity has been so egregious that con 
ducting a second election would be a futile exercise, the 
Board may order the employer to recognize and negotiate 
with the union. In cases where bargaining orders are made by 
the Board, the union will have had to submit meritorious 
ULP complaints in conjunction with the objections. Unions 
charging employers with having committed ULPs typically 
sign a "request to proceed" with the election so that the elec 
tion is not delayed pending resolution of the charge. In this 
way, if the union wins the election, it need not seek a 
bargaining order. If it loses the election, it can, in turn, seek 
a bargaining order. Before explaining in detail the pro 
cedures and policies of the NLRB in investigating objections 
and taking appropriate action, let us first examine what the 
Board and courts deem as unlawful campaign conduct.
Unlawful Campaign Conduct
The NLRA left to the NLRB the responsibility of 
establishing any governing principles or guidelines to insure 
that workers, in exercising their rights to decide upon union 
representation, will not be restrained or coerced by either 
employers or unions. It should be understood from the 
outset that, generally speaking, no single campaign activity
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by either employers or unions is sufficient to overturn the 
results of an election, but instead the NLRB and courts have 
adopted a "totality of conduct" doctrine. Under this doc 
trine, a party's campaign conduct is examined in its totality 
and any single activity is considered in light of total conduct. 
It is beyond the intended scope of this study (nor is it 
necessary for our general purpose) to develop fully all issues 
central to campaign conduct. Instead, only the more salient 
campaign behavior that is likely to lead to the filing of objec 
tions and the setting aside of elections will be highlighted.
Perhaps the clearest form of coercion is the discriminatory 
discharge of union activists during election campaigns. Sec 
tion 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice 
anytime an employer discriminates "in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ 
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization." The evidence indicates that 95 percent of Sec 
tion 8(a)(3) violations entail discharges and that roughly 90 
percent of these occur during election campaigns or during 
first contract negotiations. 2 The purpose of the 
discriminatory discharge during election campaigns is not 
only to remove key union activists from the campaign but 
also to effectively coerce employees from voting for the 
union. Discharges have the same chilling effect on the work 
unit after the union wins the election and begins to negotiate 
a contract. (That evidence is presented in chapter 3.) 
Discriminatory discharges are at once ULPs that are resolved 
via the NLRB ULP complaint procedure (discussed below) 
and are also used as evidence in hearings and decisions by the 
NLRB regarding objections filed to the election.
Section 8(c) of the Act also states that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, 
or the dissemination thereof, whether written, 
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not con 
stitute or be an unfair labor practice under the pro 
visions of this Act, if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
TheNLRB 33
Based on this section, the Board has had to interpret and 
weigh the statements of both employers and unions with 
respect to what is "free speech" vis-a-vis threats or pro 
mises. The exercise of free speech is legal, of course, while 
threats or promises provide grounds for setting aside an elec 
tion. Deciding which is which is complex, and neither the 
Board nor the courts have laid down any hard and fast rules. 
As a basic rule-of-thumb, the distinction between free speech 
and an illegal threat is determined by the degree of control 
the employer or union might have to effectuate the state 
ment. For example, if an employer states in his campaign 
that unionization is likely to lead to strikes and loss of 
customers, there is no threat or promise in the eyes of the 
law. If, on the other hand, the employer also states that a 
department will likely be closed or there likely will be 
layoffs, the Board would generally interpret this as a threat 
since the employer has control over such outcomes (see 
Feldacker, 1983, pp. 115-118).
There are, of course, more obvious forms of threat. It has 
been widely reported, for example, that some union agents 
or activists play "mean ball" with co-workers who 
demonstrate antiunion sympathies. Strong verbal or physical 
threats appear to be the most widely used form of coercion 
by unions. Although we do not have any statistics on how 
widespread such behavior is, a cursory review of court cases 
of employer objections to elections indicates that threats of 
physical harm are made frequently.
In 1948 the NLRB ruled in the now famous General Shoe 
decision that illegal campaign conduct need not be an unfair 
labor practice as defined by the Act. Instead, the Board ruled 
that any conduct which creates an atmosphere such that it 
becomes unlikely that workers will be able to exercise their 
free choice is grounds for setting aside an election. 3 In 
General Shoe, the Board emphasized that elections should be 
conducted as closely as possible to "laboratory conditions." 
The Board's interpretation of the intent of Congress opened 
up a wide range of employer activities that would contribute 
to the totality of conduct doctrine and provide grounds for
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setting aside elections. These activities include but are by no 
means limited to the conduct described next.
Employers cannot visit employees' homes to urge them to 
vote against the union. Such a personalized campaign tactic 
is seen as intimidating. Employers cannot discuss with 
employees in small groups in any places of employer authori 
ty (e.g., in a supervisor's office) the matter of voting against 
the union. The employer can, however, assemble all 
employees during working hours to deliver a general speech 
against union representation. This is known as the "captive 
audience" doctrine. 4 Such captive audience speeches must be 
void of threats or promises and cannot be made within 24 
hours of the election. Employers cannot convey to the 
employees that their efforts to bargain collectively are futile. 
That is, it would be grounds for setting aside an election for 
an employer to hold that he only has to recognize and 
negotiate with the union if it wins and, as such, employees 
should not expect any increases in wages or improvements in 
working conditions because he has no intention of doing so. 
Appeals to racial prejudice by the employer, whereby the in 
tention is to pit blacks against whites, are also prohibited by 
the Board. Finally, the Board has used the General Shoe 
decision to set aside elections when employers use or give the 
impression of using surveillance of worker involvement in 
union organizing activities. Surveillance or the impression of 
surveillance is interpreted by the Board as a form of coercion 
or intimidation intended to discourage employees from being 
actively involved in union organizing.
In 1962 the NLRB extended the laboratory conditions rule 
to include misrepresentation of facts. In particular, when 
either the union or employer made statements which 
departed substantially from the truth (whether deliberate or 
not), which (a) were presented at a time just prior to the elec 
tion date so that the other party could not reply effectively 
and (b) could be expected to have a significant impact on the 
election outcome, then the Board would have grounds for 
setting aside the election. This standard of campaign 
misrepresentation held from 1962 (Hollywood Ceramics) 5
The NLRB 35
until April 1977 when the Board decided in the Shopping 
Kart Food Market6 case that workers were sufficiently 
mature and capable of recognizing misrepresentations for 
what they were, namely, campaign propaganda, and in turn 
would discount it. Except in cases of fraud, the Board held 
that misrepresentation does not impact upon election out 
comes and, hence, would not be grounds for setting aside 
elections. However, in December 1978 the Board reversed 
itself on the issue of misrepresentation and fell back to the 
earlier Hollywood Ceramics rules. 7 But just to confuse mat 
ters, the Board resurrected the Shopping Kart rules in 1982. 8
It is difficult to say whether, in general, unions or 
employers gain more by relaxation of laboratory conditions 
governing misrepresentation. It would seem, however, that 
the number of objections filed should be reduced since 
neither party would be able to provide prima facie cases as 
easily as they would be under rules requiring laboratory con 
ditions. With respect to obtaining first contracts subsequent 
to a union victory, relaxation of misrepresentation standards 
should work to the advantage of unions in that the long 
delays typically associated with resolving objections 
significantly reduce the likelihood that unions obtain first 
contracts. Although we have no evidence readily available as 
to what proportion of employer objections entail questions 
of misrepresentation, a cursory overview of circuit court 
cases suggests that claims of misrepresentation account for a 
large part of the objection case load brought by employers.
In conclusion, the NLRB investigates timely filed objec 
tions that establish prima facie cases. There are a number of 
criteria used by the NLRB to decide the validity of objections 
and these criteria are weighed in light of the totality of cam 
paign conduct. Next, we describe the procedures and policies 
of the NLRB in their investigation and rulings on objections.
Objection Procedure
Upon receiving a timely objection, the Regional Director 
must consider two basic elements of the prima facie case.
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First, do the facts of conduct as presented, if true, potential 
ly warrant setting aside the election? If the Regional Director 
decides they do not, then he may immediately overule the ob 
jection. If they do, on the other hand, the Regional Director 
orders an investigation to ascertain the truth of the stated 
facts, which is the second element of making a prima facie 
case. If this investigation uncovers evidence suggesting the 
facts of conduct are questionable, then a hearing is schedul 
ed to delve further into the facts surrounding the objec 
tionable conduct. If it is concluded from the hearing that the 
facts as presented in the objections are not true, the Regional 
Director will overrule the objection.
In those cases in which the NLRB finds the facts of objec 
tionable conduct to be true (either with or without a 
hearing), then the Regional Director must decide whether or 
not the conduct would have a significant impact on the elec 
tion. Here, NLRB policy requires the Regional Director to 
infer whether or not the conduct would change the minds of 
voters to such a degree that the election outcome would have 
been different had the objectionable conduct not occurred.
In nonstipulated consent elections (about 3-4 percent of all 
elections today), the Regional Director supposedly has final 
say with regard to sustaining or overruling objections. In all 
other elections, the party filing the objection can appeal the 
Regional Director's recommendation to the five-member 
Board. The Board, in hearing the exceptions made, first 
determines whether in those cases in which a hearing was not 
held, indeed, a hearing should have been held. The Board 
can order a hearing if it believes there is sufficient ambiguity 
about the facts to warrant a hearing. In those cases where 
there was a hearing or no need for a hearing, the Board then 
evaluates the Regional Director's recommendation based on 
its merits. Both the merits concerning (a) the Regional Direc 
tor's finding about the stated objectionable conduct and 
(b) the Regional Director's inference about whether or not 
the objectionable conduct influenced the election outcome 
are evaluated by the Board. The Board then decides to either 
sustain or overrule the Regional Director's recommendation.
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Neither the union nor the employer can appeal the Board's 
decision and order regarding objections. As discussed below, 
however, an employer, by refusing to bargain with the 
union, can force his objections and challenges to be heard by 
the appellate courts. 9
If the five-member Board sustains the objections of an 
employer (who lost the election), then the Board sets aside 
the election and directs the Regional Director to conduct a 
rerun election. The purpose of the rerun election is to allow 
employees another opportunity to cast their votes in an elec 
tion unfettered by election improprieties. If the Board sus 
tains the objections of a union (which lost the election), then 
the Board can either order a rerun election or order the 
employer to recognize and negotiate with the union. The lat 
ter option is triggered when circumstances indicate the anti- 
union animus of the employer effectively prohibits a 
legitimate election from being held. If the Board overrules an 
employer's objections to the election, the Board certifies the 
union and orders the employer to negotiate a contract. If the 
Board overrules a union's objections, then a 12-month bar 
from any further elections is put in place. Let us next briefly 
review the Board's discretion in ordering rerun elections and 
ordering employers to negotiate first contracts.
Bargaining Orders and Rerun Elections
In a controversial landmark Supreme Court decision in 
1969 (known as the Gissel case), the high court established 
the ground rules (albeit somewhat vaguely) governing the 
Board's decisions regarding election reruns and bargaining 
orders (in spite of a union's loss at the polls). 10 Generally 
speaking, an employer need not recognize a union without 
first benefiting from a secret ballot election unless the 
employer commits ULPs that undermine union organizing. 
If the employer has effectively undermined the union's ma 
jority support through his use of ULPs, the Court allows the 
NLRB to order the employer to recognize the union without 
the benefit of an election. Our interest, however, pertains to
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the resolution of objections to elections. Here, the Supreme 
Court first requires the Board to examine the objections and 
any ULP charges stemming from the election campaign. 
Next, the Board must decide, depending on the severity of 
the objectionable conduct and ULPs, which of three 
categories a case falls within. If the employer's conduct was 
such as to have "minimal impact" upon the election out 
come, the Board can order a rerun election but not order the 
employer to bargain with the union. At the other extreme, if 
the employer's behavior was "pervasive and atrocious" to 
the extent that a fair election could not be held, then the 
Board is granted the authority to order the employer to 
bargain. This authority holds even though the union might 
fail to show that a majority of employees had signed union 
authorization cards. The third category lies somewhere bet 
ween the first and second. If the employer's misconduct is 
not outlandish, on the one hand, yet not minimal on the 
other hand, the Board has authority to order the employer to 
bargain with the union, given that at some point the union 
showed through authorization cards that it had majority 
support prior to the election.
Procedurally, if the Board orders a rerun election, it first 
orders the employer to cease and desist its unlawful activity 
and requires the employer to post a notice of the NLRB's 
order in which the employer agrees to comply. After com 
pliance is met, the Regional office establishes the date of the 
rerun election. If the Board sets aside the election based on 
the objections and likewise finds that ULPs have been com 
mitted which meet the Gissel criteria, then a bargaining order 
can be issued.
In summary, the NLRB conducts secret ballot elections. In 
those cases where neither the union nor the employer com 
mitted ULPs or other objectionable conduct to invalidate the 
election outcome, the NLRB either certifies the victorious 
union as the exclusive representative of the employees or
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bars any further elections for 12 months following a union 
loss. In those cases in which the union loses but the NLRB 
sustains union objections, elections are rerun. Where the 
NLRB also finds the employer has committed ULPs during 
the election, the Board may issue a bargaining order.
Although having successfully imposed a legal obligation 
on the employer to bargain in good faith over the first con 
tract, the union drive is not necessarily yet out of the woods. 
Recalcitrant employers seeking to stall the obligation to 
bargain or employers dissatisfied with a Board's ruling about 
objections, challenges, and ULPs have yet another route of 
appeal. By simply refusing to bargain, the employer triggers 
the ULP procedure of the NLRB. Through this separate pro 
cedure, the employer is able to get a circuit court of appeals 
to re-examine his objections or challenges to the election. 
Although he may get a reversal on the Board's decision and 
order, at the very least the employer stalls his obligation to 
bargain for many more months, if not years. In the follow 
ing section, we examine an employer's obligation to bargain 
in good faith and describe the ULP complaint procedure 
employed by the NLRB.
The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Section 8(d) of the NLRA compels the parties to negotiate 
in good faith once the union has been duly certified for such 
purposes. It states:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collec 
tively is the performance of the mutual obligation 
of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer 
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, of the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question aris 
ing thereunder, and the execution of a written con 
tract incorporating any agreement reached if re-
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quested by either party, but such obligation does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re 
quire the making of a concession.
Congress obviously intended for the parties to confer in 
good faith with the intention of entering a contract. The Act, 
however, specifically states that neither party must agree to 
any proposal or make any given concession. The Board, of 
course, is charged with interpreting Section 8(d) and 
establishing any rules or guidelines applicable to the duty to 
bargain in good faith.
Outright refusal to meet with the union to bargain is clear 
ly an unfair labor practice. Except in cases where the 
employer seeks court review of objections and challenges, 
few employers take such blatant positions. Although one can 
imagine that most employers would prefer not to recognize 
and negotiate with unions, the majority act in accordance 
with the law, having intentions to enter agreements when so 
required. That generalization, however, does not imply that 
each party will not take full advantage of permissable legal 
tactics in order to make the most of their own relative power 
positions. The parties definitely do.
In deciding on what behavior is legal or illegal, the Board 
takes a case-by-case approach and, except in the most 
flagrant demonstrations of bad faith bargaining, will rely on 
a totality of conduct doctrine. Within this totality of conduct 
framework, the Board has established a number of restric 
tions on both employers and unions. Since our intention here 
is only to highlight the more salient general restrictions that 
are especially relevant to first-contract negotiations, certain 
restrictions applicable to the renewal of contracts or long 
term bargaining relationships are not reviewed.
Among specific restrictions, the Board has found it illegal 
for an employer to make unilateral changes before the con 
tract is agreed upon. Hence, employers who want to under 
mine the purpose of union representation by unilaterally im 
proving wages or other terms and conditions of employment
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are prohibited from doing so. Nor is it lawful for employers 
to circumvent the union's bargaining responsibility by offer 
ing improved wages or working conditions directly to the 
employees. In short, once the union has been certified to 
represent the employees, the employer has an obligation to 
bargain with the union and only with the union.
In 1958, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's ruling that 
the Borg-Warner Corporation had, in bad faith, forced the 
union to agree to two provisions in a contract which the 
striking union did not want. 11 In ruling on the case in favor 
of the union, the Board established three categories of 
bargaining demands. In the first category fall all demands 
that are illegal (e.g., closed shop agreements). It would be 
considered bad faith bargaining to make such demands in 
negotiations. In the second category are mandatory items, 
which would include, for example, provisions concerning 
wages, hours, fringe benefits, contract duration, layoff 
policies, and retirement policies. If either party raises a man 
datory bargaining demand, the other part is obligated to 
negotiate in good faith over that demand, else the party 
violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The third category in 
cludes all other issues that are neither illegal nor mandatory 
items, but instead are permissible items for negotiation. For 
example, the union might want to negotiate a contract clause 
extending contract provisions to other work units outside the 
given bargaining unit. These permissible demands do not 
obligate the other party to negotiate the party may simply 
refuse. An important distinction between mandatory and 
permissive items is that negotiations may go to impasse over 
mandatory but not permissive ones. That is, if a union takes 
a walk (i.e., strikes) because the employer refuses to bargain 
over a permissive proposal, then the union is seen as bargain 
ing in bad faith. In bargaining over mandatory items, 
however, the union, having negotiated to an impasse, may 
strike. (Feldacker, 1984, pp. 219-223) Under such cir 
cumstances, the employer may then unilaterally implement 
his final offers. He cannot, on the other hand, implement 
final offers if the impasse stems from negotiation over a per-
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missive bargaining demand. One can readily imagine that 
there is a gray area between what is mandatory and what is 
permissive. It is this gray area (covering such issues as sub 
contracting and partial business closures) that causes con 
siderable confusion and controversy over the subject of good 
faith bargaining obligations.
In an important case decided by the Supreme Court in 
1970, the Board had ruled that the H.K. Porter Company 
had generally been bargaining in bad faith, as was evident 
over its refusal to grant the Steelworkers a dues checkoff 
provision in the contract. 12 The Board ordered the company 
to grant the demand to the union, arguing that refusing to 
grant such a trivial concession was made in bad faith. The 
high court, however, overturned the Board, holding that the 
law strictly prohibits the Board from compelling parties to 
agree even to very minor demands.
Similarly, the Board has held that employers cannot enter 
negotiations with a take-it-or-leave-it stance. Most famous 
for such hard bargaining stances was General Electric Cor 
poration throughout the 1960s. Simply put, the company, 
under the direction of vice-president Lemuel Boulware, 
would determine unilaterally and in advance of any negotia 
tions, the wages, hours, terms and conditions of employ 
ment. There were no negotiations. The union could accept 
the contract or strike! In 1964, the Board ruled that such 
tough bargaining postures (widely referred to as 
"Boulwarism") were in violation of section 8(a)(5). 13
The Board also requires that, as a practice of good faith 
bargaining, employers must provide unions with necessary 
company information for costing out contracts. If the re 
quested data (e.g., hours of overtime by department) are 
readily available, valuable to the union in considering a pro 
posal, and not necessarily confidential in nature, then not 
providing such data would generally be an act of bad faith 
bargaining.
Sophisticated recalcitrant employers may go through all 
the necessary motions of good faith bargaining, being
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careful not to step too far out of the bounds of the above 
restrictions. But their intention may not be to enter a collec 
tive bargaining agreement; instead they are simply "surface 
bargaining" as a way to undermine the union's potential 
strength. Such surface bargaining is indeed a violation of 
section 8(a)(5), but it makes it difficult for the Board to 
remedy. What the Board does is to look at the totality of the 
employer's behavior. Any combination of the following tac 
tics, for example, are usually considered evidence of bad 
faith bargaining: failing to make any compromises or 
counter-proposals to the union's proposals, failing to pro 
vide reasonable explanations as to why the union's proposals 
are unacceptable, agreeing to minor provisions of a contract 
but refusing to agree on any substantive issues, postponing 
meetings or being flippant about negotiations, or proposing 
compensation levels and rules no better than or different 
from before first-contract negotiations began. 14
Having briefly described conduct depicting bad faith 
bargaining, we turn our attention to the procedures used by 
the NLRB for resolving these and all other ULP disputes. In 
addition to the general steps, the special steps for resolving 
"technical" refusals to bargain and remedies for illegal 
discharges are reviewed.
Resolving Unfair Labor Practice Complaints
Short of appeal to the Supreme Court, there are five basic 
steps to the NLRB's procedure of resolving ULP complaints. 
The first step requires an employer, a union, or individual to 
file a "charge" with a regional office. The ULP charge is 
assigned to a field examiner or attorney for investigation. 
Novel or especially complex charges may first be forwarded 
to the Division of Advice for clarification of Board policy or 
precedent. After the initial investigation, the Regional Direc 
tor decides if the case is meritorious or not. If it is not, then 
the charging party is so advised and asked to "withdraw" 
the charge. If the charging party does not withdraw the 
charge then the regional office "dismisses" the case. Upon 
dismissal, the charging party may appeal to the Office of Ap 
peals under the Division of Enforcement Litigation. The
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regional office decision for dismissal is infrequently overrul 
ed and the charging party has no further means of appeal.
If the Regional Director finds the charge meritorious, then 
the second step for resolution is taken. Here, the party 
charged with the ULP is informed of the Regional Director's 
decision and asked to voluntarily comply by ceasing and 
remedying the unlawful behavior (e.g., reinstating and pro 
viding back pay to illegally discharged employees). Non- 
compliance results in a formal complaint made against the 
defendent (generally called the "respondent"). The regional 
office continues trying to obtain a settlement prior to the 
third step.
The third step is a hearing (without jury) before an ad 
ministrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ is independent of the 
Board and performs the duties of a judge, except that ALJ 
decisions are only recommendations to the five-member 
Board. An attorney from the regional office is the pro 
secutor acting in behalf of the complainant. The respondent 
may have his own attorney but it is the General Counsel's at 
torney that has the burden of proof to show that a violation 
of the Act has been committed.
If exceptions to the ALJ's recommendations are not filed 
with the Board within 20 days, the Board automatically 
adopts the ALJ's recommendations. This is step 4. The 
respondent, the General Counsel, or the complainant can file 
"exceptions" to an ALJ's recommendation as it pertains to 
the facts, the law, or the proposed remedy. Cases heard by 
the Board are assigned on a rotating basis by the Executive 
Secretary, generally to three-member panels. In more com 
plex, novel, or potentially precedent-setting cases, the full 
five-member Board decides the case. After examining the 
transcript of the ALJ hearing, any exhibits, and the excep 
tions filed, the majority of the three to five members 
deciding the case determines the Board decision and order. 
Except very infrequently, there is no oral hearing involving 
the parties themselves.
The fifth step is taken when either the losing party wants 
to appeal the Board decision or the NLRB seeks enforcement 
of its decision and order. The losing party may appeal the
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Board decision and order to the Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
Again there is no hearing; the courts base their decisions 
upon the transcripts of the Board and the hearing before the 
ALJ. The court may dismiss or affirm the Board's decision 
and order in full or in part, or it may send the case back to 
the Board for reconsideration based on the court's conclu 
sion that additional weight should be given to certain facts or 
principles of law. Such remanded cases are then examined 
again by the Board. The Board's subsequent decision and 
order is also subject to appeal to the circuit courts.
Board orders are not self-enforcing and some defendants 
ignore them or fail to comply fully. A compliance officer 
with the regional office is assigned to check with the charging 
party about 60 days after the order is made to see if the 
respondent has complied. If the respondent has not, the 
General Counsel seeks enforcement of the Board order in the 
courts of appeal. Once granted enforcement, if the respon 
dent fails to comply, he finds himself in an unwanted posi 
tion known as contempt of court. The losing party to the 
Circuit Court decision may subsequently appeal to the 
Supreme Court. This rarely occurs and the high court 
typically renders no more than a handful of such decisions in 
any given year.
In summary, the normal channel for resolving ULP 
disputes begins with a ULP charge, which is handled infor 
mally with the purpose of securing informal settlements in 
meritorious charges. Meritorious charges not resolved infor 
mally then become formal complaints that are first heard by 
an ALJ, which can be appealed to the Board, the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal and finally to the Supreme Court. Of 
special relevance to first-contract negotiations is the han 
dling of technical refusals to bargain and discriminatory 
discharges. We briefly discuss these next.
In those cases where the employer commits a "technical" 
violation of his duty to bargain in good faith, the regional 
office can petition for a "summary judgement" that by 
passes the hearing before an ALJ (step 3). The petition or 
motion goes directly to the Board for consideration. In most 
cases the Board merely affirms its earlier decision or that of
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the Regional Director with regard to the objections made in 
the representation proceedings. Once this summary judg 
ment has been made, the employer can proceed with his ap 
peal to the circuit courts.
Where the regional office finds that employees have been 
discriminatorily discharged, the standard remedy is 
reinstatement and/or make-whole back pay award. As will 
be discussed in chapter 4, a large proportion of 8(a)(3) viola 
tions are settled informally. The settlement includes some 
amount of back pay but reinstatement is often waived, either 
because the employer will not voluntarily rehire the 
employee or the employee is not willing to return. The back 
pay award deducts from the lost earnings (plus interest) any 
earnings accumulated during the period of illegal discharge. 
In some cases, even earnings that would likely have been 
made had the discharged employee looked more intensively 
for reemployment are deductible. Subsequent to a Board 
order (and generally after court enforcement), if the 
employer contends that the calculation of the back pay 
award is erroneous on some grounds and the parties cannot 
settle the dispute, then the Regional Director orders a "back 
pay specification hearing." This hearing is held before an 
ALJ and the ALJ decision can be contested as in any other 
ULP complaint.
A Profile of NLRB Activities
Let us now draw a profile of NLRB activities in which we 
examine non-neutral Board decisionmaking, the growing 
representation and ULP case load, the stages at which ULPs 
are resolved and associated delays, and statistics pertinent to 
the resolution of objections and challenges to elections.
One of the major criticisms of the NLRB is presidential 
"stacking" of the Board. Presidential administrations 
change and new appointments to the Board typically reflect
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the pro-union or pro-management predilections of these ad 
ministrations. Studies by Gross (1981) and Scher (1961) have 
documented this appointment process covering the Wagner 
Act era and the Eisenhower administration. The recent 
flurry of attention being given to President Reagan's ap 
pointments to the Board seems to indicate that the same 
flawed process is alive and well. A recent empirical investiga 
tion by Cooke and Gautschi (1982) of Board member deci 
sions involving novel and precedent-setting cases over the 
1954-1977 period gives strong support to the notion that 
Board member decisions are often biased. Based on a prob 
ability model of Board member voting behavior, the authors 
report that Democrats appointed by Democratic presidents 
were substantially more likely to favor union positions 
(either as complainants or respondents) in ULP cases than 
were Republicans appointed by Republican presidents by as 
much as 32 percentage points.
There are of course several negative consequences 
associated with oscillation in Board policy as the Board 
changes its political makeup.
First, inconsistency and ambiguity in interpreting 
legal and factual parameters in ULP cases impede 
stable labor-management relations. Neither party 
can clearly judge the appropriateness of the other 
party's actions. Consequently, unions and manage 
ment alike are more inclined to seek both Board 
review of ALJ decisions and court review of Board 
decisions. The long delay associated with ad 
judicating labor-management conflicts can only ex 
acerbate ongoing conflicts. In addition, incon 
sistency and ambiguity reduce the certainty that a 
party's practices will be deemed unlawful. As a 
consequence, both unions and employers are less 
inclined to act in good faith and resolve their own 
disputes. (Cooke and Gautschi, 1982, p. 549)
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With respect to the issue of first-contract negotiation suc 
cess, the historical evidence of biased decisionmaking 
portends fewer decisions from the Reagan Board that favor 
union positions regarding objections and challenges, refusal 
to bargain complaints, and discriminatory discharge com 
plaints.
Also important to our understanding of life at the NLRB is 
an examination of the enormous caseload of representation 
election decisions and ULP charges. Table 2-1 reports the 
caseload for certification elections conducted and ULPs 
resolved over the 1950-1981 period. In fiscal year 1981 (the 
latest published figures available), the NLRB conducted 
about 6,700 certification elections involving over 350,000 
eligible voters and processed more than 31,000 ULP charges 
against employers and nearly 12,000 ULP charges against 
unions. Since 1950 the number of ULP charges processed 
has risen seven-and-one-half fold and certification elections 
have risen about 20 percent.
Finally, there are no published data indicating the out 
come of charges against employers or unions. However, part 
of the story can be told by examining the proportion of cases 
withdrawn or dismissed. In 1981, of the 29,351 ULP charges 
against employers (which were closed), 33 percent were 
withdrawn and 32 percent were dismissed. Of the 11,116 
charges against unions (excluding union jurisdictional 
disputes which are rarely withdrawn or dismissed), 34 per 
cent were withdrawn and 41 percent were dismissed. Hence, 
at least in the initial stages of the NLRB process, some 65 
percent of charges against employers lacked merit, while 
some 75 percent of charges against unions lacked merit in 
1981. That differential in the proportion of meritorious cases 
(as defined) against unions and employers was wider during 
1980 and 1981 than at any other time. However, except for 
1960, a larger proportion of charges against employers were 
found meritorious than charges against unions. The reader 
may also find it interesting to note that the upshot in ULPs
Table 2-1 


















































































SOURCE: Columns 1 and 2 are from table 11, columns 3,4, and 6 from table 2, columns 5 and 7 from table 7 or 8, various annual reports of the 
NLRB. Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 







filed has not been accompanied by a lower proportion of 
meritorious charges. This would suggest that over time both 
employers and unions have either become more willing to 
commit ULPs or that employers, unions, and employees 
have found greater reason or need to become more litigious.
Table 2-2 provides statistics on the flow and disposition of 
ULP cases as they work their way through the stages of the 
NLRB dispute resolution procedure. It is important to note 
that the vast majority of cases (84 percent in 1981) of ULP 
charges are resolved informally. It took a median of 44 days 
per case to informally resolve approximately 35,000 charges 
filed. It has been pointed out by many observers of the 
NLRB that without such a successful record, the whole 
NLRB apparatus would very likely fold under the weight of 
so many charges filed. However, as a word of caution 
against too much optimistic praise, there has yet to be any 
research on the impact of these dismissals, recommended 
withdrawals, or settlements upon subsequent labor- 
management relationships. We must question if indeed these 
resolutions have effectuated well the purposes of the NLRA.
Another 12 percent of charges filed and closed in 1981 
were settled prior to ALJ decisions. Of the 1,583 cases heard 
by ALJs, only about 20 percent were resolved at this step; in 
all other cases, exceptions were filed by losing parties. Of the 
1,264 closed cases decided by the Board, about 29 percent 
reached the circuit courts. Approximately 67 percent of 
Board decisions were fully affirmed, 15 percent were set 
aside, and the remaining cases were modified or remanded 
(in part or in full). Of the 362 cases decided by the circuit 
courts, 54 were appealed to the Supreme Court. The high 
Court, however, only ruled in two cases. Of the two cases 
decided by the Supreme Court, one was affirmed in full and 
one was set aside.
As one can imagine, there is considerable delay in reaching 
settlements and decisions. In 1981 (see table 2-3), it took a 
median of 173 days from the date a formal complaint was 
issued to the completion of a hearing before an ALJ. It took
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at the median another 139 days for ALJs to issue their find 
ings and recommendations. Finally, it took 120 more days at 
the median to obtain a Board decision and order. All in all, 
from the filing of charges to Board decisions it took a me 
dian delay of 490 days in cases closed in 1981. We do not 
have published data on the amount of delay that was added 
for those more than 350 Board decisions heard before the 
courts of appeal. As a rule-of-thumb, however, such litiga 
tion takes an average of one year or better.
Table 2-2 
Methods of Disposition of ULP Cases, 1981
Stage Cases Percent*





2. Before Issuance of Complaint
Withdrawn 13,478 32.9 
Dismissed 14,102 34.4 
Settled 6,777 16.5
3. Settled after Complaint and
before ALJ Decision 5,080 12.3
4. After ALJ Decision
(no exceptions filed) 319 0.008
5. After Board Ruling 902 0.022
6. After Circuit Court Ruling 308 0.008
7. After Supreme Court Action 54 0.001
SOURCE: Annual Report of NLRB, 1981, tables 1A, 7, and 8. 
'Percent based on cases closed.
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Table 2-3 




1. Filing of charge to issuance of complaint 44
2. Complaint issued to close of hearing 173
3. Close of hearing to issuance of ALJ decision 139
4. ALJ decision to issuance of Board decision 120
5. Total days from filing of charge to issuance
of Board decision 490
SOURCE: Annual Report of NLRB, 1981, table 23.
Table 2-4 provides a historical sketch of Section 8(a)(3) 
charges and related remedial settlements or Board orders. 
Since 1950 there has been a near sixfold increase in annual 
8(a)(3) charges brought before the NLRB, reaching nearly 
18,000 in 1981. Given that over the 1950-1981 period there 
has only been a 20 percent increase in the number of cer 
tification elections, a nearly 60 percent drop in total eligible 
voters (from 888,287 in 1950 to 352,903 in 1981), and that 
roughly 90 percent of all 8(a)(3) violations occur during 
union organizing and first-contract negotiations, the 
dramatic increase in 8(a)(3) charges has been simply 
astonishing. Also, as reported in table 2-4, there has been a 
greater than elevenfold increase in the number of employees 
receiving back pay from employers. In 1981 alone, nearly 
26,000 employees received back pay, the total awards 
amounting to over $36 million.
Of those 25,631 workers receiving back pay in 1981, 6,463 
were offered reinstatement and 3,373 were placed on 
preferential hiring lists only. Of those offered reinstatement, 
78 percent were apparently willing to accept reinstatement. 
Unfortunately, data are not available to indicate what pro 
portion of those placed on preferential hiring lists actually
Table 2-4 





































































































SOURCE: From various annual reports of the NLRB. See selected years of Annual Report of the National Labor Regulations Board, generally
Tables 2 and 4.
a. Not all 8(a)(3) charges involve a discharge, but rather involve some other form of discrimination related to promotions, transfers, scheduling,
or pay. As reported above it appears that over 90 percent of 8(a)(3) violations involve a discharge. The figures presented include any ULP charge
in which an 8(a)(3) violation was charged even if other ULP charges were filed simultaneously.
b. Number of cases in which reinstatement was offered.





got reinstated. Based on Stephens and Chancy's (1974) study 
of illegally discharged employees placed on preferential hir 
ing lists, however, only 58 percent are eventually rehired.
As discussed above, unions and employers may object to 
campaign conduct or challenge ballots at election time. In 
fiscal year 1981, the NLRB closed (i.e., ended all decision- 
making on) 6,656 certification elections in which 1,110 ob 
jections were filed. In 16.8 percent of certification elections, 
objections were filed 41 percent of these by employers, 57 
percent by unions, and 2 percent by both parties. Of the 
1,110 total, 337 objections were withdrawn and 613 were 
overruled by the NLRB. Consequently, only 16.5 percent of 
all objections were found meritorious by the NLRB. Given 
our interest in first-contract negotiation outcomes, we might 
ask whether or not employers are filing objections at a higher 
rate today than in the recent past. As reported in table 2-5, 
there has been a steady increase of nearly threefold in the 
rate of filings since 1965 (no published statistics are available 
prior to 1965). In 1965, only 5.7 percent of elections won by 
unions (and closed during that year) resulted in employer ob 
jections. By 1981, over 15 percent of all elections won were 
accompanied by employer objections. Moreover, as a pro 
portion of total objections filed, employer objections ac 
counted for only 26 percent in 1965 but rose to 41 percent in 
1981. Unfortunately, we have no statistics on what propor 
tion of these objections were found meritorious. Nor can we 
attribute the increase to an increasing intention among 
employers to delay bargaining obligations, given the 
possibility that unions may have become more willing to 
commit objectionable behavior.
As previously reviewed, the NLRB has authority to set 
aside election results where either party acts sufficiently bad 
ly during the election campaign. The NLRB may either order 
the election rerun or, in cases where employer campaign 
behavior was egregious, the Board may simply order the 
employer to bargain in good faith sometimes without 
holding any election. Table 2-6 reports the number of rerun
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elections and bargaining orders over the 1965-1981 period. 
Of the 6,656 certification elections closed in 1981, only 147 
were rerun elections, a sharp increase over the 79 rerun elec 
tions in 1979 but 22 percent fewer than held in 1965. Only 30 
percent of rerun elections in 1981 resulted in union victories, 
which is quite low in comparison to the union victory rate of 
47 percent in 1975.
Table 2-5
Employer Objections to Closed Certification Elections 




























SOURCE: Annual Report of NLRB, selected years, tables 11A and 11C.
Table 2-6
Certification Election Reruns




































SOURCES: Columns 1 and 2 are taken from table 11 of various Annual Reports of the 
NLRB. Columns 3 and 4 are taken from a memorandum from Robert Volger to John Van 
de Water of the NLRB, 9/14/81.
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According to unpublished NLRB records, only 14 Gissel- 
type bargaining orders were made in 1979 following union 
defeats at the polls. As reported in table 2-6, there has been 
little variation in the number of such bargaining orders over 
the 1965-1979 period. In an additional 39 instances in 1979, 
the Board ordered employers to negotiate in good faith with 
unions where no elections were ever held. Based on a 1982 
poll by the AFL-CIO of its affiliated unions which secured 
Gissel-type bargaining orders during 1979, it is reported that 
only 28 percent of the 40 bargaining orders resulted in first 
contracts. Based on this limited evidence it would appear, 
therefore, that a bargaining order is hardly an adequate 
remedy for egregious employer campaign conduct.
Finally, one tactic of recalcitrant employers who have lost 
elections to unions or have been ordered to bargain by the 
Board is simply to refuse to bargain in good faith. As 
discussed, those Section 8(a)(5) violations can entail 
technical refusals to bargain or surface bargaining. In fiscal 
year 1981, there were over 9,800 refusal-to-bargain charges 
brought against employers. This compares to only 913 
brought against unions (Section 8(3)(b) charges). There has 
been a greater than sevenfold increase in refusal-to-bargain 
charges against employers since 1950 and a greater than five 
fold increase of like charges against unions since 1950. 15 We 
do not know what proportion of 8(a)(5) charges are 
associated with first-contract negotiations. However, one 
could reasonably surmise that the reported rate of increase in 
refusal-to-bargain charges is just as likely to be associated 
with first-contract negotiations as they are with contract 
renewals (if not more so).
Conclusion
The NLRB handles an enormous case load some 43,000 
ULP charges and 12,500 representation questions and 
disputes in 1981 alone. There are 33 regional offices and 19 
assorted subregional offices scattered across the U.S. at 
which this case load begins and in which the great majority 
of cases are resolved either through dismissals, withdrawals,
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formal and informal settlements, or at Regional Director 
discretion. ALJs issued decisions in over 1,200 disputes dur 
ing 1981. The five-member Board issued decisions in over 
1,000 contested ULP complaints, over 500 contested 
representation issues, and in more than 1,000 other un- 
contested cases and labor-management disputes. Further 
more, some 360 NLRB cases were brought before the circuit 
courts for enforcement and another 252 were appealed by 
losing parties. 16 In fact, it is worth noting that the NLRB was 
involved in more litigation in the courts of appeal than any 
other federal administrative agency.
The resolution of ULP charges and election campaign 
disputes takes a long time, especially those reaching the 
Board and courts of appeal. To the chagrin of many, the old 
saw that "justice delayed is justice denied" has very real 
meaning in labor-management disputes over union organiz 
ing. Delays in resolving employer objections and refusals to 
bargain are bound to frustrate union efforts and rights to 
translate election victories into satisfactory contracts, a 
hypothesis to be tested in the following chapter. 
Discriminatory discharges have risen to an unprecedented 
level in the post-Wagner Act period, even perhaps to a 
greater extent than in the pre-Wagner Act period. The im 
pact of illegal discharges upon election outcomes and first- 
contract negotiation outcomes has heretofore been untested. 
In the following chapter we examine the impact of NLRB 
procedural delays in resolving objections and challenges to 
elections, discriminatory discharges, and refusals to bargain 
upon first-contract negotiation outcomes.
NOTES
1. The following sources may be consulted for further elaboration upon 
the NLRB's structure and operational procedures. NLRB Rules and 
Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Series 8, as amended. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). NLRB 
Casehandling Manual, Part One, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings 
(April 1975), as amended; Part Two, Representational Proceedings (Oc 
tober 1975), as amended; and Part Three, Compliance Proceedings
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evidence that this has or has not become the case, however.
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Labor Relations Board, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
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U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1981, pp. 20-23.
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The extent of union representation in the private sector 
has been steadily declining over the last three decades. As a 
percent of the nonagricultural labor force, union member 
ship dropped from a high of 35 percent in 1955 to only 21 
percent by 1980. 1 There has been much written in recent 
years attempting to explain this decline. 2 Among the more 
popular explanations are the following: (1) a changing labor 
force which, for a variety of reasons, has become less in 
terested in traditional union representation; (2) a decline in 
the manufacturing sector which, since the passage of the 
Wagner Act, has been the heartland of union organizing; 
(3) the expansion of government protections in the 
workplace which have reduced the need for union represen 
tation; (4) reduced union organizing efforts by national 
unions; (5) improved human resource management practices 
that have eliminated many of the conditions that spur union 
organizing; and (6) stepped-up employer resistance to 
unionization.
Much of the loss in the degree of union representation is 
tied to the reduction in the number of employees voting for
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union representation in certification elections. In 1950, for 
example, unions won about 75 percent of all certification 
elections, but by 1981 they were winning only 45 percent. 3 
Moreover, as previously reported in table 2-1, the number of 
eligible voters in certification elections in 1981 was only 40 
percent of the total eligible in elections held in 1950. Recent 
analyses of the factors that help explain the declining elec 
tion success indicate that greater employer resistance (partly 
effectuated through NLRB procedural delays in conducting 
elections) plays a significant role. 4 To date, however, no 
research has been published showing a direct relationship 
between discriminatory discharges and election outcomes, 
albeit the circumstantial evidence strongly suggests this is a 
very important factor.
Although there has been considerable research about 
union growth and representation election outcomes, no 
study of the factors that explain the failure of unions to ob 
tain first contracts can be found in the literature. Prosten 
(1979) of the AFL-CIO reported in 1978, however, that ap 
proximately 22 percent of first-contract negotiations fail to 
result in agreements between unions and employers. 5 The 
present investigation likewise finds that unions lose 23-28 
percent of their bids for first-contract agreements. We do 
not, unfortunately, have statistics to examine whether or not 
the failing of unions to get first contracts has been on the 
rise. But given that not until the mid-1970s was this problem 
publicized by unions, it is very likely that it only became a 
serious problem in the last decade. Thus it would appear that 
one important factor in the decline in union representation 
has become the inability of unions to secure contracts subse 
quent to winning certification elections.
The lack of systematic research about the causes for 
failure to obtain first contracts has not, however, been 
coupled with idle concern by the union movement. Indeed, 
as part of the 1977 Labor Reform Bill, unions sought to
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amend the NLRA with several provisions pertinent to first- 
contract negotiations. These included expedited NLRB pro 
cedures, self-enforcing NLRB orders, make-whole remedies 
for refusal to bargain, and mandatory injunctions and dou 
ble back pay claims against employers for illegally discharg 
ing union activists. Although the reform bill was defeated in 
the U.S. Senate (by filibuster) in 1978, the same public policy 
issues surrounding first-contract negotiations remain impor 
tant issues today. 6 In chapter 4, the provisions of the 1977 
Labor Reform Bill are reviewed and evaluated.
The heart of the problem according to the union leaders is 
unnecessary procedural delays. For instance, Prosten con 
cludes:
... in most situations ... the absence of an 
agreement reflected an employer who had exploited 
the weaknesses of the National Labor Relations 
Act to frustrate the results of the election. Typically 
the employer had dragged the process out long 
enough to decimate the union's majority. (Prosten, 
1979, p. 247)
Clearly, employers who elect to use delay as a tactical 
maneuver to chip away at union support subsequent to the 
election have numerous avenues under the NLRA to delay 
good faith bargaining. By filing objections and challenges to 
elections, by refusing to bargain until court review of union 
certifications, and by surface or shadow bargaining until 
compelled by the court system to negotiate, employers can 
stall negotiations literally for years. A second and often con 
current means of diminishing union strength is through 
discriminatory discharges of union activists.
In order to examine the impact of NLRB procedural 
delays, discriminatory discharges, and other salient factors 
upon first-contract negotiation outcomes, a theoretical 
model is presented of the factors that come into play in 
negotiating first contracts. There are, of course, factors 
other than those related to the law and NLRB procedures
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that help determine the outcome of first-contract negotia 
tions, though the latter factors are shown to be most impor 
tant. After laying out the general theoretical framework for 
our analysis, a set of testable hypotheses are developed 
which are tested against two samples of first-contract 
negotiation outcomes: one from the state of Indiana and one 
nationwide. 7 The Indiana based sample was designed to col 
lect data about NLRB (Region 25) handling of objections 
and challenges to election results, refusal to bargain, and 
discriminatory discharge, as well as more detailed informa 
tion about firm-to-industry wage ratios and local labor 
market factors. The nationwide sample was compiled in 
order to gain greater generalizability of the findings and to 
examine the impact of southern sentiment toward union 
representation, so-called right-to-work laws, and national 
union organizational features upon first-contract negotia 
tions outcomes. Due to differences in data collection be 
tween the two samples, several hypotheses are either testable 
against only one sample or specified differently across 
samples. These differences are described later in the chapter.
Theory
The understanding of what factors help determine the 
likelihood that a union will successfully negotiate a first con 
tract can be theoretically viewed in terms of relative power. 
The greater the relative power of the union vis-a-vis the 
employer, the higher the probability that an agreement will 
be reached. In defining relative power, we can begin with 
Chamberlain's explanation of relative bargaining power.
[I]f the cost to B of disagreeing on A's terms is 
greater than the cost of agreeing on A's terms, 
while the cost to A of disagreeing on B's terms is 
less than the cost of agreeing on B's terms, then A's 
bargaining power is greater than that of B. 
(Chamberlain, 1951, p. 221)
Based on Chamberlain's definition, it can be maintained that 
if management can convince the union that management's
First-Contract Negotiation 63
cost to agreeing to a contract are greater than management's 
costs to disagreeing to a contract and, simultaneously, the 
union perceives that its costs to demanding a contract (i.e., 
disagreeing) are greater than its cost of foregoing a first con 
tract (i.e., agreeing), then the union will not obtain the first 
contract.
Chamberlain's definition does not provide us, however, 
with a larger picture of the factors that influence the costs of 
agreeing and disagreeing. For that broader understanding of 
relative power, we turn to the following (Cooke 1985) model:
/ - 1 \ relative power, = f (cost of ruleSj , sources of power^ bargaining skills, \
\ sources of powerj bargaining skills- /
Before briefly describing each component of the relative 
power function, it is important to note a general theoretical 
assumption. In general terms, it is assumed throughout that 
the majority of workers involved in first-contract negotia 
tions seek greater control over the work rules that govern 
their employment and that employers resist such added con 
trol. The set of work rules primarily includes (1) the 
substance of rules (e.g., the type and magnitude of wages 
and benefits and layoff criteria) and (2) procedures followed 
in the application of substantive rules.
The first component of the relative power function main 
tains that the relative power of party i decreases as the cost of 
work rules to party j increase. In the context of first-contract 
negotiations, the less costly the demands of the union in 
changing the work rules, the more likely it will succeed in ob 
taining a first contract. The cost of the new rules to the 
employer is not only a function of the absolute size of the de 
mand but is also a function of the ability of the employer to 
absorb or pass along increased labor costs to consumers and 
the perceived nonpecuniary costs employers associate with 
managing in unionized contexts. For example, (everything
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else the same) a union demanding a $1 increase in compensa 
tion per hour is less likely to obtain the first contract than a 
union demanding only a 25 cent increase in compensation 
per hour. In the first instance the employer will resist more 
because added labor costs will have more of an effect on cur 
rent profits or on product price and hence future profits. 
Where employers differ with respect to profitability and/or 
the ability to pass along costs to consumers, the cost of a $1 
increase in hourly compensation varies; and, consequently, 
the ability of unions to obtain first contracts varies across 
employers.
Additionally, the cost of unionization to employers ap 
pears to vary according to perceived nonpecuniary costs. For 
instance, some managers perceive a greater loss of status 
than other managers as a given level of control over work 
rules is relinquished to workers and their representatives. 
Consequently, employer resistance to negotiating first con 
tracts appears to vary beyond that attributable to differences 
in pecuniary costs.
The second component of the relative power function 
holds that as the sources of power available to party i to 
force its demands on party j increase (relative to the sources 
of power available to j to reject the demands of i), the 
relative power of i increases. The sources of power available 
to the parties are derived from the economic, sociopolitical, 
and technical environments of the employer and from 
organizational features of the employer and union.
The economic environment reflects at any given point in 
time the supply and demand conditions of the employer's 
product and labor markets. Cyclical activity, for example, 
acts as a temporal influence upon either party's relative 
power. The sociopolitical environment affects relative power 
as public sentiment, laws, regulatory policies and pro 
cedures, and court decisions favor the bargaining stance of 
either party. Several important facets of the technical en-
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vironment that impact upon relative power include the 
substitutability of capital for labor, the continuous nature of 
the production or service process, and the technically 
strategic position of work units within the production or ser 
vice process. Finally, certain features of organizations 
enhance the relative power of either party and/or certain 
groups within organizations. Of particular importance are 
the organizational structure, group cohesiveness, and 
organizational resources of employers and unions.
The third component of the relative power function 
depicts the bargaining skills of the parties. It is this compo 
nent that envelops the process of exchange about work rule 
preferences and where tactical maneuvers are utilized in ways 
that capitalize on the subjective nature inherent in the assess 
ment of the sources of power and the costs in the relative 
power function. In short, as the bargaining skills of party i 
increase relative to party j, the relative power of party i in 
creases. The appropriate use of a strike or strike threat, for 
example, is a form of negotiating skill (a tactic) used to alter 
the subjective perceptions of employers about the added 
labor costs associated with new contracts and about the 
perceived sources of power available to both parties.
The above theoretical framework of relative power is used 
next to establish testable hypotheses about first-contract 
negotiation outcomes. In short, we seek to specify models 
that include variables reflecting important aspects of the 
components of the relative power function.
Hypotheses
The focus of our investigation is upon whether or not the 
union involved in negotiations obtained a contract. Assum 
ing that workers are utility maximizers, the study of whether 
or not a union obtains a contract examines two outcomes: 
(1) a minimally acceptable (or better) agreement is obtained,
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or (2) a minimally acceptable agreement is not obtained. The 
latter outcome implies that union leaders and/or members 
abandoned their efforts to obtain a contract, presumably 
because the costs of obtaining a contract ultimately 
outweighed the minimally acceptable terms and conditions 
(i.e., benefits) sought. The hypotheses developed below 
follow the theoretical model, but as constrained by limita 
tions in data collection.
(a) Costs
From the first component of the relative power function, 
it is argued that as the cost to management of the proposed 
contract increases, the relative power of the union decreases. 
No estimates of the pecuniary costs of demands by the 
unions in these first-contract negotiations were made, 
however. It would be empirically impossible in the present 
context to collect the information needed to calculate the in 
creased labor costs to employers of (1) the contract (where 
contracts were obtained), or (2) of the last contract demands 
(where contracts were not obtained). Nor was it possible to 
estimate the nonpecuniary costs employers associated with 
union representation. It is possible, however, to test two 
hypotheses that proxy the theoretical notion that added 
labor costs influence the likelihood that unions obtain first 
contracts.
First, conventional thinking indicates that unions pay 
close attention to existing wage and benefit packages 
negotiated throughout the given industry (and sometimes 
beyond) (Kochan, 1980, pp. 214-217). Hence, in first- 
contract negotiations, we can expect unions to bargain for 
the union wage and benefit standard. The level of resistance 
by employers to such demands is a function of how close 
firm wages and benefits are to the union standard. It is 
hypothesized that the higher the firm-to-industry wage- 
benefit ratio, the smaller the expected increase in labor costs 
attributable to signing first contracts and, consequently, the 
greater the probability that unions obtain first contracts.
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Second, it is hypothesized that employers who have ex 
isting union contracts incur lower costs in adding new work 
units than employers having no current union contracts. 
When a union organizes an additional work unit of the 
employer who has an existing contract with the union, the 
existing contract is typically applied to the added work unit 
or is simply modified or supplemented by terms specifically 
applicable to the new unit. The transactional costs of sitting 
down and negotiating a new contract, therefore, are avoided 
or at least reduced. As another explanation of lower costs, 
the perceived loss of status to managers associated with 
union representation where no union representation current 
ly exists is likely to be greater on average than where union 
representation already exists. (Besides capturing the transac 
tional and nonpecuniary costs of negotiating first contracts, 
having an existing contract covering other work units is an 
organizational source of power to unions. This hypothesis is 
developed below.)
(b) Sources of Power
Economic Environment. An important factor of the 
economic environment of any negotiations is cyclical activity 
in the employer's product and labor markets. Economic 
research to date generally maintains and finds statistical sup 
port for the notion that during downswings employers are 
more resistant to and successful in blocking union initiatives 
at the bargaining table than during upswings (Ashenfelter 
and Pencavel, 1969). It is usually hypothesized that 
employers are in a better position to thwart strike activity 
during downswings because (1) product demand is down and 
inventories are up, and (2) the rising supply of labor in 
creases the availability of substitute labor. With respect to 
first-contract negotiations, therefore, the relative power of 
employers to resist the added costs of a contract increases 
during downswings. However, the reduction of alternative 
employment associated with cyclical downswings is likely to 
increase the desire of the work unit to negotiate the first con-
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tract. The logic behind this competing hypothesis rests with 
the fact that a majority of workers in the certification elec 
tion unit are dissatisfied enough with the existing set of work 
rules to vote for union representation as a means of changing 
the existing rules. Because the opportunities to find better 
jobs outside the given firm are reduced during cyclical 
downswings, the dissatisfied majority is more likely to per 
sist in attaining its common goals of changing work rules. 
This hypothesis is consistent with Cooke's (1983) hypothesis 
and statistical findings that workers voting in union certifica 
tion elections are more likely to vote for union representa 
tion as unemployment rises. It may be valuable to the reader 
to point out that in the study of first-contract negotiations 
(like that of certification elections), the analysis of outcomes 
is a conditional probability conditioned on the fact that an 
election was held and that first contract negotiations were 
pursued (i.e., the election was won by the union).
In large part, wage competition in the labor market is 
determined by supply and demand conditions in local labor 
markets especially for nonmanagerial and nonprofessional 
workers. Employers will not want to pay wages above the go 
ing local rate; they do not have to in order to attract workers. 
Consequently, the higher the firm-to-local wage rate ratio, 
the more willing is the employer to incur a strike since he is 
better able to replace his current labor force at his going 
wage rate. It is hypothesized, therefore, that the probability 
of obtaining an agreement is negatively related to the firm- 
to-local market wage ratio. 8
Sociopolitical Environment. Public sentiment toward the 
perceived social consequences of union representation par 
tially determines the relative power of unions. In localities 
and during periods where union representation is perceived 
less favorably than in general, the relative power of unions 
declines. A frequently maintained presumption is that 
southern communities are less favorably disposed toward
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unions than elsewhere, which effectively reduces union 
organizing success. Although the results of empirical in 
vestigations remain mixed with regard to the impact of 
southern inhospitality upon union growth and election out 
comes, no studies have examined the possible negative effect 
upon first-contract negotiation success. That hypothesis is 
examined herein.
As a second dimension of the sociopolitical environment, 
right-to-work or "free rider" laws are hypothesized to 
reduce the probability that unions obtain first contracts. 
Given that the NLRA mandates that unions represent all 
workers in the recognized bargaining unit, unions generally 
seek union security clauses in agreements. These clauses 
typically require that all workers in the bargaining unit join 
the union and/or pay representation fees as a condition of 
continued employment. Providing free services to "free 
riders" is clearly at variance with union objectives. It is not 
the purpose of the present study to debate the issue of 
whether or not workers ought to be compelled to join unions 
or pay representation fees when a majority of workers win 
representation rights. Instead, it is important to understand 
a union's greater reluctance to battle employers over first 
contracts when union security clauses are prohibited. Thus, 
it is hypothesized that, ceteris paribus, in states that prohibit 
union security clauses, unions are more reluctant to invest 
resources and time in obtaining first contracts than in states 
without such laws and, hence, are less likely to obtain first 
contracts.
NLRB policies, procedures, and practices in the resolution 
of election disputes and employer ULPs are also expected to 
impact upon first-contract negotiation outcomes. It is the 
NLRB regulation of union-management relations that Pro- 
sten (1979) reports to be a major stumbling block for union 
organizing because the procedures of the NLRB invariably 
bolster any employer resistance. The basic crux of the prob-
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lem faced by unions is the delay associated with the resolu 
tion of objections, challenges, and ULP complaints of 
refusal-to-bargain. The greater the delay between (1) the 
date of the election victory and (2) the date for which all ob 
jections, challenges, and ULP complaints are resolved (and 
the employer is ordered to bargain in good faith), the greater 
the opportunities for the employer to chip away at worker 
cohesiveness and union resources. Theoretically, the relative 
power of unions is diminished as a consequence of greater 
delay and hence the probability of successfully negotiating 
the contract is likewise reduced.
We test the hypothesis that delay in the resolution of ob 
jections and challenges to the election reduces the probability 
that unions obtain first contracts. We also test the 
hypotheses that refusal-to-bargain and illegal discrimination 
against union activists, likewise, reduce the chances of 
unions to secure first contracts. Refusal to bargain augments 
delay and discrimination (section 8(a)(3) violations) reduces 
the cohesiveness of the work unit due to implicit threats of 
further discrimination, especially the threat of discharge.
Technical Environment. There are at least three important 
facets of the technical environment that determine whether 
workers or managers are more likely to increase or reduce 
their relative power positions. First, the greater the 
substitutability of capital (e.g., robots) for labor, the greater 
management's relative power over unions, and conversely. 
Second, the more continuous the nature of production (e.g., 
plastics production in comparison to small batch machine 
tooling), the greater management's relative power vis-a-vis 
the union, and conversely. And, third, the more vulnerable 
the production or service process is to disruption by selected 
work units, the greater the relative bargaining power of those 
work units over management.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining information about 
the technical environment of the work units involved in each 
observation of first-contract negotiations, measures or prox-
First-Contract Negotiation 71
ies for this source of power are absent from the empirical 
models below. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that 
the features of the technical environment noted above, which 
could be hypothesized to affect the relative power of the par 
ties, are largely independent of the variables included in the 
models. Consequently, the inferences drawn from the tests 
will be unbiased with respect to the classical omitted variable 
problem.
Organizational Features. The final source of power 
envelops organizational features of firms and unions. 
Several organizational features are hypothesized to impact 
upon first-contract negotiations. First, the greater the sup 
port among the work unit for union representation, the more 
weight a strike threat carries at the bargaining table. 
Discriminatory discharges subsequent to union election vic 
tories are, for instance, more effective when the union enjoys 
only a slim majority of worker support. Furthermore, since 
first-contract negotiations typically take months, turnover 
(voluntary and involuntary) among workers within the new 
bargaining unit is likely to reduce the majority support. 
Here, delay between election date and closing date by the 
NLRB increases the probability that union support will 
decline. In short, the less cohesive the work unit in its bid for 
a contract, the less likely a first contract will be obtained.
Worker cohesiveness is also a function of what gets 
negotiated at the bargaining table. Having elected to bargain 
collectively in order to gain greater control over the full set 
of work rules, workers establish and seek to obtain work 
rules that reflect their common interests. When union 
representatives negotiate rules that are at variance with the 
priorities and immediate interests of the newly formed 
membership, organizational cohesiveness during negotia 
tions is diminished. As affiliates of national union organiza 
tions, local unions have varying degrees of autonomy in 
negotiating work rules. National organizations that require 
approval of contract provisions, for example, obviously 
place some restrictions upon negotiable terms and conditions 
of employment. It is hypothesized that (everything else the
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same), the probability of obtaining contracts is reduced 
where national unions must approve local agreements.
A second feature of the union organization is the level of 
resources available to negotiate first contracts. Local unions, 
for instance, that can draw upon financial support in the 
case of a strike and/or negotiation expertise from national 
union organizations increase their organizational source of 
power. Employers who know that national organizations are 
prepared to support locals with strike monies are likely to 
give greater weight to implicit or explicit strike threats (which 
is hypothesized to increase the relative power of local 
unions). In addition, the larger the work unit, the more likely 
national union organizations make resources available to af 
filiated locals and local .union organizations allocate 
resources for first-contract negotiations. Such a decision rule 
is a function of both the gain to union membership and ex 
pected servicing costs. Since there are fixed costs to both 
negotiations and the servicing of contracts, the larger the 
work unit involved, the greater the net average return on 
resources spent by unions.
Finally, where unions have existing contracts covering 
other work units, the probability of obtaining a first contract 
is enhanced. In addition to reducing the cost to the 
employer, an existing contract increases the organizational 
sources of power of the unions, which can call upon the 
covered work unit(s) to support a threatened or actual strike.
(c) Negotiation Skills.
The final component of the relative power function im 
plies that as the negotiation skills of union representatives in 
crease, the relative power of the union increases. Precise 
estimates of union and management negotiation skills would 
be empirically intractable in the present study. As a rough 
proxy for this dimension of the relative power function, 
however, it is hypothesized that union negotiation skills are 
greater in first-contract negotiations when national union 
representatives participate in negotiations. This assumes that
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negotiators from national unions are more experienced and 
thus more effective at the bargaining table (on average) than 
local union negotiators. In addition to bringing greater ex 
pertise to the table, the national representative is likely to 
reflect a commitment by the national organization to 
allocate resources to the local toward securing the first con 
tract.
Striking and threatening to strike over first contracts is 
theoretically a tactic of negotiations. Negotiators who use 
the strike or threat-of-strike more skillfully invariably in 
crease the relative power of the union. 9 Empirically 
estimating the impact of strikes and strike threats upon 
negotiation outcomes is problematic. Strike threats are as 
much implicit in the subtle give-and-take of negotiations as 
they are explicit. Creating accurate measures of strike threats 
would be quite difficult on one hand and well beyond the 
scope of the present study on the other hand. Although data 
on the incidence of strikes has been collected in the present 
investigation, treating strikes as an independent variable in 
the present model would be quite misleading. Generally 
speaking, a strike only occurs when the threat of a strike 
fails. Any statistical comparison of negotiation outcomes 
where strikes do and do not occur cannot tell us what the 
true impact of strikes is upon securing agreements since suc 
cessful strike threats would be sufficient in many (if not 
most) cases in securing contracts.
Data Collection
(a) Indiana Sample
The first step of the data collection was to identify all 
union certification election victories during 1979-1980 in In 
diana within NLRB Region 25. These victories were iden 
tified from NLRB representation election files provided by 
the NLRB on magnetic tape. In the second step, the selected
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cases were then matched with Region 25 unpublished 
records. Those records included names and addresses of 
employers and local union representatives, election and cer 
tification dates, data about objections and challenges to the 
elections, and data about subsequent unfair labor practice 
complaints. Using the names and addresses recorded, (1) a 
short survey instrument was used to collect information 
from union representatives and (2) unpublished data about 
firm wages (described below) were collected from the In 
diana Employment Security Commission. The survey to 
union representatives asked whether a contract was obtained 
and several questions about duration of negotiations, the 
utilization of national representatives and mediators during 
negotiations, other work units under contract with the given 
employer, strike activity, and business closures. (See Appen 
dix, Item 1.) A 93 percent response rate was obtained after 
two mailings of the survey and repeated follow-up telephone 
calls.
According to NLRB data files, unions won 137 certifica 
tion elections in 1979-1980 in Indiana, NLRB Region 25. Of 
these 137 observations, 2 were excluded because published 
files were incorrect with respect to year of election and name 
of union. Three local unions could not be contacted by mail 
or phone and six other local union representatives failed to 
respond to the survey instrument. Finally, six other observa 
tions had missing data on one or more independent variable 
and two observations were still in negotiations. The final 
sample included 118 observations.
(b) Nationwide Sample
A sample of first-contract negotiations was selected from 
NLRB union certification election records for 1979 and 
1980. A random sample of 500 union certification election 
victories was initially selected. The only restriction placed on 
the sampling was the requirement that unions involved were 
reported by the NLRB as AFL-CIO affiliates. This restric-
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tion was made in order to facilitate the subsequent collection 
of data in short, because the research department of the 
AFL-CIO agreed to match union victories with appropriate 
representatives of each national union involved in the elec 
tions (generally the research directors of national organiza 
tions). The restriction of the sample to AFL-CIO affiliates 
biases the sample against the experience of smaller (typically 
local) independent unions and the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. 10
In the second step in the data collection, national union 
representatives identified by the AFL-CIO were asked for 
assistance. Assistance came in the form of the national union 
representative either (a) directly gathering the requested data 
from local representatives or (b) providing names and ad 
dresses of regional or local representatives involved directly 
in the negotiations. Where names were provided, survey in 
struments were mailed directly to those representatives. (See 
Appendix, Item 2.) A follow-up survey was mailed to 
nonrespondents. Telephone calls were subsequently made to 
nonrespondents and answers were sought during telephone 
conversations. Of the 59 national unions involved in the 
survey, no response was obtained after repeated requests 
from national representatives of 22 unions.
Of the initially selected 500 cases, the following cases were 
subsequently dropped from the sample:
1. 32 cases that could not be matched with AFL-CIO af 
filiated national unions (and no questionnaires were 
mailed),
2. 27 cases for which unions reported having no record 
of the selected elections,
3. 7 cases in which unions reported that selected elec 
tions were either decertification or unit clarification 
elections,
4. 6 cases where first-contract negotiations were still 
being negotiated,
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5. 5 cases in which unions reported that selected cer 
tification elections were lost, and
6. 5 responses that could not be matched with the 
sample or were incomplete.
Of the remaining 418 cases, responses were obtained cover 
ing 140 negotiations.
Model Specification
Because of anticipated difficulties in collecting data and 
limited resources for that collection, two samples of data 
were compiled (as reported above). Thus, not all the 
hypotheses established were testable solely against either 
sample, although the empirical specifications are reasonably 
similar. In order to facilitate the discussion of the empirical 
specification of the models by simple algebraic statements, 
descriptions of the models are given first, followed by ex 
planations of specification. This is done separately for the 
Indiana and nationwide samples.
In both sample specifications the dependent variable 
(CONTRACT) is dichotomous: equal to 1 when a contract is 
obtained, and equal to 0 when a contract is not obtained. An 
appropriate estimator for the present inquiry is the 
cumulative logistic probability function which takes the 
form,
CONTRACT = 1_____
1 + e -(^W
estimated by maximum likelihood. X is a vector of indepen 
dent variables discussed below, and 0 is a vector of logit 
coefficients.
(a) Specification: Indiana Sample 
The following equation is estimated:
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CONTRACT; = j FIRM$/IND$j + b2 OTHCONTj UNEMP
+ b4 FIRM$/LOCAL$j OB JDELAYj + b6 ULPS + b?
ln(SIZE«PCVOTEj) + bg NATREPj 







= (firm average annual wage/3-digit SIC average 
annual wage in Indiana) x 100
= 1 when another contract with given union is pres 
ent, 0 otherwise
= county unemployment rate (x 100)
= (firm average annual wage/county average an 
nual wage) x 100
= days between election date and date when NLRB 
regional office closed union certification pro 
cedure 1 '
= 1 if union files a meritorious ULP complaint 
against employer for refusal to bargain and/or 
for discriminatory discharge, 0 otherwise
1 n(SIZE«PCVOTE) = natural log (size of unit multipled by percent vote 
for union representation (x 100))
NATREP = 1 if a representative from the national union par 
ticipated in negotiations, 0 otherwise
In alternative specifications, the following variables are 
employed:
HINDS = 1 when FIRM$/IND$ is > 25 percent above the mean 
ratio
HILOCALS = 1 when FIRMS/LOCALS is > 25 percent above the 
mean ratio
DISCDIS = 1 if meritorious ULP complaint of discriminatory 
discharge was made, 0 otherwise
REFUSE = 1 if meritorious ULP complaint of refusal-to-bargain 
was made, 0 otherwise
BOTHULPS = 1 if meritorious ULP complaints of discriminatory 
discharge and refusal-to-bargain were made, 0 other 
wise
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To test the first hypothesis concerning the costs of the first 
contract to the employer, we calculate the ratio of the 
average annual wage of the firm prior to the year of the elec 
tion victory (1979-1980) to the annual average wage of the 
3-digit SIC industry (in Indiana) of the firm during the same 
year. Wage data were obtained from the Indiana Employ 
ment Security Division, Research and Statistics Section. The 
annual average wage for the firm was calculated by dividing 
total annual wages by average annual employment. 12 Annual 
average wages for 3-digit SIC industries were calculated by 
multiplying the average annual weekly wage by 52. This ratio 
(call it FIRM$/IND$) suffers from measurement error in 
that firm averages are based on both salaried and non- 
salaried employee earnings, while industry averages are bas 
ed on production worker earnings. Obviously, inferences 
about the size of the estimated coefficients will be potentially 
seriously biased. Measurement error is also likely to produce 
inefficient estimates, increasing the chances of wrongly find 
ing no significant statistical support for the hypothesis. As 
an alternative specification, I construct a dummy variable 
(HINDS) equal to 1 when FIRM$/IND$ is > 25 percent 
above the mean estimated ratio, and 0 otherwise. Under this 
specification, we still could obtain seriously biased estimates 
of the magnitude of the relationship between high relative 
wages and CONTRACT, but we would reduce the chances 
of finding no statistically significant relationship where in 
fact one exists.
The second variable related in part to the costs of the first 
contract to the employer is whether or not the union had an 
existing contract with the employer covering other workers. 
It was also hypothesized that having an existing contract 
reflects an organizational source of power to the union. To 
test the hypothesis that an existing contract is positively 
related to obtaining first-contracts, we create a dummy 
variable OTHCONT, equal to 1 if the union had an existing 
contract and equal to 0 otherwise.
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The second component of the relative power function 
states that as the sources of power to the union are greater, 
the probability of obtaining first contracts is higher. To test 
the hypothesis that cyclical market conditions influence first- 
contract negotiation outcomes, the county unemployment 
rate enters the models. County statistics are utilized because 
these rates are readily available and they would appear to 
roughly approximate the surrounding labor market of firms 
within the county. (Of course measurement error is present, 
especially where firms are located on the perimeter of county 
boundary lines.) Because the predicted relationship is am 
biguous, a two-tailed test is made.
To construct a variable depicting the relative wage of the 
firm vis-a-vis the local market wage, the firm average annual 
wage (discussed above) is divided by the annual average wage 
of production workers in the county for which the firm is 
located. (This ratio is called FIRMS/LOCALS.) The same 
measurement error problems are encountered here as in the 
construction of FIRM$/IND$. Because of the probability of 
generating biased and inefficient estimates, the dummy 
variable HILOCAL$ was constructed. HILOCAL$ equals 1 
when FIRMS/LOCALS is > 25 percent above the mean 
estimated ratio, and otherwise equals 0. In the case of either 
variable, a negative relationship is predicted.
As an important sociopolitical variable, the delay between 
election date and the date the employer is obligated to begin 
good faith bargaining is hypothesized to be negatively 
related to the probability of obtaining first contracts. The 
tests below measure the days between election date and the 
date for which the NLRB regional office closed the certifica 
tion election case (OBJDELAY). This closing date, however, 
includes only the time elapsed to resolve objections and 
challenges through the five-member Board. It does not in 
clude additional delays associated with ULP complaints of 
refusal-to-bargain or discrimination. To test the impact of 
refusal-to-bargain and discrimination upon contract negotia 
tion outcomes, data concerning ULP complaints were col-
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lected from the NLRB regional office (Region 25). The type 
and date of complaint, its disposition (dismissed, 
withdrawn, settled), and whether or not a hearing was held 
were recorded. From these data, the variable ULPS is con 
structed. Whenever an 8(a)(5) or 8(a)(3) complaint was 
deemed meritorious by the regional office and resulted in a 
hearing before an administrative law judge or was settled 
prior to a hearing, ULPS is set to 1, but otherwise is set to 0. 
Either type of complaint was considered timely for present 
purposes when it was filed subsequent to the election victory 
but within one year of the given election victory or before a 
contract was signed (when this date was provided by survey 
respondents). By restricting the variable ULPS to complaints 
which lead to a hearing or were settled without a hearing, 
ULPS should depict reasonably well illegal employer ac 
tivities.
As an alternative specification, ULPS is dropped and 
three separate dummy variables enter the model. These 
variables depict (1) whether or not a meritorious discrimina 
tion complaint was filed (DISCRIM), (2) whether or not a 
meritorious refusal-to-bargain complaint was filed 
(REFUSE), and (3) whether or not meritorious complaints 
were filed against the employer for both discrimination and 
refusal-to-bargain (BOTHULPS). This alternative specifica 
tion allows us to look more closely at the separate effect of 
discrimination and refusal-to-bargain upon negotiation out 
comes.
Two organizational features were hypothesized to in 
fluence negotiation outcomes: cohesiveness and size of 
bargaining unit. Cohesiveness is measured in the model by 
the proportion of workers who voted for union representa 
tion in the certification election. It is hypothesized that the 
larger the proportion of workers voting for representation, 
the greater the cohesiveness of the work unit in securing the 
first contract, and, consequently, the greater the probability 
of obtaining a contract. It was also hypothesized that the 
larger the size of the unit, the greater the resources spent by 
the union in securing a contract, which in turn increases the
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probability of obtaining the first contract. But as shown in 
previous research, size of unit and percent vote for union 
representation are highly and negatively correlated. 13 In the 
present sample, the simple zero order correlation is -.33. 
Given a small sample, substantial collinearity problems are 
likely to arise. As an alternative specification which avoids 
the inherent collinearity problem, an interaction term is 
calculated based on size and percent vote for representation. 
The interaction term tests the hypothesis that contracts are 
more likely to be obtained when the bargaining unit is larger 
and more cohesive. The variable ln(SIZE«PCVOTE) is 
calculated by multiplying the size of the unit by the percent 
voting for representation. The natural log of the variable is 
taken in the belief that beyond some multiplication of size 
and cohesiveness, positive but decreasing marginal gains are 
realized.
Finally, as one proxy of the role of negotiation skills upon 
first contract negotiation outcomes, a dummy variable is 
employed to indicate whether or not a representative from 
the national organization participated in the negotiations 
(NATREP). The variable equals 1 when a national represen 
tative participated in negotiations, and 0 otherwise. As noted 
above, NATREP is also likely to pick up an organizational 
source of power, namely, the increased support of the na 
tional organization.
(b) Specification: Nationwide Sample
The empirical specification of the model tested against the 
nationwide sample is:
CONTRACT^ = aj + bj OTHCONTj + b2 UNEMPj + b3 SOUTH'RTWj 
+ b4 ULPSj + b5 APPRO VEj + b6 ln(SIZE«PCVOTE)j+ b? NATREP/
where CONTRACT = 1 when contract is obtained, 0 otherwise
OTHCONT = 1 when another contract with given union is pres 
ent, 0 otherwise
UNEMP = state annual unemployment rate (x 100) during 
year of negotiations
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SOUTH* RTW = 1 if state in which negotiations were held was in 
the South and in state with right-to-work law, 0 
otherwise
ULPS = 1 if union filed meritorious ULP complaint(s) 
during negotiation period, 0 otherwise
APPROVE = 1 if contract demands and/or agreements require 
approval by the national union, 0 otherwise
ln(SIZE«PCVOTE) = natural log (size of unit multiplied by percent 
vote for union representation (x 100))
NATREP = 1 if a representative from the national union par 
ticipated in negotiations, 0 otherwise
The variables OTHCONT, ln(SIZE»PCVOTE), and 
NATREP are identical to those employed in the Indiana 
sample specification, whereas in place of the county rate, 
UNEMP is the annual state average unemployment rate. 
With these exceptions, the remaining variables need explana 
tion.
In order to avoid drawing spurious conclusions due to 
high collinearity, the hypotheses that southern communities 
and right-to-work laws diminish union power in negotiating 
first contracts are combined. 14 Instead of two separate 
variables, therefore, the variable SOUTH*RTW is used, 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state in which 
negotiations were held was in the South and had a right-to- 
work law.
Specification of the dummy variable ULPS (equal to 1 if 
the union filed a meritorious complaint during the negotia 
tion period and 0 otherwise) is taken from answers to a ques 
tion in the survey of union representatives. Respondents 
were asked if any ULP complaints associated with negotia 
tions were filed with the NLRB. If ULP complaints were 
made, respondents were asked to describe the complaints 
and NLRB decisions. Verification of these answers by ex 
amination of NLRB records would be prohibitive in the pres 
ent sample. (Of the responses indicating that unions filed 
ULP complaints, 19 failed to describe NLRB decisions of 
merit and are included in the benchmark of ULPS.)
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Several organizational features of national unions were 
hypothesized to impact upon the probability of obtaining 
first contracts. A survey of national representatives, 
however, indicates that all organizations provide negotiation 
expertise either (a) upon request from local unions or (b) in 
those cases where national representatives were involved in 
the certification election campaigns and no requests were 
necessarily made by locals. Furthermore, the survey finds 
that in roughly 90 percent of the sample, national unions 
regularly provide strike monies to locals in first-contract 
negotiations. Hence, no tests of these policies and practices 
are made herein. The survey indicates, on the other hand, 
that in 62 percent of the sample, national organizations re 
quired approval of first-contract demands and/or 
agreements by local unions. As a test of the hypothesis that 
approval reduces the probability of reaching agreements, the 
dummy variable APPROVE enters the model. 15
Test Results
Descriptive statistics and data sources about the variables 
in the models are reported in tables 3-1 and 3-2. A higher 
proportion of negotiations failed to result in contracts in the 
nationwide sample (28 percent) than in the Indiana sample 
(23 percent). The lower success rate in the nationwide sample 
may be attributable to the variable SOUTH»RTW, as ex 
plained below. Other differences between samples are also 
apparent. In the Indiana sample, in only 14 percent of the 
cases did unions have separate existing contracts with 
employers, but 21 percent did in the nationwide sample. The 
unemployment rates range from 4.4-16.6 percent in the In 
diana sample and 2.8-9.7 percent in the nationwide sample. 
This difference reflects the aggregation effect of using state 
unemployment rates and relatively higher levels of 
unemployment in Indiana during 1979-1980. Using NLRB 
Region 25 records it was found that employers illegally 





































































































































































































































































































































































































-§ « 6 a
« 3 S .o
s -co ts a
6ooA: of 1980), 
T Data Sy tional u
86 First-Contract Negotiation
23 percent of the cases in the Indiana sample, whereas, only 
11 percent is reported by union representatives in the nation 
wide sample. However, if the 19 cases in which no explana 
tion of NLRB decisions was given were added to the 11 per 
cent figure, then 25 percent of the nationwide sample would 
entail ULPs.
If we examine the two components of the variable 
ln(SIZE»PCVOTE), we find that the average percent voting 
for union representation (PCVOTE) is 76 percent in each 
sample. However, the average unit size (SIZE) in the nation 
wide sample is roughly twice that of the Indiana sample; 60 
and 33, respectively. Finally, survey responses indicate that 
in the nationwide sample, national union representatives 
participated in nearly one-half of first-contract negotiations 
whereas they participated in one-third of negotiations in the 
Indiana sample.
The estimated partial derivatives of CONTRACT with 
respect to each variable, evaluated at the sample mean prob 
ability of obtaining a contract, are reported in tables 3-3 and 
3-4.
As reported in column 1 of table 3-3, the firm-to-industry 
wage ratio (FIRM$/IND$) is positive as hypothesized but in 
significant at conventional levels of confidence. However, 
when the ratio enters the model as a dummy variable depict 
ing high firm-to-industry wages (HINDS), significance is 
found at the < .05 level. Thus, support is found for the 
hypothesis that firms that pay higher wages vis-a-vis the in 
dustry incur lower increased labor costs (which increases the 
union's power to negotiate first contracts).
A positive relationship between the variable OTHCONT 
and CONTRACT is obtained in both samples. In the nation 
wide sample the estimate suggests that having an existing 
contract increases the probability of obtaining an additional 
contract (or extended coverage) by as much as 46 percentage
First-Contract Negotiation 87
Table 3-3
Estimates of the Determinants of First-Contract 






































































































The coefficients reported above are the partial derivatives of CONTRACT with respect to 
each variable evaluated at the mean (CONTRACT); calculated by ft (CONTRACT) 
(1-CONTRACT) where CONTRACT = .77. 
* Significant at < .10 level.
** Significant at < .05 level.
*** Significant at < .01 level.
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points (significant at greater than .01 level). The point 
estimate is much lower in the Indiana sample (roughly 14 
percentage points) and is insignificant. Given that OTH- 
CONT is highly unlikely to suffer from measurement error, 
we might reconsider the hypotheses underlying the variables 
in order to explain the insignificant results in the Indiana 
sample. One might conjecture that instead of perceived costs 
being lower to employers with existing contracts (due to 
lower transactional costs and supposed lower nonpecuniary 
costs), perceived costs might actually be higher in some cir 
cumstances. Perceived higher costs may be attributable to 
poor existing union-management relationships and/or a 
common belief that the relative power of unions increases 
substantially with additional union coverage of the firm's 
workforce. Under such perceptions, employers can be ex 
pected to be more resistant. Therefore, although unions can 
expect existing covered work units to support them in their 
bid to add another work unit, stepped-up employer 
resistance may neutralize this organizational source of 
power.
Mixed and insignificant results are found with respect to 
the impact of unemployment upon reaching agreements. 
Positive signs are obtained in the Indiana sample but a 
negative sign is obtained in the nationwide sample. Statistical 
significance is reached only in model 2 as tested against the 
Indiana sample and here it is limited to the < . 10 level (using 
2-tailed tests). These mixed results could be attributable to 
differences in the aggregation of unemployment rates for 
which state unemployment rates are less suitable. However, 
the results also suggest that unemployment can have both 
positive and negative effects as hypothesized.
As a second variable of the economic environment, the 
relationship between the firm's wage and the local wage has 
the expected effect. Although the negative signs on 
FIRM/LOCALS and HILOCAL$ are consistent with the
First-Contract Negotiation 89
hypothesis that employers are more resistant the higher their 
wages vis-a-vis local labor market wages, the results are in 
significant at conventional levels of significance. 16
Table 3-4
Estimates of the Determinants





















(-2)log likelihood ratio 134.51
The coefficients reported above are the partial derivatives of CONTRACT with respect to 
each variable evaluated at the mean (CONTRACT); calculated by /8 (CONTRACT) 
(1-CONTRACT), where CONTRACT = .72.
* Significant at < .10 level.
** Significant at < .05 level. 
*** Significant at < .01 level.
The variable SOUTH«RTW (tested only in the nationwide 
sample) appears to have a substantial impact upon reducing 
the probability of reaching agreements. The point estimate 
(significant at < .05 level) indicates that the probability of 
success is reduced by 28 percentage points in those 14 percent
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of negotiations held in southern states with right-to-work 
laws. In a separate equation, dummy variables for SOUTH 
and RTW were examined additively in place of 
SOUTH* RTW, but neither variable reaches conventional 
levels of statistical significance.
Several variables associated with NLRB resolution of 
union-management conflicts are examined. NLRB pro 
cedural delay (OBJDELAY) is, as anticipated, negatively 
related to CONTRACT in the Indiana sample and is signifi 
cant at the < .05 level. The estimated magnitude of the rela 
tionship indicates that, on average, every one month delay 
between election date and NLRB close date of objections 
and challenges to election outcomes reduces the probability 
of obtaining an agreement by as much as 4 percentage 
points. This figure strongly suggests, therefore, that delay, 
which gives employers more time to reduce majority support 
and/or diminish union resources is a dominant factor in the 
failure of unions to obtain first contracts.
The second NLRB-related variable (ULPS) is also 
negatively and highly significantly related to CONTRACT 
(in both samples). Those employers who refused to bargain 
in good faith and/or illegally discharged union activists, 
reduced the probability of unions successfully negotiating 
contracts by 32-36 percentage points. When ULPS is divided 
into DISCRIM, REFUSE, and BOTHULPS (in the Indiana 
sample) it is found that all three categories of ULPS are 
significantly and negatively related to CONTRACT. A 
highly robust finding is that discriminatory treatment has a 
profound negative impact upon the probability of obtaining 
first contracts. Indeed, DISCRIM reduces the probability of 
reaching an agreement by nearly 44 percentage points! 
(Significant at < .01 level.) Refusal-to-bargain (REFUSE) 
appears to reduce the probability of obtaining a contract by 
as much as 25 percentage points, significant at < .10 level. 
In those 5 percent of first-contract negotiations where the 
employer refuses to bargain and in addition discriminates 
against union activists (BOTHULPS), the probability of ob-
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taining an agreement is reduced approximately 30 percentage 
points. Consequently, the added delay gained via refusal-to- 
bargain and the implicit threat of additional discrimination, 
apparently have severe negative effects on the relative 
bargaining power of unions.
The interaction of the size of the unit and the level of 
majority support for union representation 
(ln(SIZE«PCVOTE)) yields mixed results. In the Indiana 
sample the variable reaches significance at < .05 level in all 
equations and is positively related to CONTRACT. Thus, 
the larger the unit and the larger the percent of workers 
voting for representation, the greater the probability of ob 
taining a contract. For example, the difference in the prob 
ability of obtaining a contract is approximately 25 percen 
tage points between (a) a unit of 25 workers where the ma 
jority vote was 55 percent and (b) a unit of 100 workers 
where the majority vote was 75 percent. It can be inferred 
that as important sources of power at the bargaining table, 
greater organizational resources applied to larger units and 
broader group cohesiveness increase the relative power of 
unions in first-contract negotiations.
In the nationwide sample, however, ln(SIZE«PCVOTE) 
carries a negative sign, albeit the estimate is insignificant. 
Given the results of the estimate in the Indiana sample and 
the unexpected negative sign, the variable is examined fur 
ther. As reported in table 3-5, once the model is estimated 
with SIZE and PCVOTE separately, positive signs are ob 
tained for both variables; yet the results remain insignificant. 
As an alternative measure of cohesiveness of the group, we 
could examine the percent vote for union representation in 
light of voter participation in the election. Presuming that 
workers not participating in the election are indifferent to 
union representation, it can be reasonably argued that the 
smaller the proportion of the total work unit voting for 
representation, the less cohesive and, hence, less successful 
are prounion workers in obtaining first contracts. This 
hypothesis is tested using the following ratio: workers voting
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for union representation/(workers voting for or against 
representation + workers not voting). Call this ratio 
PCVOTE2. As reported in table 3-5, PCVOTE2 is positive 
and significant at the < .05 level. The point estimate in 
dicates that on average every increase of 10 percentage points 
increases the probability of reaching agreement by approx 
imately 7 percentage points. Therefore it appears that the 
lower the level of participation in certification elections, the 
less likely unions are able to demand contracts.
SIZE, on the other hand, remains insignificant. 
Respecification of the model using the interaction of SIZE 
and PCVOTE2 (ln(SIZE»PCVOTE2)) also yields the unan 
ticipated negative sign, although the estimate remains in 
significant. The persistent negative sign (given positive signs 
on both SIZE and PCVOTE2) suggests two possible 
statistical problems that are being encountered. First, some 
important omitted variable which is highly correlated with 
ln(SIZE»PCVOTE2) but negatively correlated with CON 
TRACT may be swamping the true effect of 
ln(SIZE»PCVOTE2). Second, the interaction of SIZE and 
PCVOTE2 may not mirror well the imposed linear func 
tional form of that interaction. Further analyses of the deter 
minants of first-contract negotiation outcomes will hopeful 
ly unravel the unexpected results of the relationship between 
the interaction of SIZE and PCVOTE2 with CONTRACT as 
found in the present nationwide sample.
As an additional organizational factor, the variable AP 
PROVE was added to the model tested against the nation 
wide sample. As hypothesized, it appears that national 
unions that require approval of agreements reduce the prob 
ability of obtaining first contracts. The variable APPROVE 
carries the expected negative sign and reaches significance at 
< .10 level. The point estimate suggests that on average the 





























































The coefficients reported above are the partial derivatives of CONTRACT with respect to 
each variable evaluated at the mean (CONTRACT); calculated by /3 (CONTRACT) 
(1-CONTRACT), where CONTRACT=.72.
* Significant at < .10 level.
** Significant at < .05 level.
*** Significant at < .01 level.
Finally, the participation of representatives from national 
unions (NATREP) is positively and significantly associated 
with the probability of obtaining first contracts. In the In 
diana sample the point estimates across equations indicates
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that on average the probability of obtaining first contracts 
rises by 16 percentage points. In the nationwide sample the 
highly significant coefficient suggests that participation of a 
national representative enhances the probability by as much 
as 27 percentage points. These results strongly support the 
hypothesis that the negotiation expertise of national rep 
resentatives (and concurrently the signal to employers that 
national organization resources are available to local unions) 
can be an important factor in winning first contracts.
Conclusions
Evidence found in the present study indicates that unions 
fail to obtain first contracts following 1 of every 4 union cer 
tification victories. Obviously, this is a disturbing figure 
both to workers seeking union representation and to unions 
allocating resources to organizing and negotiations. The 
figure suggests that even after a majority of workers elect to 
bargain collectively, employer resistance to union represen 
tation is widespread and effective in keeping unions out of 
the workplace.
Empirical support is found for the hypotheses that high 
firm-to-industry wage ratios, greater worker cohesiveness, 
larger work units, the existence of other union contracts with 
employers, and participation by national union represen 
tatives increase the probability of agreement. In contrast, it 
is found that negotiations held in southern states with right- 
to-work laws and national union approval of local 
agreements reduce the probability of agreement. Further 
more, NLRB delays in the resolution of employer objections 
and challenges to election results, the refusal-to-bargain in 
good faith and discrimination subsequent to election vic 
tories have profound effects upon reducing the probability 
of agreement.
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Respondents to the two sample surveys were also asked 
what they believed were the greatest barriers to successfully 
negotiating contracts. Answers ranged from general 
statements to specific elaborations upon given cases. Most 
answers can be categorized as being related to the law, 
employer attitudes and practices, union internal weaknesses, 
and specific contractual demands. Nineteen of the 
respondents raised the issue of inadequate NLRB enforce 
ment of employer violations of the NLRA. Employer prac 
tices that topped the list were various forms of bad faith 
bargaining (and in particular, stalling tactics) and the hiring 
of outside ("union-busting") consultants. Eighteen 
respondents listed the former and twelve listed the latter 
practice. Employer attitudes were also widely cited: 18 en 
countered obvious antiunion hostilities and 17 found 
employers lacking an understanding and/or an acceptance of 
the role of unions in changing the terms and conditions of 
employment. In 11 cases respondents attributed negotiation 
difficulties to a lack of work group cohesiveness. Sometimes 
work units were not willing to strike, others expected too 
much from first contracts, and in other work units turnover 
played an important role.
Among specific contract issues, the following appeared to 
cause the greatest difficulties in reaching agreement: 27 
respondents cited union security and dues check-off provi 
sions, 17 cited wages, 14 cited various fringe benefits, 14 
cited seniority provisions, and 7 cited hours of work schedul 
ing. Numerous other barriers were also listed, including, for 
example: racial conflict, economic conditions, grievance and 
arbitration provisions, and one inexperienced negotiator ad 
mitted having "made some mistakes" during negotiations.
Two questions pertinent to the above list of negotiation 
hurdles were asked in the nationwide survey. First, the 
survey asked whether or not a union security clause was writ 
ten into the agreement. It was reported that, except for 
agreements negotiated in right-to-work states, security provi-
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sions were won in 93 percent of the negotiations. Following 
the suggestion of one national union representative, the se 
cond wave of questionnaires included a question asking 
respondents whether or not the employer used outside con 
sultants during the negotiation period. Of the 78 useable 
responses to this question, 49 respondents reported that con 
sultants were used. Of the 29 cases in which no outside con 
sultants were used, unions failed to obtain contracts in 17 
percent of negotiations. In stark contrast, of the 49 cases in 
which consultants were reportedly used, unions failed to ob 
tain contracts in 41 percent of negotiations. It would appear, 
therefore, that employers who used outside consultants 
markedly reduced the probability of reaching agreements. 17
Besides losing the right to bargain collectively subsequent 
to winning certification elections, a sizeable number of 
workers lose their jobs due to business closures. That is, 
some employers simply go out of business or close down 
selected operations before signing an agreement or shortly 
after reaching agreement. Even though it is beyond the in 
tended scope of this research to "explain" these closure deci 
sions, it is worth noting that more than 6 percent of 
employers closed their doors before contracts were signed 
and another 9 percent closed their doors subsequent to sign 
ing contracts. Some of these closures are obviously unrelated 
to unionization per se. Some employers would have gone 
out of business regardless of union election victories. Indeed, 
one can imagine that workers employed by firms facing 
threatening market conditions may turn to union representa 
tion as a potential means of providing a more democratic 
way of determining lay-off selection and other job security 
decisions. Increased labor costs are also likely to drive some 
marginally competitive employers out of business. However, 
conventional wisdom suggests that some strongly antiunion 
employers simply refuse to operate in union environments no 
matter what may be the economic decision to close opera 
tions. Of course, the present study cannot ferret out the 
degree to which antiunion animus governs what typically
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would be an economic decision to close operations. But the 
circumstantial evidence that approximately 6 percent of 
employers close their doors prior to signing agreements 
strongly implies that anitunion animus is a significant fac 
tor?
The analysis of the role of strikes in securing first con 
tracts does not fit well in the present empirical context. 
Strikes, however, are fairly frequent in the present sample; 
just over 23 percent of the negotiations in the Indiana sample 
and over 16 percent in the nationwide sample resulted in 
strikes. Of those negotiations resulting in agreement, 24 per 
cent were accompanied by strikes, and of those negotiations 
not resulting in an agreement, 22 percent were accompanied 
by strikes. The same empirical problem exists with 
evaluating the impact of mediation upon negotiation out 
comes. We simply cannot tell whether the incidence of 
mediation is effective in bringing the parties to agreement (at 
least not in the present limited analysis). Mediators, for ex 
ample, are less likely to be called in when both parties 
negotiate in good faith or when (in the present context) 
employers hope not to come to an agreement or unions don't 
want compromise. In any case, it is found that in 28 percent 
of the negotiations in the Indiana sample and in 33 percent in 
the nationwide sample, mediators were used. Of negotiations 
not resulting in agreement, mediators were used in 43 percent 
of negotiations, and where agreement was reached, 
mediators were present 29 percent of the time.
The major public policy questions of first-contract 
negotiations stem from employer violations of the NLRA 
and NLRB procedural delays. In approximately 19 percent 
of the Indiana sample, objections and/or challenges were fil 
ed by employers. The median days of delay associated with 
the NLRB resolution of these objections and challenges was 
209 days. Applying the estimated coefficient of OBJDELAY 
to the 209 day median indicates the probability of successful 
ly negotiating first contracts was reduced on average about 
27 percentage points.
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ULP complaints of refusal-to-bargain (deemed as 
meritorious by Region 25 of the NLRB) were filed by unions 
in 13 percent of the cases in the Indiana sample. (Nearly half 
of these complaints were accompanied by meritorious ULP 
charges of discrimination.) The median delay in resolving 
these charges was over 350 days. As discussed above, the 
probability of unions obtaining contracts was reduced by as 
much as 25 percentage points in these cases, everything else 
the same.
Employers hoping to chill the demand by workers for a 
union contract by discriminating against union activists are 
overwhelmingly successful. The estimates presented in table 
3-3 indicate that the incidence of one or more 8(a)(3) viola 
tions reduces the probability of agreement by some 44 
percentage points. Moreover, the incidence of such activity is 
not limited to a mere handful of employers—given that in 17 
percent of the Indiana sample, meritorious 8(a)(3) charges 
were filed against employers.
The evidence clearly indicates that the rights of many 
workers to bargain collectively with employers are denied. 
Ironically, the very agency responsible for the protection of 
these rights (the NLRB) appears to be the unwitting ac 
complice to employers wanting to deny these rights to 
workers. In order to insure workers their rights to bargain 
collectively, two important changes must occur: NLRB pro 
cedures must be greatly expedited and discriminatory 
discharges must be blocked.
Chapter 4 will discuss in detail a number of proposals 
made by labor law reform advocates to accomplish both of 
these ends. We can now turn to a discussion and evaluation 
of these proposals as they apply to first-contract negotia 
tions.
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NOTES
1. The drop in membership is smaller when one does not restrict the 
population to nonagricultural workers: from just over 25 percent in 1954 
to 21 percent in 1980. Figures for 1954 are taken from Handbook of 
Labor Statistics, 1980, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 
2070, Table 165, p. 412; figures for 1980 are taken from Daily Labor 
Report, No. 181, September 18, 1981 (Bureau of National Affairs Inc.: 
Washington, DC) p. B-8.
2. See for example Fiorito and Greer (1982).
3. See the 1950 and 1981 Annual Report of the National Labor Relations 
Board, Table 13 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office).
4. See for instance Dickens (1983), Freeman (1983), and Seeber and 
Cooke (1983).
5. Prosten also reports that 13 percent of his sample obtained contracts 
after winning elections in 1970, but that by 1975 they were no longer 
under contracts.
6. For discussion and debate over the basic sections of the bill (H.R. 
8410) in the U.S. House of Representatives, see United States of America 
Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 95th Congress, 
First Session, Vol. 123, Part 25 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1977) pp. 32118-32132.
For a brief chronology of events ending in defeat of the reform bill, see 
Congress and Nation, Volume V, 1977-1980, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc.), pp. 417-419.
7. For a separate report utilizing only the Indiana data see Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, January 1985.
8. Resistance may be offset to some degree if by increasing the wage, 
higher quality workers are attracted over the long-run, which offsets ad 
ded labor costs by direct increases in labor productivity and indirect 
capital substitution effects. For a recent analysis along these lines, see 
Clark, 1980.
9. The NLRB distinguishes between unfair labor practice strikes and so- 
called "economic" strikes. The rights to post-strike reinstatement 
following strikes is dependent upon this distinction. An unfair labor 
practice strike is one in protest of an employer's misbehavior; for exam 
ple, a strike over an employers's refusal to bargain in good faith. In these
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instances, striking workers are entitled to reinstatement at the end of the 
strike. Strike breakers only have temporary rights to employment. An 
economic strike is one in which the union attempts to improve wages or 
other terms and conditions of employment. In these instances, employers 
(at their discretion) may permanently replace strikers with nonunion 
strike breakers. Employers are required by law only to place strikers on 
preferential hiring lists. Unless the union strikes primarily over an 
employer unfair labor practice during first-contract negotiations (e.g., 
over illegal discharges or refusal to bargain), strikers face the potential of 
losing their jobs permanently. The propensity to strike over economic 
and other bargaining issues, one could surmise, is less during first- 
contract negotiations than during negotiations over contract renewals. 
Work units involved in first-contract negotiations are typically less 
cohesive, and strikes, therefore, are more easily broken. Consequently, 
the threat of permanent displacement weighs heavier (everything else the 
same) on work units involved in first-contract negotiations, effectively 
reducing the propensity to strike. See Feldacker, 1984, pp. 221-223.
10. In the Indiana sample, nonaffiliates reported losing 29 percent of 
their bids for first agreements.
11. In two cases, delay was extreme; 666 days and 857 days. OBJDELAY 
was set at 365 for these two extreme cases.
12. In seven observations, quarterly data on wages and/or monthly data 
on employment were not available for the full year. In these cases, the 
available data were used to approximate annual average wages.
13. See Cooke (1983), p. 410, for example. He finds a strong negative 
hyperbolic relationship.
14. Of the 20 states having right-to-work laws, 11 are in the 16 southern 
states. See source in table 3-2.
15. Data about organizational features were provided to me by represen 
tatives of the national unions (typically the research directors).
16. Concerned that collinearity between FIRMS/LOCALS and 
FIRM$/IND$ (simple correlation = .47) or between HINDS and 
HILOCALS (simple correlation = .38) might have yielded inefficient 
estimates, we estimate the models dropping each variable alternately. In 
no case did the results change perceptibly.
17. A variable depicting the use of consultants was not utilized in the em 
pirical model for several reasons. First, only 78 useable responses were 
collected. Second, employers who had sufficient negotiation expertise and 
inside consultation to avoid agreements would not incur the expense of
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hiring outside consultants. Moreover, some firms may hire outside ex 
pertise without intention of not bargaining in good faith. Third, by rely 
ing solely on responses from union representatives, critics of the present 
findings could reasonably argue that some union representatives were 
looking for scapegoats for their own internal union weaknesses. Finally, 
and most importantly, it is not the use of consultants per se but rather 
any unlawful, unethical, or deceptive practices consultants sell to 
employers to undercut union bids for contracts that is of primary interest 
to our analysis. Procedural delay, discrimination, and refusal-to-bargain 





In light of the results of the research, what does one make 
of all this? What should be the appropriate response of Con 
gress and the NLRB? Although there has been a long history 
of debate over a wide range of union organizing-related 
issues, the present study focuses only on several of these 
issues, albeit ones of much importance. The basic questions 
to be raised are fairly obvious; the answers and appropriate 
policies, however, are not. In the following discussion, we 
will examine (1) the issue of delay and how administratively 
it can be reduced as it pertains to objections and challenges 
to elections and to the refusal-to-bargain over first contracts; 
(2) the enforceability of the duty to bargain in good faith 
once the union has been certified as the exclusive bargaining 
representative, and (3) ways to halt heavy handed employers 
from discriminatorily discharging union activists.
Toward evaluating and recommending policy alternatives, 
we can begin by examining specific proposals embodied in 
the Labor Reform Bill of 1977 (for which there was con 
siderable heated debate between its advocates and op 
ponents). 1 We first describe these proposals and the 
arguments for and against each as presented by the pro 
ponents and opponents of the Labor Reform Bill. The pro-
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posals are then evaluated and policy recommendations 
developed.
Proposals for Labor Law Change
Expediting the NLRB Process
There were four general proposals in the 1977 Labor 
Reform Bill designed to speed up NLRB case processing. 
Three of those proposals have direct implications for our 
analysis of first-contract negotiations. The fourth proposal, 
speeding up the election process, might well have an indirect 
effect in that the sooner the election campaign period bet 
ween petition and election date comes to an end, the sooner 
victorious unions can begin negotiations over first contracts. 
This could be advantageous to unions simply because there 
would be less time for worker enthusiasm and cohesiveness 
to erode. Our focus here, however, has been on the role of 
NLRB procedures after elections have been won; hence, we 
will forego discussion of the election-timing provision of the 
Labor Reform Bill and limit our discussion to the three pro 
visions that appear to have more direct implications.
Summary Affirmation of ALJ Decisions
Section 2(b) of the Reform Bill would have required the 
Board "to establish a summary procedure whereby a Board 
panel would, upon request, have the option of affirming an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision without a full 
hearing." Basically, this proposal was a move to reduce the 
time lapse between ALJ decisions and the Board's affir 
mance, modification, or rejection of ALJ decisions appealed 
to the Board. Although the Board would have been compell 
ed to design its own summary affirmance procedure, it was 
expected that such decisions would follow the traditional 
standard in which at least 2 members of three-member panels 
would rule. (As described in chapter 2, all three members of 
a panel review a given case, with a quorum of at least two
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members agreeing.) Nonparticipating Board members—nor 
mally their staffs—also review the proposed decision and can 
require a five-member panel decision if desired. Further 
more, any motion by the prevailing party and response by 
the losing party of ALJ decisions would be made within 30 
days of the ALJ decision.
Past Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall stated in the in 
troduction of the Reform Bill hearings:
This would greatly reduce the extended time it now 
takes the Board to review even extremely simple 
cases. It would allow the Board to give more atten 
tion to the faster and more carefully considered 
resolution of the more difficult cases. 2
Douglas Fraser (past president of the United Auto 
Workers) testified in favor of the summary affirmance pro 
posal. He noted that (1) approximately 70 percent of ALJ 
decisions are largely adopted by the Board; (2) comparable 
affirmance rates in the other agencies average about 63 per 
cent; and (3) the courts of appeal affirmance rate of NLRB 
orders averages roughly 71 percent. He interpreted these 
figures to "repute any claim that the Administrative Law 
Judge is fundamentally unreliable and that injustice will be 
done by rapid enforcement of the first NLRB decision." 3 
Fraser goes on to argue that expedited review and affirmance 
in simple cases will deter meritless litigation as well as speed 
up the process.
As the matter now stands, a deliberate violator of 
the labor law receives two full appeals as of right, 
in contrast to the one appeal as of right granted in 
the normal civil litigant in federal court. 4
Although accepting the general proposition of summary 
affirmance of ALJ decisions, Theodore St. Antoine (then 
Dean of the University of Michigan Law School) was not op 
timistic that much time would be saved.
106 Policy Implications
I do have some reservations as to whether this is go 
ing to really make as much difference as it sounds 
on the surface that it is going to make, but at least 
as a matter of principle, the motion we should 
begin increasingly to rely upon a presumed finality 
of administrative law judge decisions is a proposi 
tion that I would accept. 5
Speaking against the proposed bill in behalf of the Small 
Business Legislative Council, Peter Nash first argued that 
the 30 day requirement for motion and response does very 
little to speed up the process since current Board regulations 
provide, in essence, that exceptions be filed within 20 days 
and response from the other party within the subsequent 10 
day period. Nash's conclusions is that if there is nothing or 
very little to be gained from the 30 day rule, why have it? He 
further contended that as a practical matter the Board and its 
staff currently distinguish simple, straightforward cases 
from complex ones, and usually dispose of the simpler cases 
more quickly than normal. Again Nash asks, why formalize 
the procedure if nothing significant is gained?
Indeed, Nash surmised that, if anything, the new 30 day 
rule might aggravate delay. In developing this line of argu 
ment, he first cites figures (in sharp contract with Eraser's 
above) that during fiscal year 1975 the Board affirmed 
without modification only 21.6 percent of ALJ decisions. He 
then argues that
... if summary affirmance is sought, briefs and 
arguments on the complexity of the decision and 
the wisdom or lack of wisdom in granting summary 
affirmance would presumably be made by the par 
ties. If summary affirmance was denied (as ap 
parently would be the case in about 80 percent of 
all cases) then panel and possible full Board review 
would be required. ... In addition, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that parties who have been 
subject to summary affirmance of an ALJ's deci-
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sion may move the Board for recommendation en 
bane. Whether or not such reconsideration is 
granted, this process will take additional time. 6
Nash also adds that parties who fail to get full considera 
tion of their cases by the Board would, in turn, be much 
more likely to contest a summary affirmance in the appellate 
courts. Hence, even further delay would be incurred.
Expansion of the Board and Seven-Year Appointments
Section 2(a) of the original House Labor Reform Bill 
would have expanded the Board from five to seven members 
and appointments would have been lengthened from five to 
seven year terms. The expressed purpose of these provisions 
was to increase the case handling capabilities of the Board. 
As was reported in the proposed bill, in 1975 the median 
delay at the Board in resolving ULP complaints was 315 
days, was 358 days in 1976, and was 374 days by the third 
quarter of 1977. The cause of such delays was attributed to 
the enormous increase in the case load of the NLRB—from 
roughly 20,000 per year in 1960 to 49,000 in 1976. By ex 
panding the Board to seven members but continuing to rely 
heavily on three-member panel decisions, cases could be 
resolved more quickly because more panels would be 
deciding cases at any point in time. (This presumes that the 
two new members would be given their own legal staffs and 
administrative support.) Addressing the potential cumber- 
someness of a larger Board because nonparticipating 
members would continue to review tentative decisions to en 
sure conformity with majority Board policy, John Fanning 
(then chairman of the Board) testified that such a process 
"might become cumbersome if clearance were required of 
four nonparticipating members, but I think we can control 
that situation." 7
Fanning also testified that by lengthening appointments to 
seven year terms, the Board would function better during 
those periods when the Board is short of members because a 
President fails to quickly fill expired appointments. He
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noted that the Board has operated short-handed during 11 
different periods over its 42-year history. Being short one 
member too often leads to so-called "iced" cases whereby 
the Board splits 2-2 on controversial or important decisions. 
Fanning cited, for example, that when member Walther had 
recently been appointed he had to cast the deciding vote in 75 
such "iced" cases awaiting his appointment. Fanning and 
others conjectured that with a larger Board there should be 
fewer 3-3 votes than 2-2 votes during those appointment 
periods where the Board would be short one member. 
Hence, it was argued, the resolution of cases would be made 
more quickly.
Opponents to this provision failed to see how expansion of 
the Board to seven members would expedite case handling 
since every Board member eventually reviews every case. In 
fact, the Chamber of Commerce contended that we could ex 
pect increased litigation, which of course would add to, not 
reduce, delay.
Consensus may be harder to achieve, especially in 
complex cases. The resulting increase in dissenting 
opinions could lead to reduced acceptance by the 
parties involved, and, therefore, increased litiga 
tion. 8
Peter Nash took the above argument further.
Moreover, not only will obtaining review and 
clearances from four nonparticipating members 
clearly be more difficult and time-consuming, but 
also there is a greater likelihood that full Board 
consideration will be requested when there are four 
nonparticipating members than when there are only 
two. Additionally, a decision by a unanimous panel 
of three Board members constitutes a majority of 
the full five-member Board; hence, a losing party 
has nothing to gain by requesting reconsideration 
by the full Board. 9
Given the highly political nature of the NLRB appoint 
ment history and resultant bias of Board member voting (see
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chapter 2), opponents of this provision argued that expan 
sion of the Board and increased tenure for its members were 
designed to pack the Board with pro-labor members. In the 
end, the bill passed by the House restricted membership to 
no more than four appointees from either political party— 
evidence that politics and the NLRB seem inseparable.
Expedited Enforcement of Board Orders
Once the Board has made a decision and order against a 
party, the party may appeal the decision to a circuit court of 
appeals or the Board may seek enforcement of its decision 
and order through any circuit court of appeals if the defen 
dant refuses to comply. As highlighted by the proponents of 
the Labor Reform Bill, many months and often years elapse 
between Board orders and resolution of cases that find 
themselves in the courts. It was reported by the Committee 
on Education and Labor, who introduced the bill, that in 
1976 it took an average of 365 days for the courts to enforce 
Board orders.
The proposed mechanism for reducing this delay was to 
make Board orders "self-enforcing." That is, the courts 
(without examining Board orders) would simply enforce all 
decisions for which no appeal was filed within 30 days of 
Board orders. Parties who then fail to comply automatically 
find themselves in contempt of court.
Douglas Fraser provided perhaps the most thorough state 
ment (before the House) supporting this amendment. His 
central argument was that the 30-day appeal requirement 
should substantially curtail frivolous litigation that is under 
taken for the sake of delaying compliance. To support this 
contention, Fraser reported that the rate of appeals of Board 
orders has been rising. For example, only 46 percent of 
Board decisions were appealed to the courts in 1963, while 66 
percent of Board orders were appealed by 1970. Yet this rise, 
according to Fraser, is not consistent with the quality of 
Board decisions since the courts' affirmance rate of Board 
decisions has also risen—from 76 percent during the 
1956-1965 period to 82 percent during the 1967-1970 period. 
Fraser concluded from these figures and other circumstantial
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evidence that much of the increased litigation is attributable 
to frivolous appeals made only for the sake of forestalling 
compliance with Board orders. He also contended that the 
general burden of the NLRB case load going to the courts 
(which accounts for nearly the same case load as all other 
federal agencies combined) would be reduced by the 30-day 
requirement. 10
In testimony by the Chamber of Commerce, it was argued 
that the proposed amendment compelling aggrieved parties 
to appeal Board orders within 30 days would increase the 
overall number of appeals. The conclusion was based on the 
premise that only if employers raised objections to Board 
orders in employer-initiated appeals would employers be 
able to raise objections in an enforcement proceeding 
brought by the Board after 30 days. It was argued, therefore, 
that many employers would file appeals automatically in 
order to have sufficient time to later object to the Board rul 
ings. The Chamber of Commerce went on to argue that once 
"having filed an appeal, an employer will be less likely to 
agree to voluntary compliance." 11 In summary, the op 
ponents to the bill held that the 30-day appeal requirement 
would prove to be "self-defeating" instead of "self- 
enforcing."
In response to this argument, John Fanning has stated:
It should also be kept in mind that a respondent in 
such a situation has been "faced with" the case for 
almost a year. What its standard is for compliance 
versus pursuing the case through further review can 
fairly be considered a matter already considered, if 
not precisely determined. 12
Fraser also noted that most voluntary compliances are com 
pleted before the 30-day Board limit which now exists and 
where compliance is reached after 30 days, an appeal petition 
can be withdrawn.
Peter Nash, again speaking for the Small Business 
Legislative Council, argued before a U.S. Senate subcom 
mittee on labor that all the fuss about delay is much ado 
about nothing.
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... on the issue of recalcitrant employer law 
violators, of the over 20,000 unfair labor practice 
cases filed against employers annually, less than 
200 proceedings require ultimate court 
review . . . these figures hardly establish the kind 
of rampant employer lawlessness pictured by the 
proponents of labor law reform. 13
The basic retort to this argument was to turn the argument 
upside down. If there are so few recalcitrant law violators 
then why does business object to such a provisional change 
in the NLRB? Moreover, it was typically argued that reduc 
ing delays was not a one-sided improvement; long delays can 
frustrate objectives of employers just as much as objectives 
of unions and workers. Only when it comes to the resolution 
of ULPs associated with union organizing does the evidence 
clearly indicate that reduction in delay will be disadvan 
tageous to employers wanting to keep unions out of the 
workplace.
Remedies for Refusal to Bargain 
and Discriminatory Discharges
Besides expediting NLRB procedures, proponents of labor 
law reform have also made several recommendations to deter 
employers from refusing to bargain and discriminatorily 
discharging union activists subsequent to union election vic 
tories. Next, we discuss provisions of the 1977 Labor Reform 
Bill pertinent to first-contract negotiations.
The Make- Whole Provision
One hotly debated provision of the Labor Reform Bill was 
the provision authorizing the Board to compensate the 
bargaining unit for the period in which the employer 
unlawfully refused to bargain. The basic purpose of this 
make-whole provision was to make it more costly for 
employers to intentionally prolong their duty to bargain in 
good faith. As it stands, besides denying workers tangible 
economic gains and the benefits of day-to-day representation
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during the lengthy resolution period, time erodes the 
strength of unions to successfully negotiate contracts 
(resulting often in no contract at all or less attractive con 
tracts). The current price to the recalcitrant employer is near 
ly zero, since, as it now stands, he is merely ordered to 
bargain.
In Fraser's remarks in support of a provision to compen 
sate employees, he explained why the Board does not 
presently make workers whole during the refusal-to-bargain 
period. First, the U.S. Supreme Court (in H.K. Porter) has 
held that the NLRB cannot compel either party to grant any 
concession (see chapter 2); the Board can only compel the 
parties to negotiate. Second, Board remedies cannot be 
punitive, only remedial in nature. Hence, although the 
Board has on occasion noted its dismay in not ordering 
employers to compensate workers, it has felt it cannot. For 
instance, consider the Ex-Cello-O Corporation case, where 
the Board concluded:
We . . . are in complete agreement . . . that cur 
rent remedies of the Board designed to cure viola 
tions of Section 8(a)(5) are inadequate. A mere af 
firmative order that an employer bargain upon re 
quest does not eradicate the effects of an unlawful 
delay of two or more years in the fulfillment of a 
statutory bargaining obligation. It does not put the 
employees in the position of bargaining strength 
they would have enjoyed if their employer had im 
mediately recognized and bargained with their 
chosen representative. 14
In order to allow the Board the option of making workers 
whole if it so desired, it was proposed that the given work 
unit receive compensatory damages equal to the difference 
between existing employee average wages and an estimated 
average wage increase employees would have likely obtained
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had the employer actually bargained in good faith. Compen 
sation could be awarded for some period between the date of 
certification by the NLRB and the date a first agreement 
would be signed. It was recommended that estimated average 
wages be computed against an index compiled by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Initially it was proposed that the 
benchmark for probable wage increases would be the 
quarterly Report of Major Collective Bargaining Settlements 
compiled by the BLS (unless the Secretary of Labor prefer 
red the use of an alternative index). For example, if it was 
found that (based on the BLS index) wages and benefits had 
increased 5 percent during the interim period of an 
employer's refusal-to-bargain then the affected work unit 
could be made whole by compensating workers an amount 
equal to 5 percent of their wages and benefits.
Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce (and other 
opponents of the bill) raised several objections to the propos 
ed amendment. First, it was argued that it was the intention 
of the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter15 to maintain a long 
established principle of "free" collective bargaining. The 
make-whole provision would in effect allow the NLRB to 
dictate the terms and conditions of employment, something 
the Court has refused to allow the NLRB to do. Moreover, 
the fine line between legitimate "hard bargaining" and 
refusal-to-bargain would be blurred, effectively denying 
employers the right to hard bargaining.
Second, it was argued that the Board and courts have long 
rejected the make-whole remedy because it is so speculative 
in nature.
[F]aced with the potential damages under this pro 
posal if the challenge is not upheld, an employer 
would be much less likely to challenge a union's 
representation status by engaging in technical 
refusal to bargain. This provision thus operates as a 
denial of due process by economic coercion. 16
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In retort to the first objection that the make-whole remedy 
will improve contract terms, Fraser responded this way.
... the error lies in failing to distinquish between 
imposing a contract term, and using a reasonable 
expectancy of what the employees would have 
received but for the employer's violation of the 
statute as a measurement of the amount of com 
pensatory award. 17
In response to the view that the proposed make-whole 
remedy is too speculative and, therefore, unfair, Fraser (like 
others) argued:
Opponents also argue that there is no evidence that 
any increase would have been agreed upon. The 
fault of this argument is that it assumes the necessi 
ty of proving that a contract would, in fact, have 
resulted. . . . Moreover, it must be said that there 
is likewise no evidence that a higher than average 
settlement would not have been reached. As a sim 
ple matter of fair play it seems desirable to share 
the risk of loss between both employer and 
employees rather than to have it fall totally and in 
evitably on the head of the innocent and 
financially-weaker employee. 18
Increased Back Pay
Under current practice, an individual who is illegally 
discharged has a right to be reinstated and to receive back 
pay equivalent to the amount of lost earnings (with interest) 
between the date of discharge and the date of reinstatement, 
although any interim earnings would be deducted. The 
Board is also authorized to deduct from the back pay any 
amount it determines might have been earned if the in 
dividual would have been more earnest in his or her search 
for alternative employment.
The proponents of the bill sought to charge employers 
double back pay without mitigation—i.e., without subtract-
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ing interim earnings or probable earnings. They argued for 
such a provision on the following grounds. First, it often 
takes years before illegal discharge cases are resolved. Dur 
ing the interim, considerable anguish and deprivation may 
have been experienced by the discharged employee and fami 
ly members. Back pay with mitigation is insufficient com 
pensation. Second, the back pay with mitigation award 
simply costs violators too little to act as a deterrent since 
avoiding union representation altogether is generally the in 
tended purpose of illegal discharges.
Fraser points out that even when employers are finally 
compelled to make back payments, discharged employees 
generally wave reinstatement or do not remain employed 
very long on the job once reinstated. Fraser cites Stephens 
and Chancy (1974) to support this holding. In their study of 
217 illegal discharges in NLRB Region 16 (Texas), it was 
found that only 70 individuals were actually reinstated and 
only 20 of those individuals remained in those jobs six 
months.
Fraser goes on to argue that in many cases there are 1-2 
year delays in fixing the amount of awards subsequent to 
decisions and orders to reinstate. The proposed bill would ef 
fectively eliminate these lengthy hearings since employees 
would be awarded double back pay without mitigation for 
actual and/or probable earnings during the interim period. 
Therefore, many discharged employees would be reinstated 
more quickly and the time and expense of additional hear 
ings would be saved.
Nash testified against the double back pay provision.
Clearly, nothing aids a union more than the claim 
that it caused an employer to rehire a discharged 
employee. Thus, by imposing the threat of punitive 
damages upon an employer, . . . H.R. 810 imposes 
a threat sufficient to require many employers to 
rehire even lawfully discharged employees. . . , 19
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Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce claimed 
that the existing back pay with mitigation already amounts 
to a double monetary penalty to employers who illegally 
discharge union activists. This claim was based on the fact 
that besides back pay plus interest, employers incurred the 
expense of paying for a replacement and employment of 
legal counsel to defend the employer's action. "Would the 
imposition of double back pay add any more of a deterrent? 
We believe not." 20
Chamber of Commerce spokesmen further argued that 
double back pay was designed to be punitive, not remedial. 
This punitive approach to resolving union-management rela 
tions, it was attested, would create an adversarial at 
mosphere both in the investigation and litigation stages of 
NLRB involvement. This would reduce the existing high set 
tlement rate because it would be "counter-productive to the 
encouragement of cooperation which serves as an important 
step toward the achievement of peaceful labor relations in in 
dustry."
Former NLRB Chairman Edward Miller also testified 
against the double back pay provision. He argued that by in 
creasing the ante to both parties, the incentive for both par 
ties to litigate would likewise increase.
If it's . . . an iffy situation, the employer is going 
to be willing to settle it, particularly if what the 
employee is really looking for is a cash settlement in 
any event. Many of them are. ... A realistic union 
is also going to advice the employee that litigation 
is always uncertain and that a reasonable settlement 
offer is worth considering. The result is that many, 
many of these cases are settled every year. 21
Finally, Nash argued (as others did) that double back pay 
has a moral hazard incentive.
[T]he prospect of double back pay . . . will un 
doubtedly increase the number of nonmeritorious 
charges filed with the Board, all of which require 
some degree of investigation. Moreover, the double
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back pay windfall provides an incentive for 
deliberately false claims. Indeed, it is not unheard 
of for unions to either place their agents in the 
employ of an employer they seek to organize or to 
take advantage of even legitimate employee 
discharges in an effort to further their organizing 
goals. ... If a union can obtain reinstatement of a 
discharged employee—particularly if the employee 
was lawfully discharged—its campaign is 
remarkably enhanced. 22
Injunctive Relief
In order to undermine the deleterious effect of illegal dis 
criminatory discharges during organizing and prior to the 
signing of a first contract upon the likelihood that workers 
will freely exercise their right to seek union representation, it 
was proposed that the NLRB be required to seek temporary 
federal court injunctions against unlawful discharges. As 
proposed, the issuance of a ULP complaint that a worker 
has been illegally fired (during an organizing campaign or 
after certification but prior to reaching a first contract agree 
ment), the NLRB would be compelled to seek an injunction. 
If a U.S. district court saw fit to issue an injunction, then the 
worker(s) would be reinstated until litigation of the charge 
was completed.
Although the NLRB has the right to seek injunctions for 
discriminatory discharges and related illegal campaign activi 
ty under section 10(j), it has rarely exercised that right. The 
proposed amendment to the NLRA would have utilized sec 
tion 10 (1) of the NLRA which presently requires the NLRB 
to seek temporary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo 
when a union engages in certain ULPs (secondary boycott 
activity and recognitional picketing).
Nash testified that although he saw the provision as 
designed to assist unions in their organizing campaigns, the 
use of mandatory temporary injunctions would not be im-
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proper if ordered reinstatements were actually based upon 
findings that employees were illegally discharged.
But 10(1) does not require any such findings. . . . 
The policy of the Board is that in cases of doubtful 
credibility—that is, where the Region is unable to 
resolve credibility on the basis of documentary or 
other objective evidence ... a complaint should 
issue. . . . Cases involving allegations of 
discriminatory discharge are particularly prone to 
turn on credibility, inasmuch as the main issue is 
whether the motivating factor for the discharge was 
anti-union animus on the part of the employer. . . . 
Significantly, however, the standard to be applied 
by the district judge in determining whether to 
grant injunctive relief is even more lenient than that 
applied by the Board in determining to issue a com 
plaint in the first place. 23
Representatives of the National Association of Manufac 
turers (NAM) basically argued that the Board has sufficient 
existing means to remedy unlawful discharges. Besides 
reinstatement with back pay plus interest as a deterrent, the 
Board can set aside elections and order rerun elections, it can 
issue bargaining orders, and it can temporarily enjoin 
employers from unlawfully discharging employees em 
powered under 10(j) of the NLRA.
NAM representatives contend that wider and more expe 
dient use of existing 10(j) injunctive relief would satisfy the 
underlying objectives of the proponents for mandatory 10(1) 
injunctions. The first problem with 10(j) is it is cumbersome 
to implement. First, a ULP charge must be investigated by a 
Regional Director. If he finds reasonable cause to believe a 
violation has been committed and the charging party re 
quests 10(j) relief, a report of the case is sent to the General 
Counsel's office in Washington, DC. The General Counsel's 
staff then prepares a recommendation to the Board. If the
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Board agrees that injunctive relief under 10(j) is appropriate, 
the case is then returned to the initiating Regional Director. 
The Regional Director then prepares the necessary papers for 
requesting an injunction. Although NAM did not suggest 
ways to expedite this time consuming process, they implied 
that efforts should focus on doing such. Besides the 
awkwardness of the 10G) procedure, it was further argued 
that the courts would need to be more consistent in their use 
of criteria for injunctive relief.
It is very probable that the discretion of the NLRB 
in 10(j) action has not been exercised more broadly 
because of the lack of clear-cut District Court deci 
sions on when 10(j) relief should be granted. This 
is further clouded by splits by the courts of appeal 
on what must be just and proper. Some circuits 
have said if the injunction is necessary to prevent 
the purposes of the Act from being frustrated that 
is sufficient. Other circuits say that the relief must 
be necessary to preserve the status quo or for the 
prevention of irreparable harm. Still other courts 
have held that for the relief to be just and proper it 
must be in the public interest rather than for strictly 
private rights. 24
In addition, the NAM representatives thought that 
although there have been very few 10(j) cases decided in the 
courts, it may be that cases are being effectively resolved be 
tween the time when requests from Regional Directors to the 
General Counsel are initiated and the time just short of a 
decision from district court judges. Unfortunately, these 
figures are not readily available.
An examination of such statistics may well reveal 
that 10(j) is playing an important part in the effec 
tuation of the policies of the Act. This coupled with 
a change in NLRB attitude toward seeking 10(j) 
relief as the Act says it should as well as speeding
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up its processes in the handling of 10(j) requests 
may be the answer to those who clamor for ex 
peditious action under the act. 25
In a later analysis of the 10(1) provision, former NLRB 
chairman Miller argues that such a provision would have 
clogged the Board machinery. He contends that the regional 
offices simply are not equipped to handle a major increase in 
court actions mandated by the 10(1) provision.
. . . [R]egional offices would not only have to 
prepare the case for presentation before an ad 
ministrative law judge, but would also have to 
prepare it for presentation in court and would have 
to deal with the problems of court deadlines, hear 
ing schedules, court calls, and discovery procedures 
as well. The result would be a substantially larger 
administrative case load. 26
Miller adds, however, that with a sufficiently increased 
budget, the basic problem could be licked in the long run. In 
the short run, on the other hand, he believes we would en 
counter a sizable bottleneck.
Professor Paul Weiler of the Harvard Law School also at 
tests that utilization of section 10(1) to block illegal 
discharges would be, in practice, unworkable. First, he cites 
NLRB estimates that of the approximately 17,000 com 
plaints a year of section 8(a)(3) violations, some 3,500 would 
require petitions for injunctions—a tenfold increase in the 
NLRA caseload before the district courts. Besides the prac 
tical difficulties of handling the flood of 10(1) petitions into 
the district courts, Weiler argues (1) that deciding upon the 
merits of discriminatory discharge complaints is far more 
complex than typically found in the present 10(1) decisions of 
whether recognitional picketing or secondary boycotts have 
taken place, and (2) employers would slow the 10(1) pro 
ceedings by litigating the complaint fully. 27
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Weiler (1983) also addressed the point made by pro 
ponents of the 10(1) injunction provision that the flow of 
cases to the NLRB and courts would eventually drop off 
because such injunctions would effectively deter employers 
from discharging employees for union organizing activity. 
That is, because an employer would have to reinstate rather 
quickly (presumably prior to the election or during the early 
stages of first-contract negotiations), the employer's illegal 
activity would fail to have the intended chilling effect. As 
noted above, given the capricious behavior of the employer, 
immediate reinstatement would likely enhance the union 
campaign because workers would see the need for union 
representation as all the more necessary. Weiler does not 
dismiss the plausibiity of this counter argument. However, 
he argues that over the past fifty years nonunion employers 
have become strongly accustomed to violating section 
8(a)(3). It would take, therefore, a long time before 10(1) in 
junctions would become effective deterrents.
Weiler (1983) then argues that we might, indeed, see an in 
crease in complaints of discriminatory discharge.
One of the effects of providing injunctive relief 
would be that the employee, knowing that he now 
has an effective right of reinstatement, would not 
be as likely to accept a settlement that left 
unremedied the impact of the employer's actions 
on the section 7 rights of his fellow employees. But 
if an employer were serious about resisting the 
union, it would probably not settle voluntarily for 
reinstatement before the election. As a result, the 
NLRB's settlement rate might drop in section 
8(a)(3) cases, and the Board might then have to 
resort to seeking an injunction (pending the elec 
tion) in even more cases than the projected 3500 an 
nually. 28
In his recent analysis of discriminatory discharges, Jeffery 
Smisek focuses upon the role of discriminatory discharges
122 Policy Implications
(during certification election campaigns) in thwarting the 
rights of the group—not just the individual.
The NLRA is designed to promote industrial peace 
through the encouragement of collective bargain 
ing. By protecting concerted activities, that Act 
minimizes the disruption of commerce caused by 
industrial strife. . . . The rights protected by Sec 
tion 7 are group rights. The NLRA gives no 
primary rights to employees as individuals, but in 
stead gives primary rights only to groups. 29
Although Smisek views the proposal to utilize 10(1) tem 
porary injunctive relief to be consistent with the notion of 
protecting group rights, he regards amending 10(1) as an in 
adequate means for protecting group rights.
First, Smisek points out that even 10(1) injunction pro 
cedures take too much time—at least one month since 
regional offices must first conduct their investigations and 
attempt to informally settle the ULP complaint. Because this 
necessary delay allows employers to "time" their 
discriminatory discharges one month or so prior to the elec 
tion, the targeted union activist(s) would be off the 
employer's premises and, hence, the employer's objective of 
intimidating other union supporters would likely be 
satisfied.
Second, Smisek agrees with others in that the widespread 
use of 10(1) injunctions against discriminatory discharges 
would necessarily flood the courts and require an enormous 
increase in NLRB staff to facilitate the processing of 10(1) in 
junctions. In addition, Smisek fears that once discharged 
employees were reinstated via injunctions, employers would 
have little incentive to litigate even where discharges may be 
meritorious.
If a 10(1) proceeding (by reinstating the employee) 
causes the employer not to litigate further, then the 
entire elaborate mechanism of the NLRA for
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deciding, with expertise, whether or not an unfair 
labor practice has been committed will be reduced 
to a hasty decision (of threat thereof) made by an 
overworked federal district judge with no expertise 
in NLRA administration. 30
Assessing the Proposals 
and Prescribing Policy Changes
Besides the proposals discussed above, other proposals 
have been made but ignored herein because they either did 
not bear directly upon first-contract negotiations, were very 
limited in their scope, or required rather radical departures 
from our 50 year tradition of regulating union organizing. 
For instance, speeding up the current representation election 
procedure will at best have an indirect and marginal impact 
upon successful first-contract negotiations. The 1977 Labor 
Reform Bill provision to debar "willful and repeated" 
violators from government contracts would likely be applied 
to no more than a handful of employers.
Smisek's proposal to temporarily suspend employer rights 
to discharge employees during election campaigns would be 
a radical departure from current labor relations law, 
especially if suspension of discharge rights were to be 
necessarily extended to cover first-contract negotiations. 
Likewise, Weiler's (1984) proposals to (1) require interest ar 
bitration of first contracts in cases where employers do not 
bargain in good faith, (2) deny employers' rights to per 
manently discharge workers participating in strikes over first 
contracts, and (3) allow unions to conduct some secondary 
boycott activity, would all require major abandonment of 
the prevailing philosophy and modus operandi of govern 
ment regulation of union organizing, changes that (as Weiler 
laments) are not likely to transpire in the foreseeable future. 
The policy prescriptions that follow are far more in tune with 
our traditional legal framework. And though some of the
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prescriptions below will be costly initially or have short-run 
implementation difficulties, they hold sufficient promise of 
satisfactorily protecting the rights of work groups seeking 
union representation.
It is impossible to reasonably estimate the extent to which 
the provisions discussed above would reduce the amount of 
time it takes to process ULP complaints through the NLRB 
and court system. In large part, this difficulty is due to the 
fact that some parties have the primary objective of gaining 
delay, not due process. In his evaluation of the proposal for 
a summary judgement procedure permitting motions to the 
Board to affirm ALJ decisions, former NLRB chairman Ed 
ward Miller puts it this way:
Such motions would have been routinely filed, 
routinely opposed, and very probably routinely 
denied, once defense attorneys learned what kinds 
of allegations proved successful. Perhaps this is too 
cynical a view, but judiciaries are understandably 
reluctant to ride roughshod over any defense which 
appears to have potential merit. And lawyers soon 
learn how to create sufficient appearances of merit 
to avoid hasty action by the decision makers. . . . 
The proposed procedure seemed all too likely simp 
ly to degenerate into a meaningless exercise in the 
appellate litany. 31
The same kind of potentially crippling behavior would ex 
ist under the proposed amendment for so-called self- 
enforcing Board orders. Hence, those employers who seek to 
bust the union in first-contract negotiations via tactical 
delays will be prepared to thwart the best intentions of the 
labor law reformers. Stated somewhat differently, if the 
defendents to ULP complaints of refusal-to-bargain sought 
nothing more than due process, the proposals for self- 
enforcing orders and summary judgements of ALJ decisions 
would invariably speed up the process—at least modestly so.
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Given an underlying motivation to increase delay, however, 
it is difficult to imagine that the above proposals would ef 
fectively reduce processing time.
With respect to the amendment for self-enforcing Board 
orders, it can be argued that one important reason for the 
relatively small proportion of cases that ultimately end up in 
court is that procedural delays incurred up and through 
Board decisions have been sufficient to break unions in first- 
contract negotiations. For instance, in the study of first- 
contract negotiations in Indiana, nearly all those unions that 
abandoned efforts to obtain a contract did so before their 
ULP complaints of refusal-to-bargain reached the appellate 
courts. Only two unions had not abandoned their efforts 
after nearly two years of effort. Given the evidence in 
chapter 3 that median delays in resolving objections and 
challenges was 209 days and in resolving refusal-to-bargain 
cases added another 350 days, it is readily understandable 
why very few unions have the wherewithal to withstand even 
greater delays associated with court processing. In summary, 
it is misleading to argue that no reform is needed here 
because the great majority of ULP complaints are settled 
prior to court appeal or enforcement. The facts on first- 
contract negotiations indicate that the disputes are not set 
tled— they simply have become moot; the delay (even 
without court review) was sufficient to break union bids for 
first contracts.
Of the three proposals to reduce delay in processing ULP 
charges, the amendment to increase the size of the Board 
from five to seven members and extend Board appointments 
from five to seven years has the most to offer. Here, at least, 
the party seeking delay is not provided with an alternative 
means of circumventing the intended speeding up of the pro 
cess. Instead, the Board's ability to expedite the processing 
of ULPs would be a function of the Board's ability to effi 
ciently manage a larger Board membership and resultant 
staff. And although it is difficult to second guess how effi-
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ciently managed a larger Board would be, we at least sidestep 
the problem of defendants thwarting the intended speed-up. 
According to an NLRB estimate in 1977, the costs associated 
with employing two additional Board members and their 
staff would be approximately $1.8 million annually.
One further proposal for reducing delay that was not pro 
posed in the reform bill but does stem from the research 
presented in chapter 3 above is discussed next.
What strikes this author as the most time consuming and 
unnecessary step in NLRB procedures is the mechanism for 
resolution and enforcement of decisions regarding objec 
tions and challenges. The heart of the problem is that 
Regional Director and Board determinations of the 
legitimacy of objections and challenges are separate from the 
ULP complaint procedures. It appears that the Board 
established this policy in response to congressional intent 
underlying Section 9 of the NLRA (Recall from chapter 2 
that Congress intentionally meant to insure that post- 
election objections would not be resolved in the courts in 
order to avoid unwanted litigation delays.) The crux here is 
that to get a court review or enforcement of decisions and 
orders about objections and challenges, the complaint can 
only be rerouted and reexamined via the ULP complaint 
procedure—but not until the initial decision has been 
rendered. Hence, employers can refuse to bargain as a means 
of obtaining a court review. Unions, on the other hand, have 
no effective means of generating a ULP complaint against 
themselves, if indeed they were to want a court review of 
their objections and challenges.
In addition, recall that the parties may select the stipulated 
version of consent elections, whereby objections and 
challenges can be appealed to the Board if losing parties are 
not satisfied with Regional Director decisions. Twenty years 
ago, nearly one-half of all certification elections were 
nonstipulated consent elections. Today, on the other hand, 
only 3-4 percent are nonstipulated consent elections. Given
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that it takes considerably more time to get a Board decision 
than a Regional Director decision, the average delay to 
resolve objections and challenges has obviously increased 
substantially in the last twenty years.
In order to obviate this one-sided peculiar and lengthy ap 
peal procedure, it is recommended that one of two policy 
changes be made. The first alternative would be to allow the 
losing party in Board decisions about objections and 
challenges to appeal directly to the circuit courts, and 
likewise allow the Board to directly seek court enforcement 
of its orders. A second alternative would be to make explicit 
in the NLRA that the Board has final and absolute authority 
regarding disputes over unit determination and campaign 
conduct. In other words, the circuit courts would not enter 
tain any employer objections or challenges to representation 
elections. This latter alternative would simply plug the 
technical refusal-to-bargain loophole that Congress has 
allowed since 1947. With either recommendation, we could 
cut out months of unnecessary procedural delay.
Remedies and Deterrents 
The Make- Whole Provision
The make-whole proposal appears to have two objectives: 
(1) to compensate employees for what would have been ob 
tained had the employer actually bargained in good faith; 
and (2) to deter employers from bargaining in bad faith from 
the start, since they would have to compensate employees 
anyhow for the period in which the employer refused to 
bargain in good faith. However, what was not presented in 
the hearings and testimony, yet seems central to the pro 
posal, is whether or not the union ever prevails in securing a 
first contract—which is, of course, the central focus of this 
study. Are workers to be made whole only in those cases 
where unions eventually obtain contracts or also when con 
tracts are never obtained? The language of the bill and perti 
nent testimony indicates that the provision would only have
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applied to those cases where contracts were eventually ob 
tained.
If we limit the make-whole provision to work units that 
ultimately secure an agreement, then instead of the BLS 
benchmark, an appropriate and more manageable solution 
would be to charge employers retroactively for an increase in 
compensation equivalent to that obtained in the contract 
itself. For example, if compensation was increased by 5 per 
cent in the first year of the contract, the employer would be 
handed a bill for a 5 percent increase covering the period for 
which the Board found the employer in clear and flagrant 
violation of his duties to bargain in good faith. It should be 
emphasized that the Board would order such make-whole 
compenation only in those cases where it is reasonably evi 
dent that the employer was attempting to thwart his respon 
sibilities to negotiate in good faith, not simply exercising his 
rights to "hard bargaining." This alternative proposal does 
not, however, avoid the difficulties of assessing what good 
faith bargaining really is or is not (see chapter 2) but it makes 
the practical matters of calculating fair and reasonable 
remedies much more efficient and specific to the employer. 
Furthermore, this alternative make-whole remedy would ap 
pear to obviate the H.K. Porter snag. That is, given the pro 
posed make-whole remedy would follow the terms settled on 
voluntarily, employers, in effect, would not be compelled to 
grant concessions a la the H.K. Porter logic since they 
presumably would have to come to the given (or similar) 
agreement had they not failed to negotiate in good faith in 
the first place.
But what does one propose for cases in which no contract 
is gotten? This is where the problem arises no matter what 
make-whole scheme is used. The first difficulty is the most 
obvious: Over what time period are workers to be made 
whole? Would it be between the period that bad faith 
behavior begins and the date upon which the union aban 
dons its efforts? If the union fails to gain a first contract and 
establish a long-term relationship, the make-whole remedy is
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nothing more than a hollow victory for the union. More un 
fortunately, however, the make-whole provision may not act 
as a deterrent to recalcitrant employers but rather as an addi 
tional incentive to avoid the first contract altogether. That is, 
the make-whole provision, unless it can be applied in some 
way to those situations in which no contract is gotten, in 
creases the costs of unionization to employers and hence 
would a fortiori induce employers to deny first contracts 
altogether.
In summary, it appears that the make-whole provision is 
not a very effective proposal by which workers' rights to 
union representation would be promoted. The practical ad 
ministrative aspects are burdensome and the courts are likely 
to play havoc with make-whole remedies of this kind because 
of their necessarily speculative nature. More important, 
however, the make-whole provisions would be an incentive 
to many employers to avoid contracts altogether, if indeed, 
make-whole remedies applied only to employers who even 
tually agree to a contract.
Back Pay and Reinstatement
Reimbursing illegally discharged workers more than what 
is reparative of their income loss is anathema to the underly 
ing philosophy of the NLRA. It is interesting to note that 
this philosophy prevailed in both the final House version of 
the labor reform bill and in the Senate's version. The final 
House bill sought double back pay but with mitigation of in 
terim earnings and the Senate subsequently reduced back pay 
to one-and-one-half. As Weiler (1983) points out, the 
"assumption that NLRB remedies should be reparative 
rather than punitive was so pervasive that even the Labor 
Reform Act's supporters defended the measure as a means 
of compensating discharged workers for actual harms suf 
fered over and above lost pay." 32
Since our primary interest in this study is the impact of 
discriminatory discharges and other employer activities upon 
the group's behavior, we must assess whether larger back
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pay awards would act as an effective deterrent to 
disciminatory discharges. Our assessment is that it would 
not—for the following reasons.
First, even double back pay awards (especially with 
mitigation) would prove to be very inexpensive when weigh 
ed against the likely increase in hourly wages once the work 
unit unionizes (actual labor cost increases are bound to be 
much higher on average). Assume the work unit is comprised 
of 100 employees and the average hourly wage is $8.00. Also 
assume that workers work 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per 
year. With a 10 percent increase, the total wage bill would 
rise from $1,664,000 in the first year alone to $1,830,400—a 
$166,400 increase. Say the employer discharges three active 
union adherents. If those three employees earned the average 
annual wage of $16,640 and a settlement was reached after 
one year, the total wage costs to the employer would come to 
$49,920. With mitigation for earnings received during the 
one year interim, the costs would be substantially lower. For 
instance, if the three discharged employees earned an 
average of $8,000 during the interim, the cost to the 
employer in back pay would come to only $24,920. If the in 
itial reform bill provision for double back pay without 
mitigation had become law, and the cost to the employer for 
attorney fees and replacement costs (e.g., recruitment and 
training) were less than $66,000, the employer still gains 
financially by illegally discharging union activists. Given our 
earlier estimates of the impact of discriminatory discharges 
upon the likelihood that employers are able to avoid first 
contracts, the financial gamble is typically a very small one 
for the employer.
Furthermore, even using the above very conservative 
assumptions, in one year the employer recoups his "invest 
ment" in illegal discharges. Since the union wage differential 
would likely persist for many years (if not indefinitely), it is 
difficult to imagine how (under most circumstances) even 
double back pay without mitigation would serve as a signifi-
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cant deterrent to illegal discharges, given that their purpose 
was to defeat the union.
Consider next the role of reinstatement along with back 
pay awards. Available evidence indicates that a large propor 
tion of illegally discharged employees are never reinstated in 
their previous jobs. According to NLRB records, of the 
26,631 employees receiving back pay from employers in 
1981, only 6,463 were also offered reinstatement. Assuming 
that 90 percent of these workers were illegally discharged, 
only 27 percent were offered reinstatement. Approximately 
22 percent of these turned down reinstatement offers. 
Another 14 percent of illegally discharged employees were 
placed on preferential hiring lists. According to a 1982 U.S. 
General Accounting Office report, only 39 percent of their 
sample of 151 illegally discharged workers (who were involv 
ed in union election campaigns) were offered reinstatement 
as part of their settlement. Only 69 percent of those offered 
reinstatement returned to their former employers. Stephens 
and Chancy (1974) found in their investigation of a sample 
of 217 discharged employees that only 41 percent of those of 
fered reinstatement agreed to reinstatement. However, one- 
third of those agreeing to reinstatement were merely placed 
on preferential hiring lists; and 42 percent of these workers 
were never rehired. Overall, therefore, only 32 percent of 
workers offered reinstatement in the Stephens and Chancy 
sample eventually returned to work for their former 
employers. Furthermore, of those reinstated, approximately 
68 percent had left their jobs within six months.
The evidence suggests that not only is discriminatory 
discharge activity financially inexpensive to the employer, in 
the great majority of cases it appears that discriminating 
employers are able to keep union supporters from returning 
to work. This has two long-run effects upon union organiz 
ing success. First, an employer demonstrates loudly and 
clearly to his workforce that he can effectively prevail over
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the law when it comes to diseriminatorily discharging union 
activists. The message is: "If I don't want you around, you 
won't be around. The law won't protect your rights to union 
activity or your job." The second effect is that union ac 
tivists will not be back to help later in organizing the workers 
where the union lost the election or failed to get the first con 
tract. Hence, neither the present practice nor the double 
back pay without mitigation proposal for remedying 
discriminatory discharges is likely to deter employers from 
engaging in violations of section 8(a)(3).
Injunctions
Of all the labor law reform provisions proposed, 
modified, and withdrawn during 1977 Labor Reform Bill 
hearings, requiring the NLRB to automatically process 
meritorious discriminatory discharge cases as 10(1) priority 
complaints is the only one suitably designed to effectively 
eliminate the incentive to employers to illegally discharge 
union activists. Temporary injunctions have promise of 
eliminating such illegal employer coercion because suffi 
ciently quick reinstatements will cause such behavior to 
backfire. That is, employees will see vindictive employers for 
what they are but simultaneously not be intimidated since the 
law will be there to protect their rights. In turn, above-board 
campaigns and legitimate hard bargaining will prove to be 
the more successful routes for employers wanting to avoid 
union representation and to minimize the cost of first con 
tracts.
It is important to note that opponents to bringing 
discriminatory discharges under the purview of 10(1) attack 
ed the proposal on grounds that it would flood the NLRB 
and district courts. In addition, it was argued that 10(j) in 
junctions and other remedies were already available, which 
could be used more widely. No one seriously opposed the 
provision because it would undercut any traditional underly 
ing philosophy of U.S. labor law, that discriminatory
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discharges should not be enjoined, or that employers would 
be able to readily circumvent the application of injunctions. 
In fact, it is important to bear in mind that the Landrum- 
Griffin Act amended the NLRA, giving the handling of 
discriminatory discharges priority treatment right behind 
Section 10(1) cases. As Section 10(m) reads:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged 
in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 
subsection (a)(3) or (b)(2) of Section 8, such charge 
shall be given priority over all other cases except 
cases of like character in the office where it is filed 
or to which it is referred and cases given priority 
under subsection (1).
Hence, it would appear that the stage is nicely set for bring 
ing 8(a)(3) charges under the wing of 10(1) injunctions.
With respect to the availability of existing remedies (10(j) 
injunctions, reinstatement, back pay, and setting aside elec 
tions), none is sufficient to block discriminatory discharges. 
First, the evidence presented above makes it pretty clear that 
potential back pay and reinstatement awards are not deter 
rents to many employers. Second, setting aside elections due 
to egregious employer misconduct and consequently either 
rerunning the election or issuing a bargaining order are also 
obviously having little effect upon deterring employers from 
making unlawful discharges. Moreover, winning a rerun 
election or obtaining a Gissel-type bargaining order is of lit 
tle value if the union cannot force the employer to negotiate 
in good faith over the first contract.
Seeking 10(j) injunctions to block discriminatory 
discharges has rarely been utilized by the NLRB. Recent 
reports by the General Counsel show that only a handful of 
10(j) injunctions are requested in any given year. 33 The 
criteria used by district courts to decide on 10(j)s vary great 
ly. Furthermore, the 10(j) procedure does not provide priori 
ty treatment. According to the only data available, Helm
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(1983) reports that it takes a median time of 113 days to get 
an issuance of a court order subsequent to the initial filing of 
a section 10(j) petition. If discharged employees cannot be 
reinstated quickly, i.e., sufficiently before an election is held 
if discharged during the election campaign period, and in the 
early months of first-contract negotiations if discharged 
subsequent to winning an election, then the debilitating im 
pact of discriminatory discharge on the group rights is not 
obviated.
Finally, utilization of the 10(j) provision is strictly at the 
discretion of the NLRB. Given our discussion in chapter 2 of 
the NLRB's regularly changing political makeup and conse 
quent prounion or promanagement leanings, it would be im 
portant to mandate that the Board proceed under specified 
criteria to petition the courts for section 10(1) relief. Con 
sider, for instance, a recent statement made before a House 
subcommittee by Laurence Gold (Special Counsel to the 
AFL-CIO).
A comparison of the Board's grants and denials of 
authorization in [10(j)] cases against unions and 
those against employers . . .reveals a striking dif 
ference. Since the present chairman took office, 
nearly one out of every two recommendations to 
seek 10(j) injunctions against an employer was re 
jected, whereas every injunction but one sought 
against unions was authorized. In comparison, the 
'old' Board's treatment of unions and employers 
was roughly equal. 34
The most compelling argument against 10(1) injunctive 
relief is the perceived administrative bottleneck to be incur 
red from handling a larger caseload. But as I will argue 
below, there is good reason to believe that the deterrent ef 
fect of prospective injunctions can reduce rapidly and per 
manently the growing number of illegal discharges and 
8(a)(3) violation complaints before the Board.
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According to estimates by the NLRB General Counsel's 
office, about 95 percent of 8(a)(3) violation complaints in 
volve discharges and 90 percent of these are believed to be 
associated with union organizing—either during the election 
campaign or during first-contract negotiations. Also the 
Board estimates that 40 percent of all ULP charges are 
meritorious and that one can conservatively anticipate a 50 
percent settlement rate prior to 10(1) trials. Using these 
NLRB estimates, Smisek (1983) estimates that there would 
have been approximately 2,800 section 10(1) trials in fiscal 
year 1979. In comparison to the 1979 total federal district 
court caseload of 11,764 cases, application of section 10(1) to 
discriminatory discharges associated with union organizing 
would have increased the district courts' caseload by 24 per 
cent.
The projected increase in NLRB processing of discharge 
cases before the district courts would also place an added 
burden on the NLRB. The board has estimated that it would 
require 9.2 attorney days per 10(1) trial, which translates into 
102 new attorneys to handle the case load projected by 
Smisek. Of course, there would be the added costs of in 
creasing regional office investigative agents to handle the ex 
pedited nature of these cases. The Board has projected a 33 
percent increase in the number of agents needed and an in 
crease in clerical support by a ratio of one clerical worker per 
two new professionals. Obviously, a several million dollar 
increase in the NLRB budget would, therefore, be required.
As illustrated rather dramatically in table 2-4, there has 
been a steady and rapid increase in 8(a)(3) charges. Not only 
is the current level of discriminatory discharges unacceptably 
high, one can reasonably presume that the incidence will 
continue to climb (given the evidence that discriminatory 
discharges have a substantial impact upon keeping unions 
out of the workplace). The question here, of course, is 
whether or not we as a public feel compelled to pay the costs 
associated with utilizing 10(1) injunctions and whether or not
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10(1) will eventually reduce discriminatory discharges (and 
concurrently reduce the financial burden).
The central issue to be evaluated, therefore, is whether or 
not the application of 10(1) injunctions to discriminatory 
discharges will indeed effectively diminish the practice of 
discriminatory discharge. There is good reason to believe 
that it can, albeit perhaps not in the very short run. First, it 
can be argued that quick reinstatement of discharged union 
activists would do more than simply neutralize the organiz 
ing and negotiation environments; it would given unions 
added advantage because workers would see the 
discriminatory behavior of the employer as vindictive and 
hostile toward union representation. Discriminatory 
discharges would play nicely into the hands of union 
organizers who would be able to demonstrate the "true col 
ors" of the discriminating employer and simultaneously 
demonstrate that union representation can protect workers 
from employer coercion and threats to their jobs. The real 
threat of quick reinstatement with back pay, therefore, 
would stand as a significant, if not powerful, disincentive to 
employers to utilize discriminatory discharges as an inexpen 
sive means of busting union organizing efforts. The 
employer would likely fare considerably better in keeping the 
union out by playing the game above-board rather than 
punching below the belt.
If utilization of 10(1) injunctions is to hold promise, 
reinstatement of illegally discharged union supporters would 
have to be fairly swift, especially during certification elec 
tions where the campaign period may only be one or two 
months in comparison to several months of negotiations 
over first contracts.
Unfortunately, there are no complete published data (and 
the NLRB tabulates no unpublished figures of their own) on 
the length of time involved in processing section 10(1) peti 
tions. Some parts of the picture were reported in a special 
NLRB task force report in 1976, however. Based on a 1972 
General Counsel memorandum, it was reported that it took
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at the median approximately seven days from filing of a 
10(l)-related ULP charge to obtain a regional determination 
and another five days to file 10(1) petitions. 35 In cases sub 
mitted to the Board for advice, it took another seven to eight 
days for submission of advice. It took a median of three days 
to petition the courts once the Board's advice was given. 
However, no statistics were made available in the memoran 
dum with respect to how long it took for the Board to give its 
advice, nor how long it took the courts to decide to impose 
injunctive relief. Furthermore, no evidence was given as to 
the proportion of cases submitted to Washington for advice.
Assuming, however, that the Board takes a median of 10 
days to give its advice, that another 10 days are needed for 
district courts to hold a trial and issue an injunction, and 
that all new cases involving discriminatory discharges will re 
quire submission to the Board for advice, it would take a me 
dian of 43 days from filing of the charge to issuance of a 
10(1) injunction. As pointed out by the opponents of the 10(1) 
amendment, there is likely to be further delay in deciding 
upon the merits of discriminatory discharge complaints 
because they involve more complex circumstances than the 
legality of union picketing and boycotting and they involve 
determining employer motive. Assuming it takes another 
10-12 days to resolve questions of merit, the projected me 
dian delay would be roughly 55 days.
With respect to discharges during first-contract negotia 
tions, a median 55-day reinstatement period would very like 
ly serve its purpose and hence have a substantial deterrent ef 
fect. In contrast, the 55-day median would be generally inef 
fective during short-lived election campaigns. An employer 
could easily time discharges so that the union supporters 
were out of the way until after the election. Given the blatant 
purpose underlying discriminatory discharges and the 
serious impact on the group of such discharges, it would be 
wholly consistent with present NLRB policy and practice to 
order rerun elections and issue bargaining orders. Before the 
rerun election, the illegally discharged employee(s) would be 
reinstated and the employer's ploy would very likely
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backfire. It is recommended, therefore, that the Board 
recognize the seriousness of discriminatory discharges as 
they indisputably "interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of 
the NLRA." Recognition of this by the Board should 
automatically (or nearly so) trigger rerun elections if not 
bargaining orders. Once it becomes evident to employers 
that even "timely" discharges in election campaigns will 
shortly thereafter frustrate their attempts to illegally under 
mine union organizing, the disincentive will prove sufficient 
to substantially reduce the occurrence of discriminatory 
discharges.
Let us now address more specifically several of the 
arguments against the use of Section 10(1) injunctions in 
discriminatory discharge cases. Weiler (1983) suggests that 
the rate of Section 8(a)(3) complaints and subsequent 10(1) 
proceedings might rise because neither party will be willing 
to "settle" voluntarily. On one hand, he argues that 
employees would have less incentive to settle for back pay 
without reinstatement if, indeed, injunctive relief were 
available. At first glance, one would have to agree. Given the 
evidence presented in the U.S. GAO (1982) and Stephens and 
Chancy (1974) studies, discharged union supporters have lit 
tle reason to want to return to the employer—especially, one 
can imagine, where it is apparent the union has been busted 
in its effort to represent the work group. The kind of volun 
tary settlement Weiler alludes to, however, is really nothing 
more than a means of "buying off" discharged employees. 
However, because employers would no longer be able to 
cheaply buy off discharged employees, they would have less 
incentive to discharge employees in the first place, i.e., the 
deterrent effect becomes even greater.
With respect to the other side of the coin, Weiler argues 
that "if an employer were serious about resisting the union, 
he would not settle voluntarily for reinstatement before the 
election." 36 I think we have to agree, but, as proposed 
above, it is recommended that in those cases in which 
employers do not settle voluntarily before the election, the
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Board would automatically order a rerun election based 
simply on any meritorious complaints of discriminatory 
discharge. Again, it seems likely that the employer has more 
to lose from the eventual rebuff to his behavior than he can 
expect to gain from discriminatory discharges.
Smisek's (1983) fear that employers who lawfully 
discharged workers during union organizing efforts but saw 
these employees reinstated via 10(1) injunctions would not 
eventually litigate cases through the NLRB and courts ap 
pears to be unfounded. Where employers strongly believe 
that their activity was not motivated by antiunion animus, 
they would still have good reason to litigate to protect their 
rights to lawfully discharge employees. Furthermore, one 
would have to doubt that the disincentive to litigate cases 
subsequent to temporary restraining orders would be much 
different than we would find presently for unions that have 
been enjoined under Section 10(1) for illegal concerted activ 
ity. We cannot expect to rectify all the weaknesses of the law 
governing union-management relations, but in all fairness 
we can insist that what is fed to the goose, be fed to the 
gander.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our policy recommendations are designed 
to (1) halt discriminatory discharges preceding certification 
elections and during first-contract negotiations and (2) ex 
pedite NLRB case handling of objections and challenges and 
employer refusals to bargain. Short of legally forcing 
employers to sign first contracts, we see no way to legally 
compel employers to bargain in good faith. Instead, our 
recommendations are expected to substantially increase 
union bargaining power. Unions in turn will necessarily have 
to utilize this increased power to economically force 
recalcitrant employers to fulfill their duty to bargain. In 
short, our recommendations will better allow workers to re 
main cohesive during first-contract negotiations, increasing 
the potency of strike threats and concerted activity.
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The purpose of this study has been to investigate the fac 
tors that explain why 25-30 percent of the time unions fail to 
obtain contracts after winning the right to negotiate con 
tracts in secret ballot representation elections. Several of 
these factors have major implications for public policy as 
they are tied to labor relations law and its application to 
union organizing. In order to fully understand the workings 
of the law and the implications of our findings upon ap 
propriate public policy reform, we began with a historical 
overview of American labor law and a detailed examination 
of the policies, practices, and experience of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which regulates labor- 
management relations and union organizing in the private 
sector. We then described our research design and findings 
of an investigation of the factors that impact upon the 
likelihood that unions obtain or fail to obtain first contracts. 
Finally, we drew upon our findings and knowledge of the 
law to prescribe changes in public policy to better effectuate 
the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
In this final chapter, we summarize the salient points of each 
chapter.
In chapter 1 we sketched out the history of labor law in the 
United States, beginning with the treatment of unions as 
criminal conspiracies in the early 1800s, then as monopolistic
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entities in the early 1900s, subsequently as torchbearers for 
the working class from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, and 
finally as tightly regulated associations.
Prior to 1947, our labor relations legal environment swung 
slowly from one extreme in which the hands of unions were 
tied behind their backs to the other extreme where their 
hands were free. Since 1947, the legal system has attempted 
to restrain the hands of both unions and employers, seeking 
the peaceful resolution of disputes by balancing the power of 
both parties and restricting activities disruptive to commerce 
and, hence, the public. Based on the evidence presented in 
this report, the current application and inadequate enforce 
ment of the law is allowing the pendulum to swing out of 
balance.
That the pendulum has swung out of balance has been the 
topic of considerable ongoing public debate. Indeed, during 
June 1984, several days of oversight hearings were conducted 
by the U.S. House of Representatives' Labor Subcommittee 
on Labor-Management Relations and the Government 
Operations Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing. 
Below is the opening statement of Chairman William Clay 
(Democrat from Missouri), Subcommittee on Labor- 
Management Relations.
Today we begin three days of hearings to ex 
amine the question "has labor law failed?" It is my 
belief that labor-management relations is currently 
undergoing one of the most difficult periods since 
the original enactment of the Wagner Act nearly 
fifty years ago. ... In the nineteen thirties, labor 
leadership was in the forefront of the struggle to 
enact the very same law many leaders now claim 
should be abolished. . . . These changed views and 
perceptions on the part of labor leaders and 
workers, regardless of their validity, have under 
mined the single most important underpinning of
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the collective bargaining process, faith in the 
fairness of the system. 1
Most of the testimony made before the two subcommittees 
focused upon union organizing protections and the shifting 
direction of the Reagan Board. The following statements are 
illustrative of the testimony.
The NLRB was originally established to move 
labor management relations out of the 'law of the 
jungle. 5 The idealogues appointed by the Reagan 
Administration have accelerated a process that 
began years ago to gut the protections for workers 
contained in the labor laws of this country. As a 
result, labor-management relations is back in the 
jungle. . . .
Forget the long procedure to get justice—a 
justice that would be overturned when it reached 
the Board anyway.
Forget the false hopes we'd been giving workers 
that the NLRB would protect their rights.
Now, we tell those workers who want to join our 
union—'if your employer fires you for union ac 
tivity, we'll strike him.'
'We'll give him a taste of his own medicine.'
In other words, because the UFCW cannot rely 
on the NLRB for justice, we'll get it ourselves.
We'll get it in the streets if necessary. 2
William H. Wynn, President
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union
In answer to the question, 'Have the labor laws 
failed?' I would have to respond, emphatically, no. 
The changes in Board law which we have witnessed 
in recent months have restored needed balance and 
even-handedness to the law. These corrections are 
long overdue and are proof that the NLRA has not 
failed. Instead, they are proof that the labor laws
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are working. The viability of this self-correction 
process should be a source of enthusiasm for the 
Act, not dire and misleading claims that the Act has 
'failed'. ... If the labor laws break down 
sometime in the future, it will not be because of 
Board decisions. Rather, those who have embarked 
on a negative strategy which encourages disrespect 
for law, the Board and the Act, will have 
themselves to thank. 3
John S. Irving, former General
Counsel of the NLRB, and
Management Attorney, Kirkland
and Elis, Washington, DC
It is not our purpose to weigh the merits of the most recent 
Board decisions or to deduce any antiunion animus on the 
part of Reagan appointees. Clearly, however, current Board 
decisions are generally unfavorable to unions. Nor has it 
been our purpose to examine the NLRA and NLRB pro 
cedures and practices in their totality. Serious inequities in 
the law and in its application are likely to exist (and persist) 
for workers, unions, and employers. Instead, our purpose 
here has been to examine through empirical research (not in 
tended to be prounion or promanagement in its design or 
through statistical inference) those factors that impact upon 
first-contract negotiation outcomes. The findings of this 
research must speak for themselves and the policy recom 
mendations must be seen in light of the findings. Given the 
current debate over the broader question of "has labor law 
failed?" additional research examining other potential 
failures is clearly needed. Until that research is completed, 
however, prematurely abandoning our present labor law is 
likely to be exacerbating for all parties (including the public) 
and in the end be self-defeating for all.
In chapter 2 we described the structure, policies, pro 
cedures, and case flow of the NLRB. In its role as regulator 
of labor-management relations in the private sector, the 
NLRB wears two hats—one to conduct and regulate 
representation elections and to resolve disputes arising
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therefrom and one to resolve unfair labor practice (ULP) 
disputes as defined by the NLRA. Of particular importance 
to the present inquiry, we reviewed the policies and practices 
of the NLRB regarding bargaining unit determination, ap 
propriate campaign conduct, the resolution of objections 
and challenges to representation elections, bargaining 
orders, rerun elections, employer refusals to bargain, and 
employer discrimination against union activists.
By fiscal year 1981 (the latest figures available), the NLRB 
was inundated with over 43,000 ULP charges and took in 
another 12,500 representation cases. The 1981 ULP case 
load reflected a seven-and-one-half-fold increase since 1950. 
In 1981 objections were filed in more than 15 percent of elec 
tions lost by employers, up from 5.7 percent in 1965. The 
Board issued a total of 53 bargaining orders to employers 
committing egregious campaign conduct violations in 1979 
(the latest figures available), which was only 40 percent of 
the total bargaining orders issued in 1965. The Board also 
ordered elections to be rerun in 147 cases in 1981 (of a total 
of 6,656 elections held), which reflected a modest drop from 
the 188 rerun elections in 1965. However, unions won only 
30 percent of the rerun elections in 1981, whereas in 1965 
they won about 44 percent. These figures can be compared to 
a union victory rate in all certification elections of 45 percent 
in 1981 and 65 percent in 1965.
There were nearly 10,000 charges against employers for 
refusal to bargain in good faith in 1981, a seven-and-one- 
half-fold increase since 1950. Of all the employer or union 
ULP charges brought before the NLRB, charges of employer 
discrimination against union activists top the list. In 1981, 
over 25,000 workers received back pay because of employer 
discrimination, more than 11 times the 1950 figure of 2,250.
Finally, it should be emphasized in our summary that 
there is considerable procedural delay associated with resolv 
ing ULP complaints. ULP charges are first brought before 
the various regional and subregional offices. Here the offices 
investigate ULP charges, dismissing charges or convincing 
complainants to withdraw charges approximately two-thirds
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of the time. Another 15 percent of charges (deemed 
meritorious by the NLRB) are "settled" at this informal 
stage. In 1981, the median delay associated with all this in 
formal activity was 44 days. The remaining charges become 
formal complaints and in 1981, 12 percent of the total 
caseload was settled after issuance of a formal complaint but 
prior to administrative law judge decisions. The median 
delay for this step was an additional 173 days. The remaining 
cases work their way through AL J decisions (adding another 
139 days at the median in 1981) and appeals to the five- 
member Board in Washington, DC (adding yet another 120 
days at the median in 1981). Hence, for those cases needing 
resolution at the Board level (over 1,200 in 1981) a median 
delay of 490 days was incurred in 1981. Those Board deci 
sions and orders appealed to the circuit courts of appeal or 
requiring circuit court enforcement generally take at least 
another year to process. In conclusion, the issue of delay is 
obviously important to the analysis of first-contract negotia 
tions because unions cannot legally require employers to 
negotiate first contracts until all objections and challenges to 
elections are resolved. Because employers can take un 
favorable Board rulings concerning objections and 
challenges to the appellate courts via technical refusals to 
bargain, procedural delay in resolving these disputes takes an 
inordinate amount of time.
In chapter 3 we estimated the impact of selected variables 
on the probability that unions obtain first contracts. 
Hypotheses were derived from a theory of relative bargain 
ing power which holds that factors that increase a union's 
power vis-a-vis the employer's power, increase the likelihood 
that first contracts will be obtained. Variables reflecting 
labor costs, the economic environment, the sociopolitical en 
vironment (including legal factors), organizational 
characteristics, and relative negotiating skills were identified 
as salient determinants of first-contract negotiation out 
comes. Empirical models employing these variables were 
then specified to test our hypotheses against two samples of 
data (collected and compiled from a variety of data sources, 
including surveys of union representatives).
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It was found that 23 percent of our sample of unions from 
Indiana and 28 percent nationwide failed to obtain first con 
tracts. The statistically significant results of our tests can be 
summarized as follows.
• Unions negotiating with firms having relatively high 
wages vis-a-vis the firm's industry were more likely to 
obtain contracts.
• Unions negotiating contracts with firms in which 
separate bargaining units were already under contract 
with the union were more likely to obtain first con 
tracts.
• In southern states with state right-to-work laws, 
unions were less likely to obtain contracts than in 
other states.
• Where the percent of workers voting for union 
representation was higher and the size of the work 
unit was larger, unions were more successful in ob 
taining agreements.
• In those negotiations in which national union 
representatives were involved in negotiations, unions 
were more successful in reaching agreements.
• Where the national union required national approval 
of local first-contract agreements, unions were less 
successful in obtaining agreements.
• The delay associated with NLRB resolution of 
employer objections and/or challenges to union elec 
tion victories sharply reduced the chances of unions 
obtaining first contracts.
• Employer refusals to bargain substantially reduced 
the chances of unions obtaining first contracts.
• Discriminatory discharges and other forms of illegal 
discrimination against union activists have a dramatic 
negative impact on the likelihood that unions obtain 
contracts.
It is the latter three findings that demonstrate the need for 
labor law reform. In chapter 4 we tackled the evaluation of
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various proposals for labor law reform. The three key areas 
of recommended changes stem from our need to expedite 
NLRB proceedings, to block discriminatory discharges of 
union activists, and to induce recalcitrant employers to 
negotiate in good faith.
Toward expediting NLRB case handling, several proposals 
in the Labor Reform Bill of 1977 were first evaluated. We 
dismissed the proposals that would (1) allow the Board to 
make summary judgements of uncontested ALJ recommen 
dations and (2) make Board orders not appealed within 30 
days, automatically enforced by the appellate courts. We 
dismissed these proposals on the grounds that employers 
who primarily seek to forestall their duty to bargain would 
invariably, through legal maneuvering, frustrate the best in 
tentions of these proposals.
The proposal to enlarge the Board to seven members with 
seven-year appointments (while continuing to rely on three- 
member panels for much of the decisionmaking) has the best 
chance of the three reform bill provisions to expedite NLRB 
case handling. Here at least the speeding up of the process is 
dependent upon the Board's ability to efficiently manage a 
larger Board and not upon the imagination of defendants to 
circumvent new case handling procedures.
Based on our finding of the large negative impact of the 
delayed resolution of employer objections and challenges 
upon first-contract negotiations, it is recommended that ob 
jections and challenges be subject to court review just as are 
ULP complaints. This would obviate the need to reroute the 
resolution of employer objections and challenges through 
the technical refusal-to-bargain ULP complaint procedure. 
Those employers who want circuit court review of NLRB 
decisions would not be denied that review but at the same 
time would not be able to forestall their duty to bargain the 
additional months it now takes under the current resolution 
scheme. Furthermore, unions who receive unfavorable
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Board decisions regarding objections and challenges would 
likewise be afforded (for the first time) the same right to 
court review.
An alternative policy would be to amend the NLRA to 
make it explicit that NLRB decisions regarding objections 
and challenges are not reviewable by the courts. Here we 
would eliminate any right of employers to technically refuse 
to bargain. This alternative would eliminate the long delays 
typically associated with circuit court decisionmaking.
One provision of the Labor Reform Bill required the 
Board to establish guidelines for providing make-whole 
remedies to entire work groups who were denied the benefit 
of union contracts during periods when employers refused to 
bargain in good faith. The purpose of providing make-whole 
remedies was to deter employers from bargaining in bad 
faith since if they did, they would still be compelled to 
retroactively compensate work units. The fundamental flaw 
in the proposal stems from the underlying assumption that 
unions ultimately obtain first contracts. That of course is a 
spurious assumption. Unless we are willing to dictate im 
proved terms and conditions of employment for work units 
who never come under contract, the make-whole remedy can 
be seen as an additional incentive to deny first contracts 
altogether. Hence, we recommend against the make-whole 
proposal.
Finally, in chapter 4 we discuss proposals to reduce 
discriminatory discharges of union activists. Two proposals 
were developed in the Labor Reform Bill to deter employers 
from such illegal behavior. The first proposal was to increase 
the size of the present back pay award (i.e., lost earnings 
with mitigation). As a means of deterring illegal discharges 
and, in turn, improving the chances of unions to obtain first 
contracts, we conclude that even double back pay (without 
mitigation) would be insufficient. The problem with the pro 
posal is twofold. First, even double back pay awards without
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mitigation would be insufficiently costly in most cir 
cumstances to offset the expected long-run "gain" (i.e., 
keeping unions out of the workplace). The fact is that the 
price to the employer of a few well placed discharges is quite 
modest at best. The second problem is that unless the 
discharged employees are reinstated and the employer's vin 
dictive behavior is thus rebuffed, larger back pay awards will 
not reduce the implied threat of further employer reprisals. 
In short, discharged employees must be reinstated, but as 
reported in chapter 2, only a minority ever are.
We can turn next to the heart of the problem—the need 
for quick reinstatement. Here we suggest turning to man 
datory temporary court injunctions. Although the NLRB is 
given the discretion to seek temporary injunctions against 
discriminating employers under section 10(j) of the NLRA, it 
has failed to use this option except in a handful of cases. The 
10(j) procedure is also inherently too slow to satisfy the need 
for reasonably quick reinstatements. It was proposed in the 
Labor Reform Bill that the Board be compelled under the 
automatic injunction provision of the NLRA [section 10(1)] 
to seek injunctions in discriminatory discharge cases. Of all 
the recommendations to thwart that minority of employers 
who stoop to discriminatory discharges in order to bust 
union organizing, this recommendation holds the greatest 
promise. However, we must modify the proposal to insure 
that a successful deterrent is developed. Besides the 
assurance of reinstatement, timeliness of reinstatement re 
mains important. Even 10(1) injunctive relief takes con 
siderable time. We estimated that it would take an average of 
55 days from the date of discharge to secure a 10(1) injunc 
tion. This delay is likely to be sufficiently short in the case of 
first-contract negotiations, which typically take several 
months to obtain from employers who do bargain in good 
faith. But the 55-day delay is far too long in the case of win 
ning representation rights in the first place. Employers can 
time discharges just prior to election day, insuring that key 
union activists are out of the way during crucial campaign
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periods. To thwart this practice, the NLRB must establish a 
policy that elections lost by unions (where discharges have 
taken place) will be automatically rerun or in the more 
flagrant campaigns involving illegal discharges, the Board 
simply orders employers to recognize and bargain with 
unions. Before the election is rerun the discharged employees 
would be reinstated—a clear rebuff to the employer and a 
clear signal to other workers that the law will indeed protect 
them.By making certain that discharged employees are 
reinstated reasonably quickly and that lost elections accom 
panied by illegal discharges automatically result in rerun 
elections, the deterrent effect of 10(1) injunctions should 
come to light. Employers will simply have more to lose by 
discriminatorily discharging employees than from campaign 
ing and negotiating fairly. The expected outcome, therefore, 
would be a sharp drop in discriminatory discharges. Hence, 
the greatest concern of the opponents of utilizing 10(1) in 
junctions (i.e., that the NLRB regional staff and district 
courts would be overwhelmed by a large and growing 
caseload) would be circumvented.
It is worth noting that none of our recommendations 
directly impede employers from surface bargaining or "go 
ing through the motions" during first-contract negotiations. 
Only the make-whole proposal, which we recommend 
against, directly got to the heart of this problem. Our recom 
mendations, on the other hand, are expected to have a con 
siderable indirect effect upon forcing recalcitrant employers 
to bargain in good faith. By expediting NLRB case handling 
and insuring that discrimination against union activists is 
halted, it is believed that union strength in negotiating first 
contracts will be enhanced substantially. It will be this 
enhanced bargaining power upon which unions will 
necessarily have to rely to economically force recalcitrant 
employers to fulfill their legal duty to bargain.
In conclusion, the research reported in this study began as 
an analysis of the factors that are associated with the failure 
of many unions to parlay union certification election vie-
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tories into union-management agreements. Heretofore no 
such investigation and analysis has been forthcoming. Con 
sequently, the substantial detrimental impact of several ex 
isting regulatory policies and procedures upon the rights of 
workers to union representation has not been systematically 
uncovered. In light of the findings of the present investiga 
tion, it is evident that labor law reform is greatly needed. 
Although we lack any historical evidence that the recommen 
dations made will successfully impede that minority of 
employers who purposely seek to undermine our labor laws, 
it is believed that our policy recommendations hold suffi 
cient promise to justify their implementation.
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APPENDIX
Indiana Sample Questionnaire 
Survey of First-Contract Negotiations
According to NLRB election files,
won representation rights on in a certification election by 
employees of . Please answer to the best of your 
knowledge the questions below which pertain to negotiations following 
this victory.
1. When did contract negotiations begin? _______________
2. Was a contract successfully negotiated? Yes __ No __ Still in 
negotiation __
3. When was contract signed or negotiations dropped? _______
4. Was there an existing union contract with the above employer at 
the time of negotiations?
Yes __(with our union) Yes __(with another union) No __
5. Did representatives from the national union participate in negotia 
tions? Yes __ No __
6. Did negotiations result in a strike? Yes __ No __
7. Was an outside mediator used at any time during negotiations? 
Yes __ No __
8. Did employer go out of business or permanently close the plant that 
employed workers in the certified unit?
No __ Yes __(before contract signed) Yes __(after contract 
signed)
9. What do you consider to the the greatest barrier(s) to negotiating 
the first contract?
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10. Would you be willing to be interviewed about negotiations in 
general? Yes __ No __ Name ______ Phone _____
11. Would you like to receive a copy of the final report? 
Yes __ No __
To return, enclose survey in return envelope. Thank you again for your 
response.
Nationwide Sample Questionnaire 
Survey of First-Contract Negotiations
According to NLRB election files, ____________________ 
won representation rights during ___________________ in a 
certification election by employees of __________________,
Please answer to the best of your knowledge the questions below which 
pertain to negotiations following this victory.
1. Was a contract successfully negotiated? Yes __ No __ 
Still in negotiation __
2. Approximately how long did it take to sign the contract or drop 
negotiations altogether? ____________
3. Was there an existing union contract with the above employer at 
the time of negotiations? 
Yes __(with our union) Yes __(with another union) No __
4. Did representatives from the national union participate in negotia 
tions? Yes __ No __
5. Did negotiations result in a strike? Yes __ No __
6. Was an outside mediator used at any time during negotiations? 
Yes __ No __
7. Did employer use any outside management consultants for negotia 
tions? Yes __ No __ Don't know __
8. Did you file any unfair labor practice complaints against the 
employer? No __ Yes __ 
If yes, please describe complaint and NLRB decisions.
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9. Was a union security clause negotiated into the contract? 
Yes __ No __
10. What length of contract was negotiated? _____ years
11. Did employeer go out of business or permanently close the plant 
that employed workers in the certified unit? 
No __ Yes __(before contract signed) Yes __(after contract 
signed)
12. What do you consider to be the greatest barrier(s) to negotiating the 
first contract? ____________________________
13. What is the size of your local? __ members __ workers covered 
by contracts
14. Approximately how many non-managerial employees are employed 
by this employer at the facility where workers were organized?
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